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RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


BY LOTHROP STODDARD 


RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 

THE REVOLT AGAINST CIVILIZATION 
THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 

THE RISING TIDE OF COLOR AGAINST 


WHITE WORLD-SUPREMACY 


CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS 


RACIAL REALITIES 
IN KUROPE 


BY 
LOTHROP STODDARD, oe ae ae D. (Harv.) 


AUTHO OF ‘THE NEW WO 
‘THE RISING TID eee 
‘““THE STAKES OF THE sas 
*“*THE REVOLT AGAINST CIVILIZATION’’ 


NEW YORK 
CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS 
1924 


Coprricnt, 1924, sy 
CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS 


COPYRIGHT, 1924, BY CURTIS PUBLISHING COMPANY 





Printed in the United States of America 





FOREWORD 


THE scientific discoveries of the past generation have 
clearly revealed the vital importance of the racial factor 
in human affairs. Race, hitherto disregarded or mini- 
mized, is now seen to be the basic element in the destinies 
of peoples. 

This momentous discovery makes necessary a re-inter- 
pretation of both history and current events. That does 
not mean neglecting traditional factors like soil, climate, 
ideals, and institutions. It does, however, mean a re- 
examination of Man’s past and present in which the racial 
factor shall be duly recognized and its significance appre- 
ciated. Only thus can we attain the wider, clearer vision 
which our troubled times so urgently need. 

This book attempts a brief survey of Europe along 
these lines. It makes no pretension to either complete- 
ness or finality. It is frankly a pioneering sketch. My 
hope is that others may be stimulated to enter and ex- 
plore this largely uncharted field. 


-Lorsarop STODDARD. 
BROOKLINE, MASSACHUSETTS 
July 29, 1924. 


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CONTENTS 


CHAPTER PAGH 
I. Racran Rmanrrims In EvROPH ......-e- 1 
PA PPVINDIROD / ESRITALN at itiry onthe Yu taut dhe Mel mi eure 28 
MANO ed TUN GBOTCEINOR DHA hres vais Gavel alse twist ee oN < 50 
NM IMPORUE TS RAN COB.) Og? Yel ec gi taul a ty) Satine 71 
V. Tae MEDITERRANEAN SOUTH.......+.-. 94 
LEON LPINIZE CLE RMANY sila bp lye jratie a iletowd etal 8 122 
VII. Disruprep CenTrRAL EUROPE ......46-. 145 
BORLA eA LPIN TE TAS Sipe ot Wel DUN Read ne 167 
CL HC ISALICAN UR Sieh el av Si vette wen will a tat ey ati 200 
X. Tue New Reatism oF SCIENCE ....... 230 
RR a hog wits Danae egy ee ehcaln sybeevwet es Falta hla 247 
MAPS 


PRESENT DISTRIBUTION OF EKUROPEAN RACES 
Facing page 6 
(From ‘‘ The Passing of the Great Race,’’ by Madison Grant) 
PuysicaL Map oF EuRoPE ...... Facing page 12 


LANGUAGE Map or Europp ...... Facing page 124 


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RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


CHAPTER I 
RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


Nort long ago a well-known British scientist was showing 
me his collection of Egyptian antiquities. Up and down 
the long museum hall we strolled, gazing at the innumer- 
able relics of a remote past. Safely ensconced in glass- 
covered cases, these exiles from the sunny land of the 
Pharaohs looked strangely alien in the gray light of a 
London afternoon. Presently the scientist halted before 
a show-case. 

“Here,” said he, tapping the glass with his forefinger 
—“here is something which to a student of racial mat- 
ters like yourself will be of peculiar interest.” 

I looked. The case was filled with little heads and 
busts made of burnt clay, or terra-cotta. There were 
more than a hundred of them, neatly arranged in long 
rows. 

“These little busts,” went on the scientist, ‘were made 
to represent the different types of foreigners residing in 
the city of Memphis shortly after the Persian conquest 
of Egypt, about 2,500 years ago. Apparently made for 
the purpose of being carried in some sacred procession, 
they were deposited in a shrine which was recently dis- 


covered by our excavators.” 
1 


2 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


I looked closer—and was filled with astonishment. 
Those ancient busts, modelled after men in their graves 
these 2,500 years, were strangely familiar. Many of 
them looked exactly like men who walk the earth to-day. 
There were Arabs not at all different from the Arabs whom 
I had seen sitting beneath their black Bedouin tents or 
swaying upon camels crossing the desert. sands. 

There were Armenians indistinguishable from Arme- 
nians whom I had viewed by thousands in refugee camps 
throughout the Near East. There were negroes just like 
Georgia cotton-pickers, and there was a Jew who might 
have stepped in off Broadway. 

Furthermore, there were busts representing historic — 
racial types such as Greeks, Persians, and Babylonians— 
races which no longer exist, yet whose appearance is 
known to us from statuary and kindred relics come down — 
to us from ancient times. Those old Greeks and Per- 
sians depicted in the busts were instantly recognizable as 
the same breeds of men sculptured on the friezes of the 
Athenian Parthenon and on the bas-reliefs of Persia’s 
ruined capital, Persepolis. On the contrary, the busts did 
not in the least resemble modern Greeks and Persians— 
peoples which, though bearing the same names, have 
practically none of the ancient blood. 

Lastly, there were a few busts depicting racial types 
which have perished without leaving even a historic mem- 
ory, so that to-day we have no idea of who they were or 
whence they came. 

To my mind that series of little heads and busts, fash- 
ioned by the deft fingers of old Egyptian craftsmen, is a 
most striking illustration of the mighty drama of man’s 


RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 3. 


racial life athwart the ages. Just think of it! Here we 
have a series of statuettes showing the various types of 
foreigners who walked the streets of an ancient Egyptian 
city. Pass 2,500 years, and what do we find? We find 
that some of those race types still survive relatively un- 
changed; that others have perished, leaving their names 
but not their blood; and that still others have vanished 
so utterly that not even a memory of them remains. 

And all this in 2,500 years! What rapid changes! 
Does that last remark sound strange? Let us, then, re- 
member that man has probably existed for something 
like 500,000 years. Comparing man’s race life with 
man’s individual life, what signifies a couple of thousand 
years? 

Yes, for 500,000 years men have walked the earth— 
men of all sorts and conditions, of the most varied ap- 
pearance and capacity. And for untold ages men have 
been divided into sharply marked races, ranging all the 
way from types so primitive that they looked like apes 
up to types such as the ancient Greeks, who were cer- 
tainly handsomer and probably much more intelligent 
than any human stock now alive. And the great drama 
of man’s race life still unfolds, never more intensely than 
to-day. 

More and more we are coming to realize the funda- 
mental importance of race in human affairs. More and 
more we see that the racial factor lies behind most of the 
world’s problems. This is not solely an academic mat- 
- ter, to be left for the consideration of scientists and his- 
torians; on the contrary, it is about the livest, most prac- 
tical subject that can engage the attention of thinking 


4 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


men and women to-day. A general understanding of 
racial matters is necessary for an intelligent appreciation 
of current events. 

Would you understand what is happening in the world, 
why nations act as they do, what their relations are to 
America, and what our policy should be toward them? 
You cannot fully understand these things unless you have 
some general idea of the racial factors involved. And, 
unless you thus understand, you cannot act so success- 
fully and efficiently in your own every-day activities, 
whether you be banker, manufacturer, politician, farmer, 
professional man or wage-earner. Directly or indirectly, 
these things touch us one and all, both in our common 
capacity as citizens and in our private capacity as in- 
dividuals. 

Especially do we need to regard the racial factor when 
considering Europe, because hitherto in considering Eu- 
ropean affairs that factor has been disregarded. When 
we look at other parts of the world, racial distinctions 
leap to the eye and the racial factor obtains proper recog- 
nition. Who can think of China, India, Mexico, Africa, 
without instantly sensing the significance of race? When 
we turn to Europe, however, we do not at first glance get 
any such clear-cut impression. Of course we may realize 
in a general way that inborn distinctions exist between 
the inhabitants of various European countries, that 
Swedes differ markedly from Spaniards, say, or Russians 
from Englishmen. Still, even then, we are apt to think 
of such differences not so much in terms of race as in 
terms of other things, like nationality, language, religion, 
and culture. We look at the political map of Europe 


RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 5 


and there find a continent divided into a number of na- 
tional states with sharply defined political frontiers, 
jealously independent of one another, emphasizing their 
respective policies, languages, manners, and customs. 
We see them engaged in bitter rivalries and fighting 
bloody wars over just such things. What wonder if we 
come to feel that those are the things which really mat- 
ter, that by comparison other elements in Europe’s prob- 
lems may be relatively disregarded ? 

And yet, is this true? Are there not other factors, 
deep-seated but powerful, working behind the scenes? 
Assuredly there is one such—race. The discoveries of 
modern science reveal more and more clearly the funda- 
mental importance of race in human affairs. Of course 
there are other basic factors to be considered, like climate 
-and soil. Yet even these are not so universal in their 
effects as race, which subtly but inevitably influences 
every phase of human existence. 

Whoever begins looking at Europe from the racial 
angle is astonished at the new light thrown upon its prob- 
lems, at the apparent mysteries that are explained, at 
the former riddles that are solved. Europe’s seemingly 
tangled history grows much simpler, while present-day 
conditions become more understandable. 

Look at a race map of Europe. How it differs from the 
political maps we are accustomed to see! Gone are all 
those intricate national frontiers. Instead of a Europe 
split into many states, we see a Europe inhabited by 
three races. These races are known as the Nordic race, 
the Alpine race, and the Mediterranean race. They have 
all been in Europe for thousands of years, and to them 


6 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


the great bulk of Europe’s present inhabitants belong. 
Only in Eastern Europe do we find a perceptible admix- 
ture of Asiatic elements, while in Southern Europe we 
discover certain infusions of negroid African blood. Both 
these alien elements have, however, entered Europe in 
relatively recent historic times. 

Roughly speaking, the European races spread horizon- 
tally in three broad bands across the European conti- 
nent. To the north le the Nordics, centring about the 
Baltic Sea and stretching from the British Isles to West- 
ern Russia. To the south lie the Mediterraneans, cen- 
tring about the Mediterranean Sea as the Nordics do 
about the Baltic. Between the Nordics and Mediter- 
raneans thrusts the Alpine race, stretching from Russia 
and the Near East clear across mid-Europe until its out- 
posts reach the Atlantic Ocean in Western France and 
Northern Spain. 

These three races differ markedly from one another, 
not merely in physical appearance but also in intellec- 
tual and emotional qualities. Although they have been > 
in Europe for thousands of years, have been in constant 
contact with one another, and have widely intermarried, 
they have never really fused and remain essentially diss 
tinct to-day. Right here we must emphasize the basic 
quality of race—its great persistence. Although the Eu- 
ropean races are unquestionably closer to one another in 
origin than they are to more remote human stocks like 
the yellow Mongolians of Eastern Asia or the African 
negroes, they nevertheless separated ages ago, and for 
ages thereafter remained separate. During that immense 
period of isolation they developed their racial individu- 


LEGEND 
ne PRESENT DISTRIBUTION 


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| | Mediterraneans| ~~ : 
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++ CroMagnon 0) 
aTEaA 


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Madison Grant 


‘ Scale of miles 
oO 100 200 300 





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RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 7 


alities, so that when they met again in Europe they were 
clearly distinct both in physique and in character. 

A glance is enough to distinguish full-blooded represen- 
tatives of these European races. The true Nordic is tall 
and blond, with a long head, blue or gray eyes, and a fair 
skin. The true Mediterranean is short-statured, slen- 
derly built, long-headed like the Nordic, but dark-com- 
plexioned, with black hair and eyes and a skin inclined 
to be more or less swarthy. The pure-blooded Alpine is 
also dark-complexioned, but differs from both the other 
races in being round-skulled. Of medium height, the 
Alpine is of a distinctly heavy build, bones and muscles 
being alike stockier and less gracefully proportioned than 
either the tall Nord or the slight Mediterranean. To 
visualize these race types, call to mind a typical Scandi- 
navian for the Nordic, a Southern Italian or Spaniard for 
the Mediterranean, and an average peasant from Central 
or Eastern Europe for the Alpine. The illustrations 
speak for themselves. : 

Few things are more interesting and enlightening than 
a study of the movements of these races since their emer- 
gence upon the European scene long before the dawn of 
history, many thousands of years ago. The vast migra- 
tions, the brilliant conquests, the striking shifts of for- 
tune from age to age, reveal a mighty drama of which 
the recent war was only a latest episode. For let us 
always remember that the play still goes on, with the 
actors much the same as they were in ancient times. 

This is a fact of the greatest practical importance, be- 
cause these races differ not merely in outward appearance 
but also in mind and in temperament. Thus the relative 


8 RACIAL REALITIES IN Oe ary 


strength and importance of the citer Ace deduite 
in a nation will largely determine every phase of that 
nation’s life, from its manners, customs, and ideals to its 
government and its relations with other nations. Further- 
more, knowledge of its racial make-up will enable us to 
understand many of the changes in a nation’s past and 
also to get a clearer idea of present tendencies, because 
we must not forget that, though races themselves change 
very slowly, the ratio between the racial elements in a 
nation is constantly changing. This occurs not only 
where the racial elements live distinct from one another; 
it is true even where extensive intermarriage has taken 
place. Racial characteristics are about the most per- 
sistent things that we know of. Developed and set by 
ages of isolation and inbreeding, they do not fuse when 
crossed with other characteristics of a different nature. 
On the contrary, they remain distinct in the mixed off- 
spring, and the descendants of such mixed marriages 
tend to sort themselves out as belonging predominantly 
to one or other of the original types, in accordance with 
the hereditary laws applying to their particular cases. 
Europe is a striking example of the persistence of race, 
because the three great European stocks all belong to the 
same main branch of the human species. They are all 
white men and, however remote their common origin 
may have been, they are more closely related to one an- 
other than they are to more distant branches of mankind 
like the yellow races of Eastern Asia or the black races 
of Africa. And yet during the long ages of their separa- 
tion from their original source they so far diverged in 
type that when they met again in Europe they did so as 


RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 9 


true races distinct from one another, and thousands of 
years of contact have not sufficed to fuse them again. 
On the contrary, even in those regions where racial mix- 
ture has been most prolonged and general we find popu- 
lations not fused into new intermediate varieties with 
harmonious, stably blended qualities but composed of ob- 
viously mixed individuals most of whom can be classified 
as belonging mainly to one or other of the ancestral types. 

Furthermore, in those parts of Kurope where race mix- 
ture has not been general or recent, we find the inhabi- 
tants to be mostly of almost pure racial stock. This il- 
lustrates another law of races—the tendency to breed out 
alien strains when these are not too numerous, so that 
such strains ultimately vanish and never reappear in the 
stock. The racial persistence displayed by a long-settled, 
well-acclimated population of homogeneous stock is truly 
extraordinary. This may occur even with small com- 
munities, as shown by the so-called racial islets not in- 
frequently found in various parts of Europe. In such 
cases small communities belonging to one stock have re- 
tained their racial identity for many generations, although 
surrounded by people of another stock. 

A striking illustration of this is the racial islets to be 
found in Norway. The bulk of the Norwegian people 
are pure Nordics—tall, blond, long-skulled, and fair- 
skinned. Yet here and there, in out-of-the-way nooks 
of the Norwegian coast, are found communities most of 
whose inhabitants are relatively short, dark, and round- 
skulled. These people are obviously Alpines, and they 
have been clearly identified as the descendants of Alpines 
who settled along the coasts of Norway thousands of 


10 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


years ago. Yet these people to-day still differ not only 
physically but also intellectually and temperamentally 
from the rest of the population. This is so evident that 
they have always been looked upon as different, almost 
alien, by their Nordic neighbors. 

This illustration shows why the racial make-up of a 
nation is not merely of scientific interest but also of great 
practical importance; because, as already stated, races 
differ from one another as much mentally and tempera- . 
mentally as they do physically, and because such mental 
and temperamental differences are precisely the factors 
which in great part determine national development. 
Thus, in order to understand a nation, we must find out 
its racial make-up. Lastly, we must remember that, 
except in a few cases where a people springs from only 
one race, the racial make-up of a people is not a fixed 
quantity but a highly unstable ratio, which is always 
changing and which may change very rapidly as one 
racial element is favored or penalized by a variety of 
circumstances like wars, revolutions, emigration, immi- 
gration, or social changes such as the growth of city life 
and the factory system. 

Bearing these things in mind, let us see what are the 
broad mental and temperamental characteristics of the 
three European races. We have already observed their 
general physical appearance. Now let us examine their 
inner qualities. 

The Mediterranean race is a distinctly southern type. 
Probably originating in South Central Asia, it entered 
Europe by way of the Mediterranean basin, which has 
ever since remained the centre of the race. The Medi- 


RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 11 


terraneans dislike extreme cold and high mountains, and 
tend to keep fairly close to the sea. Their most northerly 
extension was through France to the British Isles, which 
they settled many thousand years ago and where they 
still form the bulk of the population in Ireland, Wales, 
and some parts of Scotland. It is to be remembered, 
however, that the British Isles have a climate much 
milder than most countries of the same latitude. 

The Mediterranean temperament is emotional, often 
to a high degree. Passionate, excitable, loving and hating 
intensely, yet inclined to fickle changes, the Mediterranean 
is prone to lack stability and tenacity. He is social, yet 
individualistic within his group. Neither in politics nor 
in war has he a high sense of discipline. This, combined 
with his want of tenacity, has made him relatively weak 
in the competition of races. Mediterraneans have usually 
gone down before the attacks of both Nordics and Alpines, 
so that many parts of Europe once held by Mediter- 
raneans are to-day inhabited by Nordic or Alpine stocks. 
Mediterraneans have rarely succeeded in founding strong, 
enduring governments. 

Strong magnetic leaders can do great things with them, 
but the personal element is necessary, and naturally either 
dies with the leader or shifts to some other strong per- 
_ sonality that captivates the fickle multitude. 

The most attractive and certainly the most valuable 
traits of the Mediterranean stock are its artistic gifts— 
its keen sense of beauty, form, and color; its love of music, 
poetry, and other arts; and its general joy of life. The 
Mediterranean intellect is usually quick and often bril- 
liant, though apt to be superficial. The race has, how- 


12 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


ever, produced many men of high intellectual quality, 
particularly in the past. Unfortunately, some branches 
of the stock are racially impaired and impoverished 
to-day, both by a breeding out of the most intelligent 
strains and by the admixture of vast numbers of nonde- 
script, inferior Asiatic and African elements. This is 
clearly the case with the populations of Southern Italy 
and Portugal. Matters are even worse in parts of the 
Near East, inhabited in ancient times by Mediterranean - 
stocks who built up brilliant civilizations, but to-day 
inhabited by mongrel populations of a very poor qual- 
ity. 

The Alpine race originated on the high plateaus of 
West Central Asia, and it has never lost the imprint of 
its ancestral home. It is emphatically a continental 
stock, taking naturally to highlands or to inland plains 
and showing little liking for the sea. The Alpines are a 
sturdy, tenacious race, very stable, but apt to be stolid 
and unimaginative. They have a strong sense of group 
solidarity, stick together, cling to the land wherever they 
settle, and when they do migrate move in groups. ‘This 
is the secret of their successful expansion in Europe. 
The Alpines are not individually so warlike as the Medi- 
terraneans and are far less warlike than the Nordics. 
Their advances have usually been slow and their con- 
quests seldom either rapid or spectacular. Nevertheless, 
these advances, once made, have rarely been lost, at 
least in the racial sense. The great Alpine advances 
have been like glaciers, in solid masses, expelling or over- 
whelming the peoples they encountered and thoroughly 
settling the new territories. Mediterraneans have seemed 














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RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 13 


unable to resist these mass advances. Accordingly, re- 
gions like Central France and Northern Italy, once Medi- 
terranean lands, are to-day mainly Alpine in race. 
Furthermore, Mediterraneans have seldom subdued Al- 
pine peoples and imposed themselves as conquerors. 
For these reasons there has been comparatively little 
mixture between the two races. 

Far different have been the relations between the Al- 
pine and Nordic races. Ever since the dawn of history 
the restless, energetic Nordics have been coming down 
upon the Alpines, overwhelming their territories and set- 
ting themselves up as masters. Wherever the odds have 
not been too great the Nordics have usually won the bat- 
tles. Yet the fact: remains that, racially speaking, the 
Alpines have not only held their own but have actually 
gained ground at the Nordics’ expense. Both in Eastern 
and in Central Europe many regions once racially Nordic 
are to-day inhabited by predominantly Alpine popula- 
tions. 

This seeming paradox is explained by the Alpine quali- 
ties of tenacity, instinctive solidarity, and dogged endur- 
ance. ‘Their very passiveness has helped to give them 
the ultimate victory. The Nordic might conquer them 
and set himself up as master. The Alpines might sub- 
mit, become his loyal subjects, even accept his language 
and culture. Outwardly the land might be Nordicized. 
But racially it would mean merely a Nordic aristocracy 
laid like a thin top dressing on a solid Alpine soil. The 
Alpines would cling to the land, stick together, and grad- 
ually absorb their conquerors. Ultimately the region 
would be once more inhabited by an almost wholly Al- 


14 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


pine population, perhaps showing some Nordic traits 
that would be slowly bred out of the stock. 

On the other hand, where Alpines have peopled regions 
once racially Nordic, they have usually done so not by 
sudden conquest but by gradual infiltration. Often such 
regions were temporarily underpopulated, the Nordic in- 
habitants having been thinned by war or drained off by 
migration. Once in, however, the Alpines would take 
firm root. Perhaps the Nordics might conquer them ~ 
and the Alpines cease to be independent political groups. 
Yet racially they could survive and prosper. 

Germany is a striking example of all this. Down to 
the fall of the Roman Empire, Germany was almost 
wholly a Nordic land. To-day it is mainly Alpine in 
race. Only in Northwestern Germany is the population 
still predominantly Nordic in blood. This change has 
come about through a long series of wars, migrations, and 
other conditions that have favored the Alpines at the 
Nordics’ expense. It has also profoundly changed the 
character of the German people. Compare the solid, 
well-disciplined, docile German masses of to-day with 
the restless, fiercely individualistic Teutonic tribes that 
surged across the Roman world and turned Britain into a 
Nordic Anglo-Saxon land! 

The attitude of the present German people illustrates 
a trait characteristic of Alpines generally—the tendency 
to accept the rule of masterful minorities. Left to them- 
selves, Alpines rarely build strong, enduring states, at 
least of any considerable size. Whether this is due to 
lack of initiative and imagination, or to still other de- 
fects, it is undoubtedly the case. The Alpine manages 


RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 15 


his local affairs well enough. With his strong group feel- 
ing, he evolves village and regional organizations that 
work smoothly. But beyond that his political sense fal- 
ters. The Alpines thus tend to form small political units, 
which unite with difficulty and are more likely to be at 
odds with one another. This is one of the chief reasons 
why the Balkan peoples, who are of course mainly Alpines, 
are always quarrelling and fighting among themselves. 

On the other hand, where Alpines are under the guid- 
ance of strong masters they can be disciplined into power- 
ful states. Russia is a notable example. The early 
Russians, who like the other Slav tribes, were practically 
pure-blooded Alpines, were divided into many groups at 
chronic odds with one another and thus an easy prey to 
their neighbors. So intolerable did this situation become 
that they actually invited in foreign rulers, sending the 
following message to some Nordic Scandinavian chiefs: | 

“Our land is great and has everything in abundance, 
but it lacks order and justice. Come and take posses- 
sion and rule over us.” 

The Scandinavians came, established a strong govern- 
ment, and laid the foundations of the mighty Russian 
Empire. From that day to this Russia has been ruled 
mainly by persons of non-Alpine blood. The present 
Bolshevik government is no exception to the rule. Very 
few of its members spring from the Alpine peasant 
masses. 

“Peasant’’ is in fact the term which best describes the 
typical Alpine. Whether in France, South Germany, 
Poland or Russia, the type is fundamentally the same. 
On the contrary, there are no such peasant masses in 


16 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


Scandinavia or the British Isles. Why? Because there 
is no Alpine blood. Scandinavia is almost purely Nordic, 
and the British Isles are either Nordic or Mediterranean 
in race. The total absence of Alpine blood in the British 
Isles is undoubtedly one of the chief reasons for the high 
qualities of its inhabitants. 

For despite the Alpine’s many solid virtues, it seems to 
be the least gifted of the three European stocks. Its — 
type, as already stated, is the peasant. In cities the 
Alpine tends to be lower middle class—what the French 
call petit bourgeois. The effect of Alpine blood upon a 
nation, though steadying, is also levelling, if not depress- 
ing. Compared with either Nordics or Mediterraneans, 
the Alpine is a passive element. The Alpine race has 
contributed little that is truly great to politics, art or 
ideas. Yet its tenacity, endurance, and vitality favor 
its steady growth, and wherever it has a foothold it ap- 
pears to be increasing at the expense of the Nordic and 
Mediterranean elements. 

Let us now consider the third great European stock— 
the Nordic race. The Nordics seem to have originated 
in Northeastern Europe, though the shores of the Baltic 
Sea have been the racial centre since very early times. 

They are a distinctly northern stock, inured to cold 
and storm; but they do not thrive in hot, sunny south- 
lands. They also seem to take naturally to the sea. 

The outstanding characteristic of the Nordic race is 
its restless creative energy. In this peculiar quality it 
surpasses not only the other European stocks but also 
all the other branches of mankind. The Nordics are- 
assuredly the most masterful breed that the world has 


RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 17 


ever seen. For thousands of years they have poured 
forth from their northland homes in conquering waves 
over Europe and many parts of Asia as well. The Aryan 
invaders of India were Nordics; so were the ancient Per- 
sians; while the Greeks and Romans of classic times con- 
tained much Nordic blood, at least among the ruling 
classes. 

Always and everywhere the Nordics have been a race 
of warriors, sailors, pioneers, and explorers. Unlike the 
Alpines, with their slow mass migrations and peaceful 
penetration, the Nordics have ranged far and wide, often 
in small numbers, but winning their way by their fierce 
energy and great fighting power. Conquering peoples 
sometimes vastly superior in numbers, the Nordics have 
settled down as an aristocratic ruling class, and they have 
usually known how to perpetuate their rule because of 
their high political ability. Political ability is one of the 
Nordies’ chief gifts, which they display both in ruling 
others and in ruling themselves. 

The Nordic is at once democratic and aristocratic. 
Among his own kind he is democratic. Profoundly indi- 
vidualistic and touchy about his personal rights, neither 
he nor his fellows will tolerate tyranny. None of the 
primitive Nordic tribes had despotic rulers, while mod- 
-ern constitutional government was developed by the 
Nordic English and has not been really successful except 
among peoples with a strong strain of Nordic blood. 

Where the Nordic establishes himself among other 
races he is instinctively aristocratic. Feeling himself the 
ruler and the superior, he prides himself on his race and 
seeks to guard the purity of his blood. Throughout Eu- 


18 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


rope to-day the old aristocratic class tends to be of Nordic 
origin. Even in countries where the Nordic element has 
been mainly bred out of the population what little Nor- 
dic blood remains is found chiefly concentrated in the old 
upper-class families. 

Nothing better illustrates the persistence of race qual- 
ities than the way in which Nordics have everywhere 
shown the same striking traits. From the dawn of history 
to the present day they have acted very much the same. © 
Look at the Nordic Aryan invaders of India as described 
in the old Sanscrit scriptures! Those first Nordics to ap- 
pear upon the stage of history entered India nearly 4000 
years ago. Yet the family likeness is unmistakable. Tall, 
fair; hard fighting, yet jovial; loving good food, drink, 
fresh air, and exercise; chivalrous toward their women; 
despising the little dark negroid aborigines as monkeys, 
and setting up a rigid color line—how like our Anglo- 
Saxon pionecrs ! 

This description of the ancient Aryans shows us merely 
one of the many Nordic stocks that have racially per- 
ished. For not only in Asia but also in Southern and 
Eastern Europe, Nordic elements, once numerous and 
powerful, have either entirely disappeared or to-day sur- 
vive as mere lingering traces with scant significance in 
the national life of the countries where they are found. 
Only where Nordics have thoroughly occupied a coun- 
try, expelling or overwhelming the previous inhabitants, 
has the racial conquest been permanent. The best Euro- 
pean examples of this are England and Scotland. he 
Anglo-Saxon invaders turned both countries into Nordic 
lands, the former Mediterranean population almost, dis< 


RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE WM, 


appearing. In Wales and Ireland, on the contrary, the 
Nordics never became more than a conquering aristoc- 
racy, so that in those countries the old Mediterranean 
element still forms the mass of the population. 

The greatest expansion of the Nordic race has in fact 
occurred outside Europe—in the United States, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand. Here the few aborigines of 
very primitive types were quickly eliminated and popu- 
lations of practically pure Nordic type were established, 
since the pioneering settlers were overwhelmingly of Nor- 
dic stock. The only exception was the settlers of French 
Canada, who were mainly Alpine in race. Whether these 
Nordic conquests will be racially permanent is of course 
impossible to say. In the United States especially, recent 
immigration has brought in floods of Alpine and Mediter- 
ranean blood, and unless immigration from Southern and 
Hastern Europe is restricted and kept restricted the racial 
character of the American people will be rapidly and rad- 
ically altered. In Canada the French element is showing 
the usual Alpine characteristics—clinging to the soil, stick- 
ing together, and slowly but surely enlarging its racial 
area. However, in all these lands the Nordic element 
still forms the bulk of the population and can, if it so 
elects, secure its racial future. 

On the continent of Europe Nordic race prospects are 
not so bright. Everywhere save in Scandinavia—where 
it forms virtually the entire population—the Nordic ele- 
ment seems to be rapidly on the wane. Old handicaps, 
like war and migration, which have penalized the race in 
the past have been supplemented by new handicaps, like 
industrialism and city life, the upshot being a steady de- 


20 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


cline of the Nordics in favor of the Alpine and Mediter- 
ranean elements. 

It is really startling wnen one looks back into history 
and sees how the Nordics have diminished racially in 
Europe during the past 1000 years. Their heyday was 
the fall of the Roman Empire. At that time and for cen- 
turies thereafter, both Western and Central Europe were 
strongly Nordic. The Alpine and Mediterranean elements 
were either reduced to serfdom or driven into the more — 
mountainous and infertile regions. 

Since then, however, the tide has been running the 
other way. War has been a terrible scourge to the Nordic 
race. In the numberless wars that have raged in Europe 
the Nordics have done most of the fighting and suffered 
most of the losses, while the age of discovery and coloni- 
zation that began with Columbus still further thinned 
their ranks in Europe, since it was adventurous Nordics 
who formed the overwhelming majority of explorers and 
pioneers to new lands. Perhaps even more serious blows 
have been dealt the race by the conditions of modern life. 

A century ago Europe began to be transformed from an 
agricultural to an urbanized, industrial area. Countless 
cities and manufacturing centres grew up, where men 
were close packed and were subjected to all the evils of 
congested living. Of course, such conditions are not ideal 
for any stock. Nevertheless, the Nordic suffered more 
than any one else. The Nordic is essentially a high- 
standard man. He requires healthful living conditions, 
and pines when deprived of good food, fresh air, and ex- 
ercise. So long as Europe was mainly agricultural the 
Nordic usually got these things. In fact, in cool North- 


RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 21 


ern and Central Europe an agricultural environment ac- 
tually favored the big blond Nordic as against the 
slighter, less muscular Mediterranean, while in the hotter 
south the Nordic upper class, being the rulers, were pro- 
tected from field labor and thus survived as an aris- 
tocracy. Under modern conditions, however, the crowded 
city and the cramped factory weed out the Nordic much 
faster than they do the Alpine or the Mediterranean, 
both of which stocks seem to be able to stand such an 
environment with less damage to themselves. It is need- 
less to add that the late war and its aftermath have 
been terrible blows to the Nordic race. 

This rapid decline of the Nordic stock in Europe is a 
very serious matter. The Nordic’s great energy, political 
ability, and high level of intelligence are vital to Europe’s 
prosperity and progress. ‘The peculiar qualities of the 
Nordic intellect are just the ones which to-day would be 
most missed. One of the Nordic’s most valuable traits is 
his adventurous curiosity. This makes him preeminent 
not only as a pioneer and explorer but also as an inventor 
and scientific investigator. The Mediterranean probably 
excels the Nordic in music and the fine arts. But in the 
intellectual fields the Nordic excels the Mediterranean 
and vastly outstrips the Alpine. Our modern scientific 
age is mainly a product of Nordic genius. Deprived of 
that genius, it would rapidly decline. It therefore seems 
as though those nations which possess most Nordic blood 
will tend to be the most progressive as well as the most 
energetic and politically able. Important assets, these, 
for the future ! | 

Let us now take a brief survey of the present racial 


22 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


make-up of the European nations, based upon the latest 
scientific estimates that have been made. Our survey will 
shatter many old notions that used to prevail when race 
was confused with matters like language and culture. For 
example, it used to be thought that France, Italy, and 
Spain were all members of a Latin race. We now know 
that there never was any such race and that these three 
nations differ widely in racial make-up. 

Beginning our survey with the British Isles, the first — 
important point to be noted is the total absence of Alpine 
blood. England and Scotland are predominantly Nordic, 
while Wales and Ireland are predominantly Mediterra- 
nean. Scotland is the most Nordic, over four-fifths of 
the population being of that blood. England is about 
four-fifths Nordic and one-fifth Mediterranean. In Eng- 
land the Mediterranean element seems to be increasing. 
A century or two ago it was probably insignificant. Since 
then the growth of city and factory life, emigration of 
Nordics, and immigration of Welsh and Irish laborers 
have combined to make the Mediterranean element a 
erowing factor. Wales seems to be about three-fifths 
Mediterranean, while Ireland is over two-thirds Mediter- 
ranean in blood. 

Crossing to the Continent, we find that France is ra- 
cially a composite nation, all three European races being 
strongly represented in its population. The Alpine ele- 
ment is the largest, being slightly more numerous than 
the two other stocks put together. Roughly speaking, the 
Nordics are clustered in the north and the Mediterra- 
neans in the south, the Alpines forming a broad band be- 
tween. There are, however, many exceptions to this, the 


RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 23 


race map of France being quite complicated. There is 
also a distinct connection between race and social status. 
The upper classes and the city populations tend to be 
Nordic or Mediterranean, while the peasantry tend to be 
Alpine in blood. The solid French peasant is certainly a 
good Alpine type. 

Spain is predominantly a Mediterranean nation, most of 
the Spanish people belonging to that race. Nordic blood is 
mainly confined to the upper classes. The Spanish Alpines 
are tucked away in the extreme north of the country. 
They are the descendants of Alpines who entered Spain 
many thousand years ago; but the racial traits still per- 
sist, and the inhabitants of these districts are recognized 
to-day as being unusually solid, tenacious, and hard- 
working. 

As for Portugal, it is overwhelmingly Mediterranean in 
race. There are no Alpines and very few Nordics. In 
Southern Portugal the population is distinctly tinged with 
negro blood. Some centuries ago large numbers of negroes 
were brought in as slaves to work on the great estates of 
the south, which has an almost semitropical climate. Fur- 
thermore, a certain amount of negro blood seeps in con- 
tinually from Portugal’s African colonies. The result is 
that the populations both of the southern countryside and 
of the port towns show many negroid types. The effect of 
this African infusion upon the Portuguese stock has un- 
doubtedly been a depressing one. 

Italy, though politically united, is racially divided into 
two very different peoples. The north is inhabited by a 
sturdy Alpine stock, considerably leavened with Nordic 
blood. The south is almost purely Mediterranean in race, 


24 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


tinctured in the extreme south—especially in Sicily—by 
African and Asiatic strains. The racial difference between 
north and south is so evident that it strikes even the cas- 
ual tourist. The Italians recognize it frankly. It is well 
known that the north runs Italy and looks down on the 
backward south. 

Turning now to Northern Europe, we find the Scandi- 
navian nations overwhelmingly of Nordic blood. In Nor- 
way and Denmark there is a small Alpine element, de-. 
scended, as already stated, from migrations in prehistoric 
times. Sweden, however, is 100 per cent Nordic—the only 
purely Nordic nation in the world. 

Holland is predominantly Nordic, with a small Alpine 
element. Belgium, on the other hand, is sharply divided 
on race lines. The open plains of Northern and Western 
Belgium are inhabited by a strongly Nordic stock—the 
Flemings. The hilly, wooded regions of Southeastern Bel- 
gium are inhabited by a strongly Alpine stock—the Wal- 
loons. The two stocks differ markedly in temperament, 
speak different languages, and instinctively dislike each 
other. Common fear of powerful neighbors alone keeps 
them politically together, and it is very possible that Bel- 
gium may some day split up. 

The racial situation in Germany is decidedly complica- 
ted. Taken as a whole, Germany is Alpine rather than 
Nordic in race, nearly two-thirds of its population being 
classifiable as Alpines, while the remainder are predomi- 
nantly Nordic in blood. This, however, is by no means 
the whole story. To begin with, in Germany, perhaps 
more than anywhere else in Europe, the two races have 
intermarried wholesale. It is probable that a clear ma- 


RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 25 


jority of the German people are of mixed blood. This 
is particularly true of Central Germany, where one sees 
ereat numbers of what scientists call disharmonic types 
—persons, say, with blondish hair and light eyes, yet 
with round Alpine heads and thick-set bodies. In North- 
western Germany, however, the population is almost 
purely Nordic, while in the southern highlands and the 
eastern provinces the peasantry is practically pure Al- 
pine. Yet here again we get a fresh complication, be- 
cause in both Southern and Eastern Germany race runs 
strongly with social status. Even in the most Alpine parts 
of Germany the aristocracy tends to be Nordic, while the 
towns are more Nordic than the countryside. This seems 
to be one of the chief reasons for the marked class dis- 
tinctions that prevail in German social life. Again, racial 
differences have much to do with the contrasts in tempera- 
ment and the latent dislike that exists between north and 
south. 

As already remarked, Germany has for centuries been 
getting more Alpine in blood. The terrible wars that 
ravaged Germany in the past were immensely destruc- 
tive of Nordic life. The late war continued this process, 
while Germany’s present economic situation bears much 
harder on its Nordic than on its Alpine elements. The 
Alpinization of Germany is proceeding rapidly to-day. 

_ Switzerland and German Austria are racially much the 
same as Southern Germany. Both countries are predom- 
inantly Alpine in blood, but with a strong Nordic element, 
much intermarriage between the races, and a tendency of 
Nordic blood to prevail in the upper classes and the town 
populations. The racial make-up of Switzerland is about 


26 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


two-thirds Alpine.and one-third Nordic. In German Aus- 
tria the Nordic element is probably not quite so numerous. 

When we touch Eastern Europe we find racial condi- 
tions very different from those in the countries to the west. 
In Western Europe the racial elements have been long 
established and are more or less adjusted to one another. 
In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, racial movements 
have been more violent and recent, and racial adjust- 
ments are not well established. The whole situation is at . 
once less stable and more complex. | 

Over the greater part of this immense area, stretching 
from Russia to the Balkan Peninsula, Alpine stocks tend 
to form the most numerous racial element. This is espe- 
cially true of the various Slav peoples. Of course, there is 
no such thing as a Slav race, any more than there is such 
a thing as a Latin race. In each case the phrase really 
means a group of peoples with similar languages and cul- 
tures. With the Slavs, the fact that they belong mainly 
to the same race has made a more or less instinctive bond 
of sympathy between them. Yet this sympathy has not 
produced the profound political consequences that might 
offhand be assumed. It has not produced any general 
political union between the Slav peoples. That would 
have been dead against the Alpine racial temperament, 
which, as we have already seen, tends to relatively small 
political groups more apt to quarrel than to fuse. 

The Alpines are, however, merely the most numerous 
element in the East European racial situation. There is 
considerable Nordic blood in Northwestern Russia and a 
good deal of Mediterranean blood in the Balkans, espe- 
cially in Greece, which is mainly a Mediterranean nation. 


RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 27 


Besides these familiar stocks, however, there are in East- 
ern Europe powerful Asiatic elements that make fresh 
difficulties. For the past 1500 years Eastern Europe has 
experienced a long series of Asiatic invasions. These 
Asiatic elements—Huns, Mongols, Tartars, Turks, Jews, 
Gypsies, and many others—have left their mark on the 
various East European populations. In some parts they 
have widely intermarried; in other parts they have re- 
mained largely distinct, forming separate castes or com- 
munities. But in both cases the general effect has been to 
confuse and complicate the situation. 

So ends our preliminary survey. In subsequent chap- 
ters we will view present-day conditions in the various 
parts of Europe, discussing many things, but not forget- 
ting that racial factor, which, though often overlooked in 
human affairs, is perhaps the most fundamental of all. 


CHAPTER II 
KINDRED BRITAIN 


For America the word “Britain” is of profound signifi- 
cance. It evokes a multitude of thoughts. Whether the ~ 
word be taken in its narrowest sense as meaning merely 
England, or extended to the British Isles, or broadened to 
include those self-governing dominions which go to make 
up the English-speaking commonwealth of nations, or, — 
finally, widened to signify the vast assemblage of lands 
and peoples known as the British Empire, we Americans 
instinctively realize that here is something which to us is 
of deep concern. 

This is true of Americans generally, whatever their 
origin, because the United States is an English-speaking 
country, settled mainly by people of British stock, who 
built up a civilization, fundamentally Anglo-Saxon in 
character, that has set its stamp upon all who have reached 
our shores. For most Americans the significance of Brit- 
ain is not merely a matter of cultural acquirement but 
also of racial inheritance—in other words, something in 
the blood. Despite recent immigration from Southern 
and Eastern Europe, the population of the United States 
is still basically Anglo-Saxon, while a decided majority of 
its inhabitants are of British or kindred North European 
stocks. 


The essentially Anglo-Saxon character of our stock and 
28 


KINDRED BRITAIN 29 


civilization makes a study of things British at once pecu- 
liarly interesting and peculiarly important. Since race is 
unquestionably the basic factor in human affairs, we have 
weighty reasons for observing our British kin. This will 
aid us not only in our relations with them but also in our 
own domestic problems. For with folk so similar, a knowl- 
edge of what sort of people the British really are, and of 
what they are thinking and doing, will throw much light 
on what sort of people we ourselves are and what is the 
significance of our thoughts and actions. 

It is a narrow and short-sighted view which holds that 
the parallel development of the British and American 
peoples is due chiefly to ease and frequency of intellectual 
intercourse—that we are so much alike because we can 
read each other’s books and newspapers and can talk 
without an interpreter. That is rather putting the cart 
before the horse. It ignores the much more fundamental 
query as to how we both got that way. You can realize 
the significance of this point by a very simple test. Com- 
pare a conversation you have had with an Englishman 
and a conversation you have had with a person of some 
other nationality. The chances are ten to one that in ana- 
lyzing those conversations you will discover a very signifi- 
cant distinction between them—the fact that you met 
your Englishman on a footing of more instinctive com- 
prehension. As you look back you will probably remem- 
ber that there were a lot of rather subtle things like view- 
points, ideals, prejudices even, which you could more or 
less take for granted with the Englishman, but which you 
could not thus tacitly assume with the other. 

I am not here referring to knowledge of facts; your 


30 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


Englishman may have been ignorant, while the other man 
may have been learned in the topics you discussed. Like- 
wise, I am not concerned with the outcome of those con- 
versations; you may have disagreed violently with the 
Englishman and have agreed fully with the other. Yet 
even that violent controversy between yourself and the 
Englishman had an intimate note; that is to say, in all 
probability it was not a clash between absolutely antag- 
onistic ideals, but rather a family row over details—a mag- 
nifying of differences, perhaps just because you two had 
started with so much in common. 

All this is of great practical importance, because it fur- | 
nishes a clew to the understanding not merely of personal 
contacts between individual Englishmen and Americans 
but also of the relations between the American and British 
peoples. We two peoples cannot be really indifferent to 
each other, any more than members of the same family 
can be really indifferent to one another. Anglo-Ameri- 
can relations must be characterized by a peculiar fam- 
ily quality which contains great possibilities for good and 
for il. Things which between other nations might not 
make a ripple can, as between Americans and English- 
men, promote warm sympathy or provoke bitter resent- 
ment. 

That is why the fullest possible understanding is so nec- 
essary between the two peoples. Here, if ever, “a little 
knowledge is a dangerous thing.” Englishmen and Amer- 
icans who know each other just well enough to see their 
differences are apt to quarrel. Englishmen and Americans 
who know each other intimately realize that such dif- 
ferences are far outweighed by common likenesses and 


KINDRED BRITAIN 31 


usually succeed in maintaining friendly harmony in out- 
look and action. 

Such friendship was never more needed than it is to- 
day. The American and British peoples are unquestion- 
ably the strongest and stablest elements in a very troubled 
world, and their friendly co-operation is the best hope of 
the future. Probably no reflective American or English- 
man thinks otherwise. And yet, desirable though this 
may be, it need not necessarily come about. Minor points 
of friction exist and misunderstandings are always liable 
to arise. The best way to better Anglo-American rela- 
tions is to know each other better, thereby gaining that 
broader vision and deeper insight that can sense the rel- 
ative importance of things and act accordingly. 

Who and what, then, are these British kin of ours? 

Racially speaking, the British people are at once a 
blend and a mixture. That fact gives the key to their 
national character, and explains both their past history 
and their present tendencies. An English writer once 
called his country Teutonic with a Celtic fringe. Trans- 
lating this into modern racial terms, we can say that the 
population of Britain is predominantly Nordic, with a 
Mediterranean element that varies widely in strength in 
different parts of the island. 

Britain’s racial destiny was fixed about 1500 years ago, 
after the fall of the Roman Empire. Down to that time 
the British Isles had been inhabited almost entirely by 
the slender, dark-complexioned race called Mediterranean, 
which still inhabits most of the lands about the Mediter- 
ranean Sea and which settled the British Isles long before 
the dawn of history. After the fall of Rome swarms of 


32 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


tall blond Nordics, coming from Germany and Scandi- 
navia, invaded Britain and ultimately transformed the 
island’s racial character. 

This Nordic influx was, however, of a peculiar nature 
and had peculiar results. If the Nordics had come all at 
once in vast numbers they would have quickly overrun 
the whole island, would have subdued the Mediterra- 
neans at a stroke, and would ultimately have intermarried 
and formed a generally mixed population. But just the 
reverse of this took place. The Nordics came in relatively 
small numbers, settling first on the eastern coasts and 
gradually working inland. Also, the Mediterraneans put 
up a stiff fight and gave ground slowly. In other words, 
a situation arose very much like that which occurred 
during the settlement of America—an invading frontier 
pushing slowly westward, with fierce hatred between in- 
vaders and natives, little intermarriage, and therefore a 
thorough racial replacement. For this reason Eastern 
England is to-day almost purely Nordic in race. 

Yet Britain was not destined to become a purely Nordic 
land. The western fringe of the island is rugged and 
relatively infertile. In these wild lands the Mediterra- 
neans found refuge, while the pursuing Nordics had no 
special temptation to conquer them. For a long while 
Britain was divided between two sharply contrasted races, 
the Nordics occupying most of the island, while the west- 
ern fringes, especially Wales, Cornwall, and the Scotch 
Highlands, were solidly Mediterranean. In time these 
race lines became somewhat blurred by intermarriage; 
yet even to-day England and Scotland are four-fifths Nor- 
dic, while Wales is mainly Mediterranean in blood. 


KINDRED BRITAIN 33 


Meanwhile the Nordics were undergoing an important 
development among themselves. Instead of coming all 
at once, the Nordic invaders came at different times and 
from different places. The first invaders, who were 
Angles, Saxons, and Jutes, came from Northwestern Ger- 
many. Later came Danes and Norwegians, and finally 
the Normans, who were also Scandinavians, settled for a 
short time on French soil and with just a dash of French 
blood. These different sorts of Nordics ultimately inter- 
married and fused into a new English type. 

They fused. That is the important thing to remember. 
When different varieties of the same race intermarry there 
is a real blend, from which springs a new stock, harmoni- 
ous and stable in character. On the other hand, when 
different races intermarry, there is no blend, but a mix- 
ture, the children tending to belong mainly to one or other 
of the parent stocks. In England, therefore, we get a new 
Nordic type. In Scotland we also get a new type, differing 
slightly from the English owing to a somewhat different 
blend of Nordic elements. Lastly, both these new Nordic 
types mix lightly but continuously with the old Medi- 
terranean stock. 

In other words, we have that combination of racial 
blend and mixture which is the key to English history and 
-English character. Predominantly Nordic as it is, the 
‘English stock shows those traits of creative intelligence, 
political ability, and great energy steadied by common 
sense that are displayed by all branches of the Nordic 
race. At the same time, it must not be forgotten that the 
English stock has received slight but continuous infusions 
of Mediterranean blood that have tinctured many Eng- 


34 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


lishmen with Mediterranean qualities like heightened 
temperament, quick imagination, and artistic feeling. 
This Mediterranean dash has been too slight to upset 
English stability and poise, but it has been enough to 
give England many brilliant individuals and partially to 
correct the tendency to heavy seriousness common among 
pure-blooded Nordics, whether in England or elsewhere. 

Despite the valuable contributions that the Mediter- 
ranean element has made, it is unquestionably the Nordic 
stock that is mainly responsible for Britain’s greatness. 
To Nordic energy, intelligence, and common sense are due 
both England’s political development at home and that 
extraordinary achievement, the British Empire, which to- 
day covers nearly one-fourth of the entire land surface 
of the globe and contains fully one-fourth of the world’s 
total population. Nordic, likewise, is the combination of 
inventive genius and business ability which made Britain 
the industrial and financial centre of the world. It is often 
said that Britain’s present wealth is due to the fortunate 
accident of rich coal and iron deposits beneath her soil. 
That is true, in a sense. But it is also true that these de- 
posits would not have been developed without a remark- 
able combination of English and Scotch inventors, manu- 
facturers, financiers, and workers, who first realized the 
possibilities of coal and iron, got the jump on the rest of 
the world, and thereby gave Britain the economic posi- 
tion which she has ever since retained. 

Because Britain’s progress has been so consistently 
successful, some observers have been tempted to think 
that it just happened—in other words, that it was due to 
good fortune or fatality. Nothing, however, could be more 


KINDRED BRITAIN 30 


untrue. The closer we study English history, the more we 
realize what immense problems Britain has had to face, 
and what intelligence, determination, hard work, and 
common sense the British people have shown in their 
solution. 

During the past century Britain has gone through one 
of the most tremendous transformations that the world 
has ever seen. A hundred years ago Britain was still 
mainly an agricultural country, capable of feeding its 
relatively small population, which then numbered only 
about 14,000,000. To-day the same area—England, Scot- 
land, and Wales—has a population of 43,000,000, four- 
fifths of whom live in cities or towns. Instead of being 
self-feeding, Britain grows only enough foodstuffs to 
nourish its people ninety days in the year. The rest of 
its food has to be imported, together with all sorts of other 
raw materials and manufactured products. This, in turn, 
means that the only way the British people can pay for 
these things is by exporting to foreign countries a cor- 
responding amount of goods or services. Accordingly, 
Britain’s very life to-day depends upon a complex and 
delicately adjusted system of manufacturing, commerce, 
shipping, and banking, which she has slowly built up and 
which at all costs she must maintain. 

And yet, as already remarked, the very building up of 
this system has involved a transformation of Britain’s 
economic, social, and political life so profound that most 
other countries would probably have fallen into civil war 
or revolution. The British have, however, succeeded in 
avoiding these evils and adjusting themselves peacefully 
to new conditions. 


36 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


How? Primariiy because of their national character— 
in other words, because of their racial make-up. 

No one can be long in England without being struck 
with the basic unity of the English people. Of course, 
there are extremes of wealth and poverty, of education 
and ignorance; and these produce a wide variety of 
manners, ideas, and opinions. Yet beneath all such differ- 
ences we somehow sense the fact that these people are 
fundamentally of the same stuff. Englishmen who have 
lived abroad get this impression as sharply as observant 
foreigners. 

Not long ago an English friend of mine who lives in 
New York City was telling me his impressions of a trip 
home—the first in several years. 

My friend goes to his New York office daily in the sub- 
way and is thus accustomed to rub elbows with about 
every racial and national type on earth. 

“Do you know,” he said, “the first time I rode in a 
London tube I had the queerest feeling! I couldn’t place 
it at first, but I soon found that I was looking at the people 
in the car and comparing them with the people in the New 
York subway. And then I realized that all the people in 
that tube car were very much alike—and very much like 
me! I can’t tell you how queerly it hit me; I just can’t 
forget it.” 

In that simple anecdote lies the secret of Britain’s 
stability. In other words, even when Englishmen talk 
and think differently they feel alike. That is why foreign 
students of English politics are always going wrong in 
their prophecies. How many times have we heard the 
statement from some foreign observer that England was 


KINDRED BRITAIN 37 


standing on the verge of revolution? Our observer may 
have made a careful study of the facts, have read all the 
speeches, analyzed all the arguments, and proved quite 
logically that such irreconcilable standpoints could not be 
compromised. 

And yet the revolution just didn’t come off! After 
everybody had had his say and had blown off steam, those 
angry Englishmen instinctively realized that every one of 
them was ‘‘very much alike—and very much like me.” 
Whereupon a compromise adjustment was somehow 
evolved, the crisis was ended, and the country went on its 
way. 

The stable, evolutionary character of English political 
life is well illustrated by the present situation. The ad- 
vent of a Labor government to power—the first in British 
history—is certainly a momentous event. But there is 
nothing revolutionary about it. When I was last in Eng- 
land I made a careful study of British political conditions, 
and I was interested to observe the quiet, temperate way 
in which political possibilities were discussed and dis- 
counted. 

Talking informally with representative spokesmen of 
all the political parties, I found that, when not talking for 
publication, they differed singularly little in their esti- 
mates and judgments. 

Although the election which swept the Conservatives 
from power and resulted in a Labor cabinet was not yet 
on the political horizon, most persons with whom I talked 
considered a Labor government a distinct possibility 
within a relatively short period. Yet neither Conserva- 
tives nor Liberals were really alarmed at the prospect. A 


38 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


few die-hard Tories and one or two Liberals did express 
frank pessimism, but the more general view was that the 
Laborites weren’t such a bad lot after all; that they might 
make some foolish mistakes at the start, but would quickly 
learn by experience; and that they would be held in check 
by all sorts of moderating forces like the Liberal elements 
within their own ranks, the permanent officials of the 
government services, and the criticism of an alert and in- 
telligent public opinion. 

Equally instructive was the attitude of the Laborites 
themselves. In the first place, it must be remembered 
that a large proportion of the leaders of the British Labor 
Party are not workingmen in the ordinary sense of the 
word, many of them being highly educated intellectuals 
drawn from the upper and middle social classes. But 
whether intellectuals or hand workers, and however sharp 
their criticisms of existing institutions, very few of them 
had even a theoretical leaning toward violent revolution- 
ary methods. 

I well remember a talk I had with one of the so-called 
wild men of the Glasgow group—the most radical wing 
of the Labor Party in the last Parliament. This radical 
M. P. was a picturesque person—a live wire, with keen 
gray eyes, a great shock of hair, hat cocked aggressively 
to one side of his head, and a Glasgow burr that you could 
cut with a knife. He was scathing in his criticism of the 
existing economic order and eloquent concerning the “in- 
tolerable” condition of the British working classes. I 
broached the possibility of revolutionary action. He shook 
his head emphatically. 

‘No, no,” he answered gravely; “I’m fundamentally 
opposed to revolutionary methods; they defeat their 


KINDRED BRITAIN 39 


own ends. Violence, once employed wholesale, can’t be 
stopped. Ye need ever more and more of it, and ruin is 
the final result. Of course,” he added with a twinkle in 
his eye, “I’m not saying I object to a bit o’ rough stuff 
now and then to throw a scare into the opposition. But 
—no real violence; no revolution.” 

Perhaps even more significant was a talk I had with 
one of the few Labor intellectuals who sympathize with 
the Bolshevik doctrine of the revolutionary dictatorship 
of a militant minority imposing its proletarian will on a 
nation. Despite his intellectual leanings, however, he 
was as convinced as every one else that a revolution in 
England was impossible. Not only were the upper and 
middle classes too powerful, but the working classes were 
not inclined to such action. Leaders and masses alike, 
he said regretfully, were too much imbued with what he 
rather scornfully termed Liberal maxims like the will of 
the majority and the rights of minorities to make a revolu- 
tion even a remote possibility. 

This I believe to be an accurate statement of the case. 
The British workingman is about the poorest material for 
a red revolution that can be imagined. Generally speak- 
ing, he is a slow, steady fellow, content with moderate 
comforts and averse to getting excited, especially over 
matters like abstract theories and principles. He might 
raise a riot if you suddenly clapped an extra penny on his 
beer, but he isn’t a bit interested in fighting for a phrase 
like the “dictatorship of the proletariat.’’ Of course there 
are occasional exceptions to the rule, but I doubt if there 
are more than a few thousand genuine revolutionists in 
the whole of Great Britain. 

Among both Conservatives and Liberals the chief anxi- 


40 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


ety over what a Labor government may do lies, not in 
the sphere of domestic politics but concerning the non- 
white portions of the empire. The importance of this 
matter can be appreciated when we remember that the 
entire white population of the empire, including the British 
Isles and all the self-governing dominions, is only about 
60,000,000, whereas the non-white population of the em- 
pire is over 400,000,000. Some of the non-white portions 
of the empire and its dependencies, like India and Egypt, 
to-day are restless and difficult to govern. Furthermore, 
the relations between the non-white colonies and the white 
self-governing dominions present a problem of increasing 
seriousness. The demand of the Indians to migrate freely 
throughout the empire—a demand absolutely rejected by 
the white dominions—is an especially ticklish matter. It 
is most emphatically loaded with dynamite and if roughly 
handled might cause an explosion that would literally blow 
the British Empire to bits. 

On these thorny problems Conservatives and Liberals 
hold opinions which, however they may differ in details, 
are basically the same. The Labor Party, however, has 
in the past taken quite another attitude, and has favored 
much wider concessions to Indian and other demands for 
self-government than the older British parties have 
thought wise or possible. Accordingly in both Conserva- 
tive and Liberal circles there exists a widespread appre- 
hension that a Labor government may make mistakes in 
imperial policy that can never be rectified. As a prominent 
Conservative said to me: “My chief fear is that Labor in 
power may light a fire in India that neither they nor we 
can afterward put out.””? Whether this pessimism is justi- 


KINDRED BRITAIN 4] 


fied remains to be seen. It shows, however, the gravity of 
Britain’s imperial problems and the necessity for continu- 
ous statesmanship in their handling if irreparable damage 
is to be averted. 

More pressing even than imperial questions are the 
problems arising from Britain’s industrial situation. We 
have already seen how during the past century England 
made herself the industrial heart of the world, thereby 
gaining great wealth and increasing her population nearly 
300 per cent. But we also saw that this vast population 
was dependent for its very life upon precisely that same 
complex and nicely adjusted system of manufacturing, 
commerce, shipping, and banking which had brought it 
into being. 

We Americans can hardly realize what such a situation 
means. Our country is so large, our natural resources are 
so vast, and our climates are so varied that we could get 
along fairly well if all the rest of the world were to sink 
beneath the ocean. For Britain, however, such an event 
would be the most frightful catastrophe. Left to herself, 
more than half her present population would literally 
have to starve. Britain’s economic situation is thus funda- 
mentally artificial. It is not a natural but a man-made 
creation, which can be maintained only by tireless fore- 
sight, energy, and skill. 

Furthermore, for many years past it has been getting 
harder for Britain to keep up the pace. There are two main 
reasons for this: the increasing severity of foreign com- 
petition and the steady growth of her own population. 
When Britain became an industrial nation, about a cen- 
tury ago, she had the field almost to herself, and for a 


42 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


long time she made something like monopoly profits. 
But little by little other nations began to take a hand in 
the game, so that to keep her foreign trade against com- 
petition Britain had to work harder, produce more effi- 
ciently, and sell more cheaply. That was the only way 
that she could support her population. Also, that popula- 
tion was rapidly growing. In other words, it was getting 
harder to feed British mouths, and there were ever more 
British mouths to feed. 

Britain’s present economic difficulties are no recent de- 
velopment. They are of long standing. As far back as the 
year 1872 the balance of trade began to run against her; 
that is, her exports fell below her imports. And the bal- | 
ance of trade has continued to run pretty steadily against 
her ever since. Of course, Britain has covered the bal- 
ance by “‘invisible exports” like shipping services, bank- 
ing profits, and returns of capital invested abroad. Never- 
theless, the fact remains that it became increasingly 
difficult to support her population. 

As a matter of fact, not all her population was properly 
supported. The widespread poverty in England’s great 
cities and industrial centres has long been proverbial, and 
England’s poor consisted not merely of her degenerate 
pauper elements, who were practically unemployable, but 
also of many persons able and willing to work yet unable 
to find work, or able to find it only part of the time. The 
result was a vast mass of people underfed, living from hand 
to mouth, and dependent upon public or private charity. 
Their numbers were disclosed during the war, when Brit- 
ain’s man power was systematically examined by draft 
boards to determine their physical fitness for military 


KINDRED BRITAIN 43 


service. The amount of physical unfitness due, not to in- 
- born degeneracy, but to poor living conditions, which 
those examinations disclosed was far greater than had 
been previously imagined. 

Of course, during the war living conditions among the 
poor were much improved. Millions of men went off to 
fight, while every able-bodied man and woman left at 
home was sure of a job to keep Britain’s war machine sup- 
‘ plied. The problem of unemployment virtually disap- 
peared. But this was an artificial, unhealthy situation 
which could not last and which was bound to be followed 
by an acute reaction. Britain was mortgaging her future 
by huge taxes and loans which would have to be repaid. 
The war once over, back came the millions of soldiers 
demanding jobs, while at the same time the war boom col- 
lapsed in that great industrial depression which hit not 
only England but the whole world as well. With markets 
everywhere disorganized, and with some of her best custo- 
mers, like Germany and Russia, more or less out of busi- 
ness, Britain’s foreign trade was hit a body blow and her 
whole industrial life slowed down. Once more the spectre 
of unemployment raised its ugly head. To avert whole- 
sale semistarvation, the British Government supple- 
mented existing measures of poor relief by a great system 
of unemployment insurance. The need for such action is 
shown by the numbers of persons applying for assistance. 
Since the year 1920, when the system went into effect, 
averages of from 1,000,000 to 1,800,000 persons have been 
assisted as totally unemployed, while the number of per- 
sons assisted as being only partially employed has aver- 
aged about 500,000. These people, be it remembered, are 


44 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


genuine employables, able to work if work can be found. 
In addition to them is the host of unemployables—the 
physically unfit, mentally defective and degenerate 
elements who are supported by public or private char- 
ity. 

Such is Britain’s unemployment problem, and it is dif- 
ficult to see how any political action can really solve it. 
Wise measures can better it somewhat, while unwise 
measures can make it much worse. But the cure—if cure 
there be—lies outside Britain, in the general world situa- 
tion. The hard fact is that, as things now are, Britain’s 
industry and trade cannot support her population, which 
continues to grow and thus makes the problem more and 
more difficult. 

Britain’s population is increasing between 300,000 and 
400,000 a year. How are these new mouths to be fed? 
Many Englishmen advocate wholesale emigration to the 
dominions. Great efforts have been made and much 
money spent to this end. And yet the annual quota of 
British emigrants to all parts of the world averages less 
than 200,000. Thus not even the annual increase of popu- 
lation is taken care of. But under present world condi- 
tions Britain probably has at least 5,000,000 more people 
than can be supported in reasonable comfort. Here, truly, 
is a problem that will test British statesmanship to the 
full. 

It is assuredly one of the great motives in British for- 
eign policy. Determined as she is to build up her foreign 
trade, Britain feels it absolutely necessary to restore 
stability and prosperity to the Continent of Europe. 
This explains British policy toward Germany and Russia. 


KINDRED BRITAIN 45 


It likewise explains in great measure her policy toward 
France, which most Englishmen regard as blocking the 
road to Europe’s economic recovery. 

It is useless for Frenchmen to talk to Englishmen about 
the possible future political dangers that British policy 
may evolve. The present economic motive is so pressing 
that most Englishmen are willing to take the political 
risks that may be involved. A prominent French politi- 
cian hit this off very well when he told me about a con- 
versation he had had with a British cabinet minister not 
long after the war. The Frenchman asked the minister if 
he did not think England was playing a dangerous game 
in trying to build up Germany and Russia—the two 
powers which she had most feared in the past—and 
pointed out several unpleasant political possibilities. 

“Well,” replied the Englishman, “all you say may be 
true, and if it turns out that way we may have to fight 
’em ten years hence. But now we must trade and make 
money.” 

It is very easy to label this sort of thing as short-sighted 
and to call the English a nation of shopkeepers and simi- 
lar unpleasant things. That, in fact, was the way my 
French acquaintance felt, and he told the anecdote I 
have just narrated to prove his point. To me, however, 
it proved something quite different—namely, British 
coolness and common sense. Englishmen rarely waste 
time spinning elaborate logical theories of what may 
happen in the future. Instead, they look at what is hap- 
pening in the present, see what is amiss, get after it, and 
keep their eye on the ball. That is why, in the long run, 
they usually come out on top. 


46 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


It is just these_qualities of practical common sense and 
dislike of theorizing that cause the English to be so per- 
sistently misjudged by their more logical and argumen- 
tative Continental neighbors. Except when really stirred, 
the Englishman is apt to draw into his shell and to be- 
come aloof and inarticulate. Not realizing how English- 
men are thinking and working beneath the casual exterior 
of British life, Continentals frequently underrate them 
and may even come to think England decadent. That is - 
what happened with the Germans before the war, and 
when I was recently in Europe I found a distinct tendency 
of the same sort among Frenchmen and Italians. I dis- 
cussed this point at length with one of the most thought- 
ful of England’s publicists, having specially in mind the 
erowing misunderstanding between French and British 
public opinion. My friend considered that the way many 
Frenchmen were belittling England was perhaps the most 
serious aspect of the whole situation. 

“The British people,” said he, “are grappling with 
their problems and are bearing their burdens with un- 
flinching grit and determination. This indomitable spirit 
is the basic trait of the English people. It also shows 
what great reserves of energy and poise are latent within 
them, though this is never visible except in crises, because 
the English are ordinarily so inarticulate and so self- 
repressed. That is why Continentals are continually 
coming to believe England decadent. Germany made 
that mistake a short time ago. Well, perhaps that is not 
surprising, because England had not been put to the test 
for one hundred years. But here is the extraordinary 
fact: people on the Continent are beginning to say just 


KINDRED BRITAIN 47 


the same things to-day, despite the lesson of the late 
war. And therein lies a real danger, because it may lead 
such people—notably in France—to despise England and 
challenge her in what she regards as life-and-death mat- 
ters. And then Britain will give the Continent another 
surprise.” . 

Grit and determination are, indeed, the underlying 
traits of the British people. Those traits do not reveal 
themselves fully to the passing traveller, for the English- 
man is at once reserved and casual before strangers. But 
after you have been in England a while and have got 
a bit below the surface, you will be impressed by the 
calm resolution with which the English are facing their 
problems and bearing their burdens. The problems are 
many; the burdens are heavy. England was hard hit 
by the war. Her people are frightfully taxed and her 
industrial life is still somewhat out of gear. The work- 
ing classes are haunted by the spectre of unemployment, 
while the upper and middle classes have lost much of their 
old prosperity. Britain is, in fact, going through a period 
of profound readjustment—never a pleasant experience 
—and Englishmen admit frankly that the process will be 
hard and long. Yet practically all Englishmen are firmly 
convinced that Britain will win through. 

One of the points on which British public opinion is 
unusually solid is the necessity of good relations with 
America. That does not mean that the English all cor- 
dially like us. Of course many Englishmen do, but others 
cordially dislike us, while still others know almost nothing 
about us, their chief acquaintance with things American 
being derived from the omnipresent American moving 


48 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


picture, which usually presents either a distortion or a 
caricature of American life. 

And yet, in the larger sense, all this matters very little. 
To judge Anglo-American relations on a basis of indi- 
vidual likes and dislikes—as is too often done—is a short- 
sighted and rather silly attitude that quite overlooks the 
basic realities of the case. The really important thing is 
that, though some Englishmen may like and others may 
dislike Americans, practically all Englishmen are con- 
vinced that Britain must be on good terms with America. 
That is one of the corner-stones of British foreign policy. 

Anglo-American relations are, indeed, inspired by a 
happy blend of sentiment and self-interest, which is the 
best guaranty for their stability. As peoples, we may 
sometimes rub each other the wrong way; but we both 
feel instinctively that we are kindred in blood and basic 
ideals. As nations, we may develop differences in policy; 
yet we both know that such differences are vastly out- 
weighed by the interests we have in common. We both 
realize profoundly that real enmity between us would be 
a hideous disaster which might well spell our common un- 
doing. This feeling is particularly keen in the dominions 
of the British Empire—Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
and the rest. The dominions know that conflict in the 
English-speaking world would be for them the worst of 
disasters. They are thus added links in the chain of friend- 
ship between Britain and America. 

All signs, therefore, point to lasting concord and grow- 
ing co-operation between the English-speaking peoples. 
Disagreements may arise, but they will be settled by the 
good sense and temperate reasonableness which charac- 


KINDRED BRITAIN 49 


terize both stocks. Not for nothing are we both mainly 
Nordic in blood! The intelligence and self-control inborn 
in the Nordic race can be trusted to give us sober second 
thoughts and to guard us against being swept off our feet 
by gusts of passion which might blind us to our larger 
interests. America and Britain will never again be foes; 
and so far as anything can be predicted, they seem des- 
tined to become steadily better friends. 


CHAPTER III 
THE NORDIC NORTH 


No part of Europe is more truly interesting than Scan- 
dinavia, the home of the three northern nations, Den- 
mark, Norway, and Sweden. The closer we observe them 
the greater becomes their significance. This is not, per- 
haps, apparent to the casual eye. These nations do not 
often appear in the limelight. Their doings are seldom 
good newspaper copy. Foreign press despatches tend to 
deal with the sensational and the ominous—political 
crises, falling currencies, threats of revolution, war rumors, 
and the like. 

Europe is a troubled place these days, and, taken as a 
whole, the outlook is far from bright. Yet here and there 
we do find bright spots, and the brightest of these is un- 
doubtedly Scandinavia. On the northern rim of a Europe 
rent by political and social dissensions, threatened with 
economic collapse, and menaced by next wars, there 
stands a group of peoples who are strixingly free from 
such troubles. Stable, moderately but consistently pros- 
perous, threatened neither by domestic convulsions nor 
by foreign foes, here are countries worth investigating. 

And the closer we look the more interesting do they 
become. We find the Scandinavian countries what they 
are to-day, not through sheer good luck, but through 


wise policy and intelligent action. These countries have 
50 


THE NORDIC NORTH 51 


had to face many of the difficulties and temptations that 
have beset their European fellows. The difference is that 
instead of making a mess of things, as has happened else- 
where, the Scandinavian peoples have dealt with their 
troubles coolly and constructively, and are solving them 
in peaceful, satisfactory fashion. 

Intelligence is, in fact, the key to Scandinavia’s present 
good fortune. The Scandinavian peoples to-day stand 
admittedly on a high plane. They are well to the fore- 
front among the truly progressive, civilized nations of the 
earth. In every field of human endeavor they are active, 
and they are keenly alive to all the intellectual, social, 
and artistic movements of our time. 

Now, how does all this come about? How do the Scan- 
dinavians get that way? The answer is: not by luck, 
but by using their brains. Nature certainly did not en- 
dow the Scandinavian countries with the resources that 
we are apt to think of as necessary to highly flourishing 
peoples. Scandinavia is naturally poor, with a cold climate 
and comparatively little fertile soil. Without unusually 
intelligent, energetic inhabitants, Scandinavia would have 
been backward, thinly populated, and generally insignif- 
icant. 

Yet just the opposite has happened. Small though 
these countries are compared with the big nations of 
the world, they are universally respected and their inde- 
pendence is secure. They are solidly prosperous. Placed 
though they are in a semibankrupt, distracted Europe, 
they are stable and peaceful. Faced though they are by 
serious problems, they are learning by past errors and 
are in a fair way to solve them. 


52 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


This last fact is the most important point of the whole 
matter. The Scandinavian peoples have in the past made 
bad blunders, for which they have paid dearly. But they 
have profited by their mistakes and they are learning to 
avoid such mistakes in the future. That is where they 
happily differ from other peoples, who either continue to 
make the same old mistakes without any serious effort to 
stop or, grown impatient at their consequent misfor- 
tunes, try to cure these by quack remedies and short 
cuts to some emotional millennium. 

The Scandinavian peoples, however, rarely let their 
emotions run away with them. They usually keep their 
feet on the ground, stick to their common sense, and think 
things through. The result is that they usually evolve a 
method of dealing with the particular difficulty in ques- 
tion which proves to be a real step forward. It may not 
look especially brilliant and it does not get big newspaper 
headlines. But it stays put and doesn’t have to be un- 
done. 

Take one notable instance of the way in which the 
Scandinavian peoples have dealt constructively with a 
great problem—the problem of war. War is undoubtedly 
one of the chief perils to modern civilization. The last 
war almost ruined Europe, yet already the next war hangs 
like a thundercloud on the political horizon. And Europe 
is not the only continent thus threatened. Other parts 
of the world are menaced by strife between nations or 
are scourged with those internal wars known as revolu- 
tions. It is one of our proudest boasts that we English- 
speaking peoples of the United States and the British 
Empire are a unique exception to the rule; that we stand 


THE NORDIC NORTH 53 


forth as a group of peoples between whom war has be- 
come not merely unlikely but impossible. 

Yet when we turn to Scandinavia we discover another 
group of peoples between whom war has become prac- 
tically unthinkable. And this is a noteworthy triumph of 
conscious intelligence, because neither by temperament, 
tradition, nor outward circumstances has such a state of 
affairs automatically come about. The Scandinavians are 
~ certainly not pacifists by nature. On the contrary, the 
old viking blood runs strongly in their veins. Several 
times during their history the Scandinavians were the 
terror of Europe. Furthermore, they have never fought 
so fiercely as when fighting among themselves. Scandi- 
navia’s past history has been largely a record of bloody 
internecine wars. In fact, these wars have been Scandi- 
navia’s chief stumbling-block to political power. Had the 
Scandinavians united instead of wasting their strength in 
fratricidal conflicts, they would probably to-day form one 
of the great nations of the earth. Instead of this, the 
Scandinavian peoples by their disunion not only lost to 
more powerful neighbors many lands once belonging to 
them but also raised between themselves barriers of 
hatred that tended to drive them still further asunder 
and made common action extremely difficult. 

Among less intelligent peoples this state of things might 
have gone on indefinitely. That is precisely what has 
happened among the Balkan peoples, for example, who, 
having fought each other for centuries, hate each other 
ferociously and are quite ready to fight again. Not so 
the Scandinavian peoples. Profiting by the lessons of 
the past, they have buried old feuds and have learned 


54 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


to settle their differences without war, and even without 
bitterness. The task has not been easy, for during the 
past twenty years alone they have been divided by dif- 
ferences so serious that among other peoples war, or at 
least lasting rancor, would have been inevitable. It is a 
true triumph of Scandinavian intelligence that not only 
has war been avoided but the way in which these dis- 
putes have been settled has actually led to increased 
sympathy and closer co-operation. When we come to 
view in detail events like the separation of Norway and 
Sweden and the grant by Denmark of practical indepen- 
dence to Iceland, we can better appreciate their deep 
significance. 

In this connection let us further note that these prob- 
lems have been solved spontaneously as they arose. No 
elaborate machinery of conciliation had been erected be- 
forehand to deal with them. No arbitration tribunal, no 
league, no loss of sovereignty was involved. When the 
dispute arose, the disputants met one another frankly 
and decided to sit down and talk matters over. They 
conducted the discussion like well-bred gentlemen, kept 
their tempers, avoided rows, and ultimately agreed on a 
settlement that was lasting and that formed the basis of 
increasing friendship for the future. How many other 
nations in this troubled world of ours can say the same? 

With such a record of constructive achievement, it is 
clear that the Scandinavian peoples well merit our close 
attention. Let us, then, see more in detail what are these 
Scandinavian lands and what sort of people are their 
inhabitants. 

Scandinavia consists of two peninsulas that almost 


THE NORDIC NORTH 55 


touch, one reaching down from the far north, the other 
jutting up from the mass of Central Europe to the south. 
The northern peninsula, which is very much the larger 
in size, is the’ home of the Norwegians and Swedes. The 
relatively small southern peninsula, together with its 
adjacent islands, is peopled by the Danish nation. 

Denmark has an area of about 16,000 square miles and 
a population of a trifle under 3,300,000 souls. Its capital 
is Copenhagen, a city of nearly 600,000 inhabitants, with 
a fine port, which is a centre of Baltic commerce. The 
climate of Denmark is damp and fairly mild, being not 
unlike that of England. Much of its soil is fertile, and 
the Danes have made the most of this by building up a 
remarkable system of dairying and other specialized 
agricultural pursuits. Denmark has, however, neither 
mineral wealth nor water-power, and thus lacks the essen- 
tials of industrial development. This, together with her 
small size, sets close limits to her further growth in wealth 
and population. 

Norway and Sweden are each much larger than Den- 
mark, though less fertile, much of their territory being 
barren plateau or rugged mountains. They are separated 
from each other by a high mountain range. This is the 
reason why Norway and Sweden are separate nations. 
Even to-day, with good roads and railways, there is little 
land communication between them. Nature has in fact 
placed them like two men back to back and looking in 
opposite directions, Norway gazing westward out into 
the Atlantic Ocean, Sweden gazing eastward over the 
Baltic Sea. With their cold climates and scarcity of fer- 
tile land, neither country has been able to develop a 


56 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


flourishing agriculture. However, Sweden has consider- 
able mineral wealth, especially iron, while both countries 
have an abundance of water-power. With the develop- 
ment of hydroelectricity, this water power has been a 
great source of prosperity and has formed the basis for 
an important and rapidly growing industrial life. Further- 
more, since only a small part of these natural resources 
has as yet been developed, both countries have great 
possibilities for future growth in wealth and population. 
Norway has an area of 125,000 square miles with a pop- 
ulation of about 2,700,000. Sweden’s area is 173,000 
square miles with just under 6,000,000 population. 

Such are the three Scandinavian nations. Taken to- 
gether, they are a group of some importance, covering a 
considerable area and with a combined population of 
12,000,000. Furthermore, there is the adjacent country 
of Finland, which is so intimately related to Sweden in 
both blood and culture that, in the broader sense, it may 
be counted as belonging to the Scandinavian family. If_ 
that be done, the population of the Scandinavian group 
is raised to more than 15,000,000. Lastly, considering 
the Scandinavian stock in its world aspect, we must re- 
member the immense emigration of Scandinavians to 
various parts of the world, especially to the United States 
and Canada. It is probable that something like 3,000,000 
of the inhabitants of the United States are of Scandi- 
navian birth or descent. 

Here, then, is a group of peoples numbering from 12,- 
000,000 to 15,000,000 souls, solidly planted in the north- 
west corner of Europe. These peoples are connected by 
close ties of language and culture. They are also bound 


THE NORDIC NORTH 57 


together by the even closer tie of blood, for they are near 
kin. The Scandinavians are almost all pure-blooded 
members of the Nordic race—that tall, blond stock which 
forms the predominant element in the British Isles, the 
United States, and the self-governing dominions of the 
British Empire, together with many parts of Europe, like 
northern Germany, northern France, the Netherlands, 
and northwestern Russia. The Scandinavians are thus 
blood brothers of the Anglo-Saxons, and both stocks show 
to the full those striking qualities of creative energy, 
political ability, self-reliance, self-control, and common 
sense that have everywhere distinguished the Nordic 
race. 

Scandinavia is in fact an old Nordic brood land, a 
reservoir and breeding-ground of Nordic stock, sending 
forth for ages wave after wave of Nordic migration. 
Many of the Nordic tribes that overran the Roman Em- 
pire and settled the British Isles came from Scandinavia. 
Pure Scandinavians were the vikings, who not only ranged 
Europe from Spain to Russia but also fared forth in their 
tiny ships across the trackless northern ocean, settling 
Iceland and Greenland, and actually discovering North 
America, thus anticipating Columbus by 500 years. 
Strange accident of history! If Leif Ericson and his Norse 
rovers had voyaged a little father southward and had 
planted a colony that could well have prospered, North 
America might centuries ago have become a Greater Scan- 
dinavia and the whole history of the world would have 
been changed. 

It was not to be. Scandinavia missed her great oppor- 
tunity overseas. She also lost her European opportunity. 


58 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE, 


Instead of uniting; the Scandinavian peoples wasted their 
abounding energies in fratricidal wars that were their com- 
mon undoing. When we look back on the medizval might 
of Denmark and on the power of Sweden from Gustavus 
Adolphus to Charles XII, it is not too much to say that 
a united Scandinavia might have forged a Baltic empire 
that would have endured to this day. Instead of this, 
the rising empires of Russia and Germany broke Scan- 
dinavia’s resistance piecemeal, cut away its borderlands, 
and confined it to its ancient bounds. A century ago the 
world had practically forgotten the Scandinavian peoples, 
regarding them as little nations whose day was over and 
whose very existence would henceforth depend upon the 
mutual jealousies of powerful neighbors, tempered per- 
haps by sentimental consideration for a heroic past. 

This attitude was not strange, because a century ago 
the Scandinavian nations seemed to have no future worth 
speaking of. Their present prosperity is in striking con- 
trast to their past misfortunes. A century ago the Scan- 
dinavian countries were profoundly poor, most of their 
present sources of wealth being either unknown or unde- 
veloped. This poverty was reflected by the sparseness of 
population, Scandinavia at that time being able to sup- 
port less than a third of its present inhabitants. And the 
prospects did not look bright. Sweden, with her cold, 
frostbound soil, could never hope greatly to extend her 
cultivable area. Denmark, though possessed of rich farm- 
land, was very small. Norway was but a strip of barren 
mountains. 

Nevertheless, despite all these handicaps, the Scandi- 
navian peoples turned to and showed the stuff that was 


THE NORDIC NORTH 59 


in them. Putting behind them the bitter memories of 
their defeats and their lost provinces, they resolved to 
make the most of what was left. Applying their inborn 
energy and intelligence to an intensive development of 
their natural resources, they soon laid the foundations of 
their present prosperity. 

In all three countries it is the same story of grit, thrift, 
hard work, and intelligent insight making much of little 
and turning every new development to full account. Take 
Denmark, for example. Lacking, as she does, minerals, 
coal, and water-power, Denmark’s one real asset was some 
good farmland. But there was so little of it that, culti- 
vated in the ordinary way, it would never support a large 
population. The Danes therefore determined to specialize 
on high-grade lines for export. Accordingly, they went in 
for scientific dairying, pedigreed live stock, and certain 
high-class agricultural specialties. Gradually they built 
up a marvellous system of production, distribution, and 
marketing on co-operative lines. It is not too much to 
say that the Danes have industrialized agriculture. As 
time passed and western Europe became covered with 
cities and factories the Danes found an ever-increasing 
market for their products. ‘The development of cold 
storage and cheap long-distance ocean transportation 
threatened to hit them for a while by bringing in compe- 
tition from distant parts of the world, like North America, 
Siberia, and China. But the Danes triumphed over this 
also by concentrating on quality. More and more, Danish 
butter, Danish eggs, and Danish agricultural specialties 
got the reputation for being the best on the European 
markets and thus fetched fancy prices. Danish agricul- 


60 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


ture is thus the solid foundation of Denmark’s economic 
life, and it is all a triumph of intelligent, skilful planning. 
Besides her agriculture, Denmark has a large merchant 
marine and a prosperous fishing fleet, while her industries, 
though relatively less important, are profitable and high- 
erade. 

Another point that should be noted is Denmark’s social 
soundness and the wide diffusion of prosperity. The Dan- 
ish countryside is inhabited, not by peasants in the ordi- 
nary European sense, but by intelligent, well-educated, 
prosperous yeomen, owning and loving their land—in 
other words, farmers in the true American sense of the 
word. Even in the towns there are not the contrasts be- 
tween great wealth and grinding poverty observable in 
many other lands. Furthermore, taxation statistics show 
that the national wealth is becoming more generally dis- 
tributed; and this, be it noted, is due to natural economic 
eer ADEN Danes are too intelligent, to tinker with 
crank legislation. 

Thus Denmark advances steadily despite all the troubles 
of her European neighbors. It is estimated that the na- 
tional wealth of Denmark has doubled in the last twenty 
years. As might be imagined under such circumstances, 
the health and vigor of the Danish people are excellent. 
The average expectation of life is fifty-six years for men 
and fifty-nine years for women. A century ago it was only 
forty years for men and forty-three for women. This 
clearly shows the great advance of health and vigor that 
has taken place during that period. As might be expected, 
the population shows an increase healthily adjusted to 
the rate of economic and social progress. At present the 


THE NORDIC NORTH 61 


net increase in population is a trifle more than one per 
cent a year. 

The economic development of Norway and Sweden, 
though different in direction from that of Denmark, is 
equally striking and equally due to energetic, intelligent 
foresight. At first this development was largely maritime, 
both countries building up flourishing merchant marines 
and fishing fleets. The perfecting of the steamship, for 
instance, enabled Norway to develop fully possibilities 
like the Arctic fisheries. Later, Norway began to capital- 
ize her scenery, becoming one of the chief tourist resorts 
of the world. Every year great floating hotels bring multi- 
tudes of travellers to enjoy the beauties of Norway’s 
magnificent fiords and to gaze at the midnight sun. Mean- 
while Sweden was fast developing her mineral wealth. 
Until the age of railroads, steam, and electricity this had 
been but little exploited, because most of Sweden’s min- 
erals, particularly her iron deposits, lie in the far north. 
To-day Sweden is an important iron-and-steel-producing 
country, specializing in high-grade lines. 

The greatest single factor in the prosperity of Norway 
and Sweden is, however, the development of water-power. 
Its importance is comparatively recent. Both these moun- 
tainous lands have a multitude of waterfalls and rushing 
streams; but formerly these, though things of beauty, 
were of little practical use. The development of elec- 
tricity, however, entirely changed the situation. Hydro- 
electric power was now seen to be available in almost 
limitless quantities, and this white coal, as it has been 
aptly named, has been increasingly harnessed to a myriad 
industrial activities, so that both Norway and Sweden 


62 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


to-day possess a flourishing industrial life. And this may 
perhaps be still in its infancy, because neither country is 
at present using more than one-tenth of the total hydro- 
electric power that is available. The perfecting of long- 
distance electric-power transmission promises soon to 
open up a great new source of wealth, since Norway and 
Sweden will be capable of supplying the power needs of 
all North-Central Europe. 

Economie and social conditions in Norway and Sweden 
bear a general resemblance to those of Denmark. In both 
countries the standard of living, health, and education is 
high. In both countries the national wealth is rapidly in- 
creasing and is well distributed, while the rural popula- 
tion consists, as in Denmark, of sturdy, free-spirited yeo- 
man farmers. The population shows a steady, healthy 
increase of about one per cent a year, and, should the 
development of natural resources continue at its present 
rate, large further increases of population can be supported 
in the future. 

Such are the economic and social achievements of the 
Scandinavian peoples. Let us now examine their polit- 
ical achievements, which have insured their stability and 
have saved them both from tragic quarrels among them- 
selves and from dangerous feuds with their neighbors. 
As we have already remarked, these political achieve- 
ments have been of a high order. During the past twenty 
years the Scandinavian peoples have to their credit a 
whole series of successful political settlements that rank 
among the finest examples of human intelligence, fore- 
sight, and self-control. 

The first of these political tests was the crisis that arose 


THE NORDIC NORTH 63 


between Norway and Sweden, resulting in the separation 
of the two countries in the year 1905. Though occupying 
the same peninsula, the Swedes and Norwegians have 
never been one people. Sundered by a barrier of lofty 
mountains, they had slight physical contact and accord- 
ingly went their respective ways. Such contact as they 
did have was usually of a hostile nature. For centuries 
Norway was politically united to Denmark, and loyally 
supported it in the long series of Dano-Swedish wars. 
When the Vienna Congress of 1814 remade the map of 
Europe after the Napoleonic wars, it took Norway away 
from Denmark and assigned it to Sweden as compensation 
for Finland, conquered by Russia a few years before. 
But this diplomatic transfer did not result in a union of 
hearts. Though Sweden granted the Norwegians prac- 
tically full autonomy, they remained dissatisfied and 
chafed at political union with their Swedish neighbors. 
Chronic disputes culminated in the year 1905, when Nor- 
way seceded and proclaimed its independence. 

This was rebellion. Sweden was aflame with wrath, 
especially since most Swedes believed that Norway was 
guilty of nothing short of treason in face of a common 
foe—Russia. For Czarist Russia was at that very mo- 
ment destroying the liberties of Finland, hitherto an 
- autonomous dependency of Russia, but now being bru- 
tally transformed into a Russian intrenched camp that 
threatened all Scandinavia with the shadow of the Rus- 
sian bear. 

For a moment war between Norway and Sweden seemed 
inevitable. Swedish voices demanded the punishment and 
subjection of the “traitorous rebels.’ Norwegian voices 


64 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


answered bold defiance. Both sides mobilized and made 
ready for a war that would inevitably have been of a 
most stubborn and sanguinary character. 

But the war did not take place. Intelligent, sober sec- 
ond thought—the inborn heritage of the race—warned 
instinctively against fatal disaster. Both sides began to 
figure out the consequences. Cool-headed Swedes soon 
realized that to hold down Norway against the fixed de- 
termination of its people was in the long run impossible. 
Furthermore, both peoples came to see that such a war, 
whatever its outcome, would leave them alike at Russia’s 
mercy. Accordingly, the crisis was settled without shed- 
ding a drop of blood. Sweden recognized Norway’s inde- 
pendence, and Norway gladly accepted Sweden’s demand 
for the total disarmament of their common frontier. 

The results of this peaceful settlement were of the 
happiest nature. Within a few years all traces of mutual 
bitterness had vanished. On the contrary, since causes 
of friction had been removed, the two peoples began 
looking at their common interests. The Russian peril 
was a powerful promoter of kindred feeling. When the 
Great War broke out in 1914 both countries made haste 
to affirm their friendship, for, simultaneously with their 
declarations of neutrality, they formally agreed that under 
no circumstances should one country take hostile action 
against the other. 

An even more remarkable example of intelligent for- 
bearance was shown in the settlement of the Danish- 
Icelandic controversy. Iceland, that strange land of snow- 
fields and volcanoes lying in the remote recesses of the 
Arctic Ocean, was settled more than 1,000 years ago by 


THE NORDIC NORTH 65 


rebel vikings refusing obedience to the first Norwegian 
kings. Eventually brought under Norwegian control, 
Iceland passed with Norway under Danish rule; but when 
Norway was joined to Sweden in 1814, Iceland remained 
under the Danish crown. It may seem strange that the 
sparse population of this forbidding land—only 90,000 
souls—should have cherished separatist feelings; yet such 
was the case. The old Norse love of freedom was in the 
blood, and as time passed the Icelanders, despite wide 
autonomy, chafed under Danish overlordship, precisely 
as their Norwegian brethren did at political union with 
the Swedes. 

Here, if ever, was a test of Scandinavian forbearance 
and self-control. A handful of people scattered along the 
shores of a distant and barren island were asserting their 
claim to independence against a wealthy nation of 3,000,- 
000. Denmark could have crushed Iceland at a stroke. 
In fact, dependent as the island is on imported food- 
stuffs, a mere blockade of its ports would have starved 
the Icelanders into submission. 

Yet the Danes never even considered such measures. 
The dispute was temperately argued out, and a solution 
was finally arrived at satisfactory to both sides. By the 
Act of Union of November 30, 1918, Iceland was declared 
_ to be a free sovereign state, united with Denmark by a 
personal bond of union under the same king. Certain 
matters, especially foreign affairs, are conducted by Den- 
mark; but the act may be revised in the year 1940 at the 
option of the contracting parties. 

This settlement, like that between Norway and Sweden, 
is producing the happiest results, both Danes and Ice- 


66 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


landers experiencing an increase in mutual regard and 
common aspiration toward larger Scandinavian interests. 

These two examples show how Scandinavia has solved 
her internal problems of political readjustment. They 
certainly merit the attention of thinking people every- 
where. Yet no less worthy of the world’s attention is 
Scandinavia’s attitude toward her neighbors, partic- 
ularly regarding lost or unredeemed territories. One of 
the most disquieting and discouraging aspects of present- 
day Europe is the fierce clash of imperialistic appetites 
displayed by most of the European nations. This is not 
a matter of size; some of the small nations are more greedy 
and reckless than the larger ones. In certain cases the 
claims advanced by nationalistic propagandas are based 
on the most absurd perversions of history, or even upon 
the brazen argument of strategic frontiers. Some of the 
arguments would be laughable if they were not so tragic. 
Territories lost centuries ago are to be redeemed, ancient 
defeats are to be avenged, long-established borders must 
be rectified. The Versailles Peace Conference, at the end 
of the Great War, was turned into a perfect bedlam by 
the wild cries of greedy propagandists after all they could 
get regardless of consequences, and too many of these 
unsound claims were, alas, allowed; the upshot being that 
Europe is to-day cursed by a whole crop of nationalistic 
troubles threatening new wars. 

In striking contrast to all this stands the attitude of 
Scandinavia. Not that Scandinavia lacks such claims if 
she cared to raise them. The Scandinavian nations have 
lost many territories to neighboring states. In two cases 
the loss was comparatively recent and still keenly felt. 


THE NORDIC NORTH 67 


These were Sweden’s loss of Finland to Russia in 1809 
and Denmark’s loss of Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia in 
1864. At the close of the late war Denmark and Sweden 
both had opportunities to regain at least portions of these 
lost territories. Let us see how they conducted them- 
selves. Their attitude is in such refreshing contrast to 
that of most other European nations that it well merits 
our attention. 

Consider first the case of Schleswig-Holstein. This 
borderland between Denmark and Germany was con- 
quered by Prussia in the year 1864. The southern province 
—Holstein—is thoroughly German in blood and speech. 
The northern province—Schleswig—is predominatingly 
German in its southern part; but the northern portion, 
adjoining Denmark, is mostly Danish in blood and lan- 
guage, while there is a considerable Danish element in 
the central portion as well. By the peace of 1864 it was 
agreed that a plebiscite should be held in north Schleswig 
in order that the inhabitants might themselves decide 
their political allegiance. Prussia, however, disregarded 
this proviso. The plebiscite was never held and the Dan- 
ish districts were ruthlessly Germanized. 

Denmark thus had a first-class grievance, which was 
recognized by the Versailles Conference. Indeed, a con- 
siderable body of public opinion in the Allied countries, 
particularly in France, urged the Danes to assert their 
historic rights to all Schleswig-Holstein. If Denmark had 
said the word she could probably have had both provinces 
for the asking. Imagine what would have happened if 
such an opportunity had been offered most European 
nations! But not the sane, far-seeing Scandinavians! The 


68 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


bulk of Danish public opinion rejected such suggestions 
without a moment’s hesitation. To poison their national 
life by annexing more than 1,000,000 recalcitrant Ger- 
mans and to hang about Denmark’s neck the millstone 
of a German war of revenge was clean against Danish 
common sense. Danish feeling crystallized in a popular 
slogan: All that is Danish. No More and No Less! 

That was the watchword, and thus was it settled. The 
destiny of Schleswig was determined by the free vote of 
its inhabitants. ‘The province was divided into three 
zones, each zone to vote separately. In fact, before the 
vote was held, the Danish Government voluntarily ruled 
the southern zone out of consideration as being clearly 
German, thus avoiding the unnecessary friction that the 
holding of a vote might have caused. Ultimately the 
northern zone voted for union with Denmark by a vote 
of three to one. The middle zone, on the contrary, voted 
to remain German by more than two to one. This result 
was, of course, disappointing to Denmark. There was 
even some talk of disregarding the vote and annexing the 
territory. But the bulk of Danish public opinion refused 
to be stampeded: All that is Danish. No More and No 
Less! That was what the Danish people had promised, 
and they kept their word. 

The next notable instance of Scandinavian moderation 
was the attitude of Sweden in the Aland Islands con- 
troversy. This rocky archipelago lies in the Baltic Sea 
midway between Sweden and Finland. Sweden ceded 
the Alands to Russia along with Finland in 1809, but 
always regretted their loss, since they virtually dominate 
Sweden’s capital, Stockholm. When Finland declared its 


THE NORDIC NORTH 69 


independence after the Russian revolution of 1917, the 
inhabitants of the Aland Islands, who are of pure Swedish 
blood, declared that they wanted to go back to Sweden 
rather than to form part of the new Finnish state. Natu- 
rally, Swedish public opinion warmly favored the recovery 
of the Alands. But the Finns strongly objected, declar- 
ing that the islands formed part of their country. The 
question was warmly debated on both sides, considerable 
bitterness developed, and there was even talk of war. 
Sweden was so much stronger than Finland that she 
could have seized the islands at will. But Sweden resisted 
the temptation. 

Here again Scandinavian common sense and far-sight- 
edness prevailed. Sweden’s true policy was to make fast 
friends with Finland and bind Finland to the Scandi- 
navian family of nations, where she really belonged, thus 
banishing the Russian peril. To seize the Alands would 
embitter Finland and perhaps drive her back into Rus- 
sia’s arms. Accordingly, Sweden offered to submit the 
matter to arbitration, and the case was tried by the 
League of Nations. The League awarded the Alands to 
Finland on condition that they be permanently neutral- 
ized and that their inhabitants be granted full autonomy. 
Another victory for peace and sanity had been won. 

Such is the record of the Scandinavian peoples in their 
dealings both with one another and with their neighbors. 
It is a brilliant record that may well be pondered not 
merely by Europe but by the whole world. It is also a 
striking display of those inborn qualities of intelligent 
foresight, high political ability, self-control, and common 
sense that are the birthright of the great Nordic race, to 


70 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


which the Scandinavians belong. These things did not 
happen by chance; they happened because they were 
thought out and carried out by well-bred brains. Once 
again the fundamental importance of race in human af- 
fairs is clearly shown. 

It is interesting to note that this basic fact is consciously 
appreciated in Scandinavia, perhaps more generally than 
anywhere else. More and more, Scandinavian public opin- 
ion is realizing the true significance of race, as distinguished 
from other factors, like language and nationality, which 
elsewhere are apt to confuse the issue. 

This growing appreciation of the racial idea is produc- 
ing excellent results. 

It is drawing the Scandinavian blood brcthers into a 
closer and more intimate association. It is also inspiring 
them with a heightened desire to do their utmost in sav- 
ing the threatened fabric of European civilization. 

And surely the Scandinavian peoples are capable of 
playing a part in Europe’s reconstruction far greater than 
might appear from their mere size and population. One 
of the things that the whole world needs to learn is the 
fact that quality is much more important than quantity. 
In Scandinavia we surely have quality. Here are fully 
12,000,000 people, racially homogeneous and of an un- 
usually high grade; intelligent, progressive, and pros- 
perous; with no serious internal differences and no ex- 
ternal foes. Certainly, Scandinavia is to-day the brightest 
spot on the Continent of Europe. 


CHAPTER IV 
COMPOSITE FRANCE 


FRANCE is in many ways a land of paradox. Viewed from 
afar or seen by the passing traveller, she presents a surface 
appearance that is deceptive. Things are frequently not 
what they seem and outward semblance does not corre- 
spond to inner reality. More perhaps than in any other 
European country, one must get below the surface to un- 
derstand the true trend of affairs. 

The first impression which France gives the stranger is 
that of intense unity. A compact country, with a cen- 
tralized government, an old civilization, and a special cul- 
ture, both land and people have a marked French stamp 
which is unmistakable wherever you cross the French 
frontier. 

And when you come to meet Frenchmen this impres- 
sion of unity is deepened. In manners, habits, and or- 
dinary conversation Frenchmen seem alike. Above all, 
they are strongly nationalistic. Almost without excep- 
tion, Frenchmen profess an ardent national patriotism. 
They are forever talking and writing about it. “La 
France” and “la Patrie’—the Fatherland—are words 
continually on French lips. Furthermore, Frenchmen 
emphasize the unity of their country. ‘‘France, one and 
indivisible,” is a stock phrase. Lastly, this unitary doc- 
trine is reflected in the centralization that characterizes 


every phase of French national life. Government, finance, 
71 


72 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


education, art, and literature—all are centred in Paris, 
the mighty capital. Seeing these things, what wonder if 
most foreign observers come to think of the French as a 
homogeneous people, essentially of one stock? 

That, at least, is the prevailing idea concerning France 
and the French. And yet it is very far from being the case. 
The truth of the matter is that the French are a nation 
but not a race. France is in fact a good example of na- 
tional, as distinguished from racial, unity. This does not 
mean that the French nation is likely to break yp. But it 
does mean that French unity lacks the racial element. 
And this lack the French instinctively feel to be a weak- 
ness and a possible source of danger to their national 
life. That is Just the reason why they are always stressing 
their unity and why they favor extreme centralization. 
When people keep emphasizing something as supremely 
desirable it is a pretty good sign that they are not quite 
sure of it. We do not congratulate ourselves on the air we 
breathe; we just breathe it and take it for granted. 

Compare France with its neighbor England. Both are 
strongly marked nations. The chief difference is that Eng- 
land has racial unity while France hasnot. Englishmen are 
overwhelmingly of one stock—the Nordic race. The popu- 
lation of France, on the other hand, is highly composite; 
it is made up of all three of the European races. This 
difference in the racial make-up of France and England 
explains in great part why the two peoples are so different 
in past history and present outlook. England’s develop- 
ment has been at once more stable and more consistent; 
English party quarrels have been less bitter, while there 
has never been a violent breach with the past like that 


COMPOSITE FRANCE 73 


of the French Revolution. Also, English nationality has 
been mainly a spontaneous growth, a natural evolution; 
whereas French nationality has been largely due to ex- 
ternal causes like foreign invasion, combined with con- 
scious efforts of the French ruling classes to weld the 
country into a strong political unity. England was a na- 
tion long before France, yet the process was so normal 
and imperceptible that Englishmen have never thought or 
talked much about it. In France, however, national unity 
was attained only after great difficulties, so that in France 
nationality became a conscious principle, inspiring passion- 
ate zeal of an almost religious character. It was revolu- 
tionary France that proclaimed the doctrine of nation- 
ality, which asserts that national feeling is more powerful 
than blood in binding men together. 

This doctrine has profoundly affected the thought not 
merely of France but of the whole world, and is still 
widely believed. However, the discoveries of modern 
science are undermining its authority. We now know 
that nationality is at bottom merely a state of mind, 
which may conceal but cannot really abolish those pro- 
found differences of instinct, temperament, and intelli- 
gence that are inborn in persons of different racial stocks. 

France herself is the best proof of this. Despite the 
fact that for generations everything has been done to 
break down local distinctions and to unify her population, 
the inhabitants of various parts of France differ from one 
another in many important ways. French investigators of 
racial matters admit this frankly. Says the well-known 
French writer, Gustave Le Bon: » 

“In France, the Provengal is very different from the 


74 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


Breton, the inhabitant of Auvergne from the inhabitant 
of Normandy. Unfortunately, these types are very dis- 
tinct as regards their ideas and character. It is difficult 
in consequence to devise institutions which shall suit them 
all equally well, and it is only by dint of energetic concen- 
tration that it is possible to lend them some community 
of thought. Our profound divergences of sentiment and 
belief, and the political upheavals which result there- 
from, are due, in the main, to differences of mental con- 
stitution.” 

As a matter of fact, the policy of centralizing every- 
thing in Paris has produced grave disadvantages, which 
have led some Frenchmen to advocate granting local self- 
government and encouraging intellectual life in the prov- 
inces instead of draining it all to the capital. This is the 
movement known as regionalism. But regionalism is 
viewed with disfavor verging on alarm both by the bulk 
of French public opinion and by the government. Clemen- 
ceau voiced this uneasiness very well when he said of 
regionalism : 

“Tt might correct those evils of excessive centraliza- 
tion from which we have suffered and still suffer so cruelly. 
And yet, somehow, we feel that if we relaxed our unifying 
bonds, France might well be lost.” 

It is interesting to note that the French dislike to ad- 
mit the importance of race in human affairs. Most French- 
men still cling to the old doctrine of nationality, and even 
deny that racial differences amount to much. Leading 
French students of racial matters like De Lapouge and Le 
Bon have told me personally that their writings are not 
only unpopular but have often been condemned as down- 


COMPOSITE FRANCE 75 


right unpatriotic in official circles. This reveals a state 
of mind in the French people which is of unquestionable 
importance to the world at large. France’s insistence upon 
nationalism and minimizing of race, though due primarily 
to her internal political situation, affects strongly her 
attitude toward her vast colonial empire in Africa and ac- 
counts largely for policies like the creation of her Black 
Army for service in Europe, which we will later examine 
more in detail. 

Although the three races which make up France’s popu- 
lation have been settled there for ages, they have not in- 
termarried to the extent which might be imagined, but 
still remain largely segregated in different regions. The 
reason for this is found in the geography of the country. 
Geographically speaking, France divides into three parallel 
zones, running east and west. Northern France is mainly 
plain and valley country, open and fertile. Southern 
France is of somewhat similar character. Between these 
two well-favored regions thrusts an intermediate zone of 
relatively barren mountains, highlands, and plateaus, 
stretching clear across Central France from the Alps to 
Brittany. However, this barrier is not absolute; it is 
broken by two corridors of fertile lowland, which form 
natural highways between north and south. The broader 
of these corridors runs down through France from the 
open valleys and wide plains around Paris until it reaches 
the plain country about Bordeaux. The second corridor 
cuts down through Eastern France, narrowing to the 
valley of the River Rhone and then broadening out into 
the coastal plains that fringe the Mediterranean Sea. 

These corridors through the upland belt together form 


76 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


one of the keys to French history. If they had not existed, 
if the upland zone had been unbroken, there would have 
been no France, but rather two, or even three, separate 
nations. Along those two natural highways invading 
hosts have passed easily northward or southward, as the 
case might be, conquering the whole of France and thus 
bringing north and south under the same sway. But on 
the other hand, the presence of that intermediate upland 
belt has broken the full sweep of these invasions, restricted 
the numbers of the invaders, and thus prevented a gen- 
eral mixture of conquerors and conquered. Race lines 
have in fact always tended to follow geographical lines. 

Both racially and geographically, present-day France 
can be described much as Cesar described ancient Gaul 
—divided into three parts. 

It is really extraordinary when we observe how closely 
the racial make-up of Gaul—the ancient name for France 
—corresponds to the racial make-up of France to-day. 
Nordics, Alpines, and Mediterraneans were then grouped 
geographically much as they are now. When Cesar con- 
quered Gaul, and thus brought it out of the twilight of 
barbarism into the light of world history, he found the 
south inhabited mainly by the slender, dark-complexioned 
race known as Mediterranean, the north mainly inhabited 
by the tall, blond race known as Nordic, while the inter- 
mediate uplands were occupied by the stocky, round- 
headed Alpine race, living in subjection to a Nordic 
aristocracy which had conquered the uplands a short 
time before and were beginning to push down through 
the fertile corridors between the uplands to the conquest 
of the Mediterranean south. 


COMPOSITE FRANCE 77 


Cesar’s conquest of Gaul illustrates another striking 
feature of French history—the sudden shifts of fortune 
suffered by its various racial elements. Cesar’s conquest 
is in fact merely one of a long series of changes in the bal- 
ance of power from the hands of one racial element to 
those of another which is still going on. To-day, for ex- 
ample, the Alpine element in the French population is 
gaining so rapidly at the expense of both Nordics and 
Mediterraneans that the process must, unless speedily 
checked, produce profound changes in every phase of 
French national life. 

This rapid rise of the Alpine element in present-day 
France is all the more interesting because it is the first 
time since the dawn of history that such a thing has hap- 
pened. For ages the French Alpines have been continu- 
ously dominated by either the Nordic or Mediterranean 
elements. This Alpine stock, relatively passive and unin- 
telligent, but extremely tenacious, has hitherto formed 
the solid yet humble base of the French social system. 
Hard-working, thrifty, clinging to the soil, caring little 
for politics, and contributing little to either art or ideas, 
the French Alpine has been the typical peasant, the man 
with the hoe, accepting stolidly the rule of more active 
and intelligent stocks, yet surviving doggedly the worst 
misfortunes and increasing rapidly in numbers whenever 
conditions have not been too unfavorable. More than 
once the Alpine element has been crowded back upon the 
poor and infertile uplands which from time immemorial 
have been its strongholds. But there it has stood its 
ground, multiplied, and spread out again when circum- 
stances changed in its favor. Now for the past century a 


78 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


number of causes have favored the Alpines as never before, 
the result being that to-day this element is more numer- 
ous than the Nordic and Mediterranean put together, 
and bids fair to turn France within a few generations 
into a land overwhelmingly Alpine in race. 

The full significance of this racial change will be better 
appreciated if we glance backward at the racial changes 
of the past. When Cesar and his legions invaded Gaul 
the Nordics were the dominant element. The Roman 
conquest, however, radically altered the situation. The 
Nordic Gauls put up a furious resistance, were slaugh- 
tered or enslaved wholesale, and were permanently 
broken. On the other hand, their Alpine subjects did little 
fighting, submitted to Roman rule, and continued to be 
the peasantry under the new order as they had been under 
the old. The real gainers were the Mediterranean ele- 
ments. Welcoming the Romans, who were blood kin, they 
took naturally to Roman civilization. During the five 
centuries of Roman rule Gaul became increasingly Medi- 
terraneanized. The many cities and towns which sprang 
up were inhabited mainly by Mediterraneans, drawn not 
only from Gaul but from other parts of the Roman world. 

Then came another dramatic shift of fortune. Roman 
civilization decayed and finally collapsed beneath a flood 
of Nordic barbarians pouring down from Germany. The 
cities and towns were ravaged, and with them perished 
most of their Mediterranean inhabitants. The Mediter- 
ranean element in France was again confined to the south. 
The north was once more stocked with a Nordic popula- 
tion, which spread as a conquering aristocracy over the 
central uplands and even into the southern plains. As 


COMPOSITE FRANCE 79 


for the Alpine peasantry, they bowed their heads to the 
storm and again became the serfs of Nordic masters, Just 
as they had been before Ceesar’s day. 

For a thousand years France was a predominantly Nor- 
dic land. The ruling classes were everywhere mainly Nor- 
dic in blood and set the tone to French life. It is striking 
to note how different the French spirit was in the Middle 
Ages from what it is now. There was then an individuali- 
stic energy, a fierce self-assertiveness, and a richness of 
local life which are rare in the centralized, regulated 
France of to-day. That was the Nordic spirit, stimulated 
by a dash of Mediterranean blood. In all this the Alpine 
peasant had practically no share. 

Nordic ascendancy in France continued down to the 
French Revolution, a little more than a century ago. And 
yet long before the revolution France had been getting 
steadily less Nordic and more Alpine, this racial shift 
being revealed by subtle changes in both spirit and insti- 
tutions. The main reason for Nordic decline was the end- 
less series of foreign, civil, and religious wars which raged 
for centuries. In France, as elsewhere, war proved to be 
the Nordic’s worst enemy. A born soldier, the Nordic 
always does most of the fighting and suffers most of the 
losses. Another reason for Nordic decline was the estab- 
lishment of despotic monarchy. It is a significant fact 
that in their struggle for power the French kings found 
their stanchest allies among the largely Alpine middle 
classes, while their bitterest enemies were the free-spirited, 
individualistic Nordic aristocracy. To be sure, when the 
king had broken their resistance he did not destroy the 
aristocrats, but turned them into idle courtiers loaded 


80 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


with honors and privileges. Yet this was merely a subtle 
way of ruining them, because they thereby became social 
parasites hated by the people. 

Then the monarchy itself decayed, and after that came 
the revolution. Although political in form, the French 
Revolution had a racial aspect far more important than is 
usually realized. It was largely a revolt of the Alpine 
and Mediterranean elements against the Nordic ruling 
class. The revolutionary leaders openly boasted that they 
were avenging themselves on the descendants of the 
Nordic Franks, who had dominated them since the fall 
of Rome. Asa revolutionary orator shouted in a memo- 
rable speech against the aristocrats, “Let us send them 
back to their German marshes, whence they came!” 
Eye-witnesses of the Reign of Terror have left us vivid pic- 
tures of how the dark-haired mob surging around the guil- 
lotine yelled with special delight whenever the executioner 
would hold up the head of some French lady, swinging the 
head by its long blond tresses for the amusement of the 
crowd. 

The revolution marks, indeed, a turning-point in the 
racial history of France. It started that rapid decline of 
the Nordic element which is still in full swing. Not only 
was the Nordic aristocracy hopelessly broken but the Nor- 
dic strain in the general population was weeded out faster 
than ever. The revolution caused a series of terrible wars, 
which were continued under Napoleon. For twenty-three 
years France was fighting most of Europe. Millions of 
Frenchmen perished on the battle-field, and, as usual, the 
Nordics were the worst sufferers. It has been shown that 
at the end of this war period the average stature of French 


COMPOSITE FRANCE 81 


army recruits had been lowered nearly four inches. This 
is striking proof of how the tall Nordics had been weeded 
out of the population in favor of the shorter Alpine and 
Mediterranean elements. 

Although a clear majority of the French population is 
to-day Alpine in race the minority elements still play a 
greater part in the national life than their mere numbers 
would indicate. This is particularly true in certain fields. 
Nordics contribute most to science and invention, while 
in literature and art honors are shared between Nordics 
and Mediterraneans. On the other hand, politics “and 
government are falling more and more into Alpine hands, 
as is natural for a majority under democratic political 
institutions. In fact, the general tone of French national 
life is becoming increasingly Alpine in character. This un- 
questionably makes for solidity. Yet many French writers 
deplore the lack of individual initiative and the reliance 
upon the state which the average Frenchman displays. 

Both the virtues and the shortcomings of the Alpine 
temperament come out most clearly in the French peas- 
antry, which is mainly Alpine in blood. Hard-working, 
thrifty, solid, but limited in imaginative vision and crea- 
tive intelligence, the French peasant remains what he has 
always been. The difference lies not in himself but in the 
- fact that modern political and economic conditions have 
made him a greater power in the nation than was formerly 
the case. The French peasantry was never so prosperous 
as it is to-day. Furthermore, it is the most numerous oc- 
cupational group in the nation. We must remember that 
France never industrialized herself like England and Ger- 
many, where the bulk of the population now lives in cities 


82 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


and towns. In France a majority of the population still 
lives in the country. According to the last census, of 
France’s 39,000,000 inhabitants only 18,000,000 live under 
urban conditions, while 21,000,000 live on the land. 

This means that France grows enough foodstuffs to 
feed her own population, and that, unlike England and 
Germany, she is not dependent for her very life upon sell- 
ing the products of her industry in foreign markets. In- 
deed, France’s whole economic system is very different 
from that of her more industrialized neighbors. British 
and German industry is based upon the principle of mass 
production for foreign markets. French industry, so far 
as staple manufactures are concerned, is based upon lim- 
ited production behind a high tariff wall primarily for the 
home market. And French production is further limited 
by the home demand for high quality coupled with long 
wear. This is where the French view-point differs radically 
from ours. The Frenchman hates to scrap anything. 
Whether it be a single machine or a whole factory, his 
idea is to buy a well-made article and then use it until it is 
absolutely worn out. Even if it gets behind the times, he 
cannot bear to throw it away. Under such circumstances 
French manufactured staples have not been able to com- 
pete in the world market with British, German, or Ameri- 
can staples, and France’s typical exports have remained 
high-grade specialties such as ladies’ fashions, silks, per- 
fumes, wines, and other articles in which France has more 
or less of a monopoly advantage. 

French business and finance have much the same char- 
acter as French industry. The French merchant and the 
French investor do not like to take risks. They prefer 


COMPOSITE FRANCE 83 


safety to chances of big profits—and big losses. French- 
men like to salt down their thrifty savings in gilt-edged 
securities like government bonds. The recent decline of 
the French franc, threatening as it does the value of all in- 
vestments, has been a great shock to the French people; 
and if anything like a collapse of the franc should take 
place, the political and social consequences might be noth- 
ing short of catastrophic. 

This profound uneasiness among the great French in- 
vesting public—and it must be remembered that in pro- 
portion to her population France has a greater number of 
small investors than any other country—is only part of 
the general shaking up which the war has caused. The 
casual observer may not see much of this, but the truth is 
that below the well-ordered surface of French national life 
important developments are taking place. 

France to-day stands at a momentous parting of the 
ways. Before the late war her national life was, so to 
speak, geared low. Refraining from thoroughly industrial- 
izing herself like England and Germany, maintaining a 
balance between town and country, and with a stationary 
population, France led a stable, well-balanced existence. 
This balance the war and the peace combined to shatter 
in two different ways. France is to-day both much weaker 
and much stronger than she was in 1914. She is much 
weaker in blood and wealth; she is much stronger in 
political and military power. Let us cast our eyes 
over this singular balance sheet and note the possible 
results. 

The late war was a frightful blood-letting for France. 
At the beginning of 1914 the population of France was 


84 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


39,700,000. From this population nearly 8,000,000 men 
were mobilized during the war years. Of these 1,400,000. 
were killed and 3,000,000 were wounded. Of the wounded, 
more than 800,000 were left permanent physical wrecks. 
Thus fully 2,000,000 men—mostly drawn from the flower 
of French manhood—were killed or hopelessly incapaci- 
tated. In addition to this the civilian population suffered 
heavy losses. The result is that the last census—1921— 
showed a net decrease of over 2,000,000 inhabitants. Of 
course, the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine brought in 
1,700,000 people. Nevertheless, even including Alsace- 
Lorraine, the population of France is 500,000 below what 
it was when the war broke out. 

And, of course, the mere numbers of the dead are no 
test of the seriousness of the losses, because, as already 
stated, the killed included so large a proportion of the 
very flower of France. The drain on French vitality and 
ability has been simply incalculable. Frenchmen con- 
tinually stress this melancholy fact. A leading French uni- 
versity professor said to me sadly: 

“‘Nine-tenths of the rising generation of intellectuals 
who should now be coming to the fore—that is, men in the 
early thirties—are dead. Old men like myself feel as 
though we were in an intellectual desert. We look about 
in vain for successors to whom we may hand on the torch 
of learning.” 

And one of France’s best-known political figures re- 
marked to me grimly: 

“You see, our surviving generations are seeking to 
bridge the gulf of death. I, an old man of seventy, am 
working like a man of forty; and I tell my grandson, aged 


COMPOSITE FRANCE 85 


fourteen, that he mast jump into his profession five years 
ahead of normal. 

The most serious aspect of the situation is that, owing 
to France’s low birth-rate, her vital losses will take a very 
long time to be repaired. In fast-breeding countries the 
ravages of war can be effaced, so far as numbers are con- 
cerned, in a generation. In France, however, population 
has long been practically stationary, and there are no 
signs of any marked betterment in the situation. It took 
France more than a century to increase her population 40 
per cent. In fact the total number of births per year has 
actually fallen. In the year 1801, 904,000 babies were 
born in France. In the year 1901, the number of births 
had fallen to 857,000, although the population was 40 per 
cent greater than it had been a century before, and the 
number of births at the old rate should thus have been 
1,266,000. The reason why France’s population had in- 
creased notwithstanding the falling birth-rate was due 
mainly to a corresponding fall in the death-rate. It was 
also due to the growing number of foreigners who had en- 
tered the country. The foreign element in France is much 
larger than is usually imagined. In the year 1861 the for- 
eign element numbered less than 400,000; in 1911 it had 
risen to 1,100,000; in 1921 it was nearly 1,600,000. Nearly 
one-third of these are Italians, with Belgians and Span- 
iards also contributing large quotas. Many Frenchmen 
are decidedly uneasy over this large foreign element, which 
they consider a possible danger to French national and 
cultural unity. 

Such is France’s population problem. And when we 
turn to her financial situation we find it likewise in serious 


86 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


shape. Even before the war the French Government was 
not paying its way. Every year saw considerable deficits 
in the budget, which were covered by floating bonds that 
were readily absorbed by the French investing public,» 
which, as we have already seen, has a strong liking for 
safe securities. The French have always hated high taxa- 
tion, particularly direct taxes—before the war France had 
no income tax—and the government naturally took the 
easier way of issuing bonds rather than rousing unpopu- 
larity by“imposing new taxes. This was all very well for 
a while, but it could not go on forever. At the beginning 
of 1914, the French national debt was 34,000,000,000 
francs, the largest per capita debt in Europe, which swal- 
lowed almost three-fourths of the annual revenue to pay 
interest charges. 

Then came the war, and France’s financial condition, 
which had already been dubious, became infinitely worse. 
In contrast to Britain, which promptly imposed tremen- 
dous taxes and partly paid for the war as she went along, 
France financed herself almost entirely by new loans coup- 
led with a partial inflation of her currency. The propor- 
tion of war expenses paid out of current revenue was in- 
finitesimal—less than one-tenth of 1 per cent. The result 
was that at the end of the war France’s national debt had 
grown to 147,000,000,000 francs. Still France made no 
real effort to balance her budget by drastic taxation on the 
English scale, and her debt grew even faster than during 
the war. To-day France’s national debt stands at about 
339,000,000,000 francs—practically ten times her debt in 
1914, while her currency has been inflated to nearly seven 
times the amount in circulation in 1914. 


COMPOSITE FRANCE 87 


No wonder that the franc has fallen! To be sure, this 
fall of the franc has so alarmed the French people that it 
is getting ready to stand really drastic taxation. Never- 
theless, even the new taxation programme which has been 
proposed will cover only a little more than half of France’s 
annual expenses; so the national debt will continue to 
mount and the financial situation will get still worse. 

Such is the debit side of France’s national balance sheet. 
With a decimated stationary population, and with a debt 
so crushing as to threaten possible national bankruptcy, 
it is clear that the war has drained France of blood and 
treasure so terribly that in both respects she is much 
weaker than she was ten years ago. 

However, there is a credit side to the ledger. Whatever 
her losses, the fact remains that France won the war and 
that the peace treaties gave her such political and military 
power that she stands to-day the strongest nation on the 
European Continent. Her army is the finest war machine 
in existence, while the system of alliances that she has 
built up, stretching from Belgium to Poland, dominates 
the Continent, at least for the time being. Lastily, it must 
not be forgotten that France possesses a great colonial 
empire, second only to Britain’s, including as it does vast 
areas in Africa, rich portions of Asia, and desirable bits in 

other parts of the world. 

Present-day France is thus a strange combination of 
ereat weakness and great strength. And this, as already 
remarked, means for France a momentous parting of 
the ways. Two roads lie open to her. On the one hand 
lies the path of conservative foreign policy and domestic 
reconstruction along traditional lines. On the other hand 


88 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


lies the path of expansive policy, both foreign and domes- 
tic, which if successful would make France politically and 
industrially a great world power, as Germany was before 
the war and as Britain is to-day. If France follows the 
conservative path she will endeavor to become once more 
the rather self-centred but stable and moderately pros- 
perous nation that she was before the war. If France de- 
cides to tread the ambitious path, this will mean not only 
a great change in her political relations with other nations — 
but also a profound transformation of her own internal 
economic and social life. We have seen that hitherto 
France’s economic system has been characterized by a 
balance between manufacturing and agriculture, between 
town and country; that she has refrained from extreme in- 
dustrialization and consequent vital dependence upon 
exports to foreign markets. If France abandons this sys- 
tem for that of mass production of industrial staples for 
the world market, she will have to do precisely what Eng- 
land did a century ago and what Germany did half a cen- 
tury ago. The outstanding features of such a policy would 
be retention at all risks of her present political and mili- 
tary dominance on the Continent of Europe, and compe- 
tition, sharp and general, in the world market with great 
industrial nations like Britain and America, not to men- 
tion rising industrial nations like Italy and Japan—and 
Germany, if she recovers her former industrial strength. 
All this plays a great part in producing the mood of 
uncertainty and uneasiness which is so evident in French 
public opinion to-day. Consciously or instinctively, most 
Frenchmen feel that they are passing through a highly 
critical transition period and that decisions now taken 


COMPOSITE FRANCE 89 


may involve momentous consequences for good or for 
ill. Foreign observers make a mistake in fixing their 
attention upon particular issues like reparations and se- 
curity. Important though these matters undoubtedly 
are, they form merely part of a larger whole. 

It is interesting to talk with Frenchmen these days 
and to observe the sharp contrasts of opinion and of mood. 
Paradoxical though it may seem, such contrasting ideas 
and sentiments are often held by the same individual. 
I have heard a Frenchman start conversation with ex- 
pressions of high confidence in France’s position and pros- 
pects and a few minutes later fall into deep pessimism. 
This, of course, arises from the unusual combination. of 
strength and weakness which we have already seen torbe 
the basic feature of France’s situation. 

Another point insufficiently appreciated outside France 
is the extent to which its colonial empire figures in French 
calculations. France possesses the second-largest colonial 
empire in the world, Britain alone surpassing her in this 
respect. Indeed, in some ways France’s colonial posses- 
sions constitute more of an empire than do Britain’s. The 
vast assemblage of lands and peoples under the British 
flag are rapidly evolving into a loose-knit association of 
semi-independent nations. The territories and popula- 
tions under the French flag, on the other hand, form a 
colonial empire in the old-fashioned sense, closely sub- 
ordinated to the home government and surrounded by a 
high tariff wall which makes them frankly a preserve for 
French trade and commerce. Another point of difference 
between the French and British colonial empires is that 
none of the French colonies contain large populations 


90 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


of French blood. Algeria alone possesses a considerable 
French element—about 500,000—yet even this is only 
one-tenth of the total population. Most of France’s co- 
lonial possessions are tropical or semi-tropical lands in- 
habited by non-white races. These possessions are, how- 
ever, very extensive. In Southeastern Asia—Indo-China 
—France has a rich and populous group of colonies, while 
in Africa she owns a vast domain. Practically the whole 
northwestern quarter of the African continent is under 
the French flag—a region nearly twice as large as the 
United States and with fully 35,000,000 inhabitants. The 
total population of France’s colonial empire is a trifle 
more than 62,000,000. 

For a long time France regarded her colonial posses- 
sions chiefly in an economic sense, the idea being that they 
would form a close economic unit which might ultimately 
be self-sufficing, the colonies absorbing France’s exports 
and capital while furnishing France in return with the 
bulk of her imported raw materials and tropical products. 
But about a generation ago France woke up to the poten- 
tial value of her colonies in the political and military 
sense—as reservoirs of soldiers which would increase 
French power both at the diplomatic council table and 
upon the battle-field. For the past twenty years France 
has been raising larger and larger contingents of colonial 
troops, especially in Africa, where both the brown-skinned 
Arab and Berber populations of the northern regions and - 
the negro tribes to the south contain much excellent fight- 
ing material. The process was accelerated by the late war, 
when France raised hundreds of thousands of soldiers in 
Africa and Indo-China, shipping them to Europe, where 


COMPOSITE FRANCE ur 


they did good service. And this was not a mere war mea- 
sure; it has been established as a fixed principle of French 
policy. In the present French military system nearly 
200,000 African and Asiatic troops are included, part of 
whom are quartered in France, while in time of war their 
numbers could be expanded to something like 1,000,000. 
A large section of French public opinion frankly admits 
that they intend to exploit their colonial man-power to 
the uttermost and to make it the corner-stone of French 
_ military strength. Not long ago General Mangin, one of 
the pioneers in the creation of France’s African army, 
asserted that ‘‘our colonial empire may be welded into 
one whole with France herself, and our power of expansion 
in the whole world thus increased.’”’ And about the same 
time Premier Poincaré stated that France was no longer 
a nation of 40,000,000, but a nation of 100,000,000. 

From a strictly military view-point these calculations 
are justified. But from the political view-point there are 
serious disadvantages. France’s avowed intention of ex- 
ploiting her colored colonial man-power for use in Europe 
is rousing fear and antagonism in Europe and is cooling 
friendly feeling for France in other parts of the world. 

In England and Italy hostility to France’s colonial mil- 
itary policy is widespread. Prominent Englishmen and 
Italians have assured me that neither country would long 
tolerate a policy which they considered a menace to the 
very heart of European civilization. The recent under- 
standing between Italy and Spain was undoubtedly fur- 
thered by common dislike of France’s African policies. 
As for Britain, this is one more count in the serious differ- 
ences which exist between her and France. Typical of 


92 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


British feeling is this comment on General Mangin’s 
speech by a leading English newspaper, the Manchester 
Guardian: 

“Tt does not need much imagination to understand the 
horrors that would be brought upon Europe if European 
nations came to rely on the weapon that General Mangin 
brandishes before the world. A Europe with black garri- 
sons would symbolize a civilization even more desperately 
retrograde and despairing than a Europe armed to the 
teeth. White conscription would mean a Europe without 
hope, but black conscription would mean a Europe with- 
out self-respect.” 

Here again we come back to the truth which we have 
already observed—the striking contrast of strength and 
weakness that characterizes France’s present situation. 
I have never heard it expressed better than it was by a 
clever French diplomat, who said to me: ‘‘You want to 
know what I think of my country’s position to-day? Ill 
tell you. It’s just about what it was at the height of 
Napoleon’s power—outwardly brilliant, inwardly dan- 
gerous.” 

One of the most serious miscalculations which many 
Frenchmen make is in regarding their country as precisely 
what it was in the past. That, of course, is an error of 
which other nations are guilty, notably the Germans; but 
it is a mistake which, wherever made, is apt to be very 
costly. The fact is that neither outwardly nor inwardly 
is France what she was in the days of her greatest power 
under Louis XIV and Napoleon. In those days France 
was in every respect the strongest nation in Europe. 
Take the factor of population alone. Under Louis XIV, 


COMPOSITE FRANCE 93 


France had three times the population of Britain, twice 
the population of Germany, and almost twice the popula- 
tion of Russia. To-day Britain and Germany have much 
larger populations than France, while Russia outnumbers 
her nearly five to one. Of course, Frenchmen see this and 
are mobilizing Africa to redress the balance, yet in so do- 
ing they may be also adding such counterweights of fear 
and hatred that in the end the scales will run still more 
heavily against them than they do now. 

And even more important, though less evident, is the 
question of the internal make-up of the French people to- 
day as compared with past times. We have already noted 
the striking racial changes which have been going on in 
France, and which have resulted in the rapid rise of the 
Alpine at the expense of the Nordic and Mediterranean 
elements. For the first time in French history power is 
definitely passing into Alpine hands, backed by a clear 
majority of the population. This rise of the Alpine ele- 
ment has already produced distinct changes in the national 
life. 

How will the Nordic and Mediterranean minorities 
accommodate themselves to these increasing changes? 
Already many of the internal strains in French national 
life are unquestionably due to this subtle yet powerful 
factor of racial readjustment. Can an Alpinized France 
be a world power? However solid their qualities, the 
Alpines have never shone as empire builders. Again, will 
the highly centralized French national fabric remain un- 
altered? Such are some of the questions which the France 
of to-morrow will have to face. 


CHAPTER V 
THE MEDITERRANEAN SOUTH 


One of the most wide-spread errors which exist to-day is 
the belief in a Latin race. The traditional idea is that 
southwestern Europe is Latin; that France, Italy, Spain, 
and Portugal are sister nations inhabited by peoples of 
kindred blood. This idea has, to be sure, strongly influ- 
enced the course of European politics on many occasions; 
and yet it is a delusion. The truth of the matter is that 
there is no such thing as a Latin race, but that, on the 
contrary, the so-called Latin peoples differ widely from 
one another in racial make-up. In a previous chapter we 
observed the racially composite character of France. In 
the present chapter we shall examine the racial make-ups 
of Italy, Spain, and Portugal and shall note the prac- 
tical consequences. 

Viewing these countries from the racial angle, the first 
thing that strikes our notice is the fact that in all three 
countries a large proportion of the population belongs to 
the Mediterranean race—the slender, dark-complexioned 
stock which thousands of years ago occupied the lands 
bordering the Mediterranean Sea and has ever since re-_ 
mained the most numerous element in those regions. 
However, we should note two things: in the first place, 
we must not confuse the terms “Mediterranean” and 
“Latin’’; in the second place, we must realize that the 


original Mediterranean stock has been greatly modified 
94 


THE MEDITERRANEAN SOUTH 95 


during its long history, so that it has come to vary widely 
at different times and in different places. 

Loose usage of the words ‘“ Mediterranean” and 
“Tatin” has caused endless confusion, and the distinction 
between the meaning of the two terms must be clearly 
understood before the actual state of affairs in south- 
western Europe can be appreciated. The term “ Mediter- 
ranean”’ has a purely racial meaning and refers, as already 
stated, to the slender, dark-complexioned stock which, in 
very ancient times, settled the lands about the Mediter- 
ranean Sea and also pushed northward across France to 
the British Isles, where it still survives, especially in Wales 
and Ireland. The word “Latin,” on the other hand, is 
not a racial but a historical and cultural term harking 
back to Roman days. Central Italy was the Roman home- 
land, and with the growth of Roman power the Latin 
language and Latin culture spread over southwestern Eu- 
rope. Not merely all Italy, but also France, Spain, and 
Portugal were thoroughly Latinized, and to-day the 
peoples of those countries speak tongues and possess cul- 
tures alike derived from the old Latin source. 

Unquestionably these similar languages and cultures 
are ties making for sympathetic understanding among the 
southwest European peoples. And yet their significance 
-must not be overestimated. History proves conclusively 
that such ties do not bind beyond a certain degree unless 
reinforced by the subtler yet closer tie of kindred blood. 
That is the reason why observers who disregard the racial 
factor are so continually fooled. Judged merely by speech 
and culture, the peoples of Southwestern Europe seem 
well fitted for close and harmonious association. Accord- 


96 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


ingly, political prophets have often preached the doctrine 
of Latin fraternity and have advocated Pan-Latinism— 
in other words, a league of Latin peoples. 

And yet despite all such eloquent preaching Pan-Latin- 
ism just doesn’t take place. The reason, of course, is that 
the doctrine is based on a delusion—the delusion of con- 
fusing likeness in speech and manners with kinship in 
blood. The peoples of Southwestern Europe differ from 
one another in racial make-up far more widely than is 
usually imagined, and these racial differences largely 
counteract the ties of culture and speech. 

Whoever gets to know the Latin peoples well discovers 
one thing as curious as it is significant. This is the fact 
that the more these peoples are thrown together, the less 
they like one another. So long as their contacts are merely 
superficial, so long as they exchange courtesies or read one 
another’s books, a feeling of friendly similarity tends to 
arise. But let them come into intimate contact, and the 
chances are that they will quickly and instinctively dis- 
cover marked temperamental differences which will be 
more apt to drive them apart than to draw them together. 
This is particularly the case with Frenchmen and their 
southern neighbors. But it is also true in lesser degree 
as between Italians.and Spaniards, and even as between | 
Spaniards and Portuguese. In every case a study of the 
facts will bring to light differences in racial make-up which 
account for the temperamental differences that exist be- 
tween the so-called Latin peoples. 

Of course, the presence of a large Mediterranean ele- 
ment in the populations of Italy, Spain, and Portugal 
creates between those peoples a blood relationship which 


THE ME DITERRANEAN SOUTH 97 


is almost wholly absent as between them and the French, 
who are mainly Alpine or Nordic in race, with very little 
Mediterranean blood. In this basic sense, therefore, 
Italy, Spain, and Portugal can be considered as forming 
a block of kindred peoples which may be classed together 
as the Mediterranean south of Europe. However, as al- 
ready remarked, these three peoples are racially much 
less alike than they superficially appear, and a just esti- 
mate of their respective situations can be gained only by 
viewing them separately, as we will now undertake to do. 

Italy is by far the most important nation in southern 
Europe. The medieval might of Spain has long passed, 
while the short-lived glory of Portugal is but a dim mem- 
ory. Italy, however, recently emerged from centuries of 
eclipse, has forged her political unity, increased her ma- 
terial prosperity, and to-day displays a spontaneous vigor 
which augurs well for her future. 

The long peninsula of Italy juts out from the mass of 
Continental Europe far to the southward, bestriding the 
waters of the Mediterranean Sea and through its island 
appendage of Sicily almost touching North Africa. Italy 
is long and narrow in shape, its fancied resemblance to a 
jack-boot being a geographical commonplace. Including 
its island dependencies, Sicily and Sardinia, Italy’s area 
is about 118,000 square miles. On this area lives a popu- 
lation of nearly 40,000,000, rapidly increasing in num- 
bers. 

Italy is a well-defined geographical unit. Sundered 
from the European land mass by the massive rampart of 
the Alps, and washed elsewhere by the sea, Italy’s bound- 
aries are clearly traced by nature. This natural isolation 


98 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


has been enough to insure the impress of a common 
language and culture upon all the inhabitants of the 
peninsula. It has not, however, been enough to keep 
out numerous foreign influences. The mountain chain of 
the Alps is broken by passes through which invading 
hosts have often poured. Also, the seas which bound 
Italy are narrow and easily crossed from the opposite 
shores. In fact Italy has for ages been racially modified 
by two contrasted streams of incoming population, one 
entering the country through the Alpine passes of the 
north, the other descending upon its southern coasts from 
lands to the eastward or from North Africa. This is the 
basic reason for those pronounced racial distinctions which 
characterize the Italian people to-day. 

Another factor making for racial diversity is Italy’s 
internal geography. The peninsula itself is mainly moun- 
tainous, thus breaking up the land surface into many 
small districts separated from one another. Only in the 
north is there a really large stretch of plain country— 
the broad valley of the Po. These two geographical fac- 
tors together give the key to Italy’s racial history. 

To-day, as in the past, Italy is divided into two sharply 
contrasted regions, inhabited by populations of a very 
different character. To the north lies the rich Po valley, — 
a natural magnet for invaders from beyond the Alps. 
To the southward stretches the narrow and mountainous 
peninsula, becoming ever more rugged and broken, rela- 
tively unattractive and inaccessible to landward pene- 
tration from the north, yet open to landings from the sea. 

We are now able to understand Italy’s racial history, 
which has followed closely the lines traced by nature, 


THE MEDITERRANEAN SOUTH 99 


The earliest inhabitants of any lasting significance were 
the Mediterraneans, the slender, dark-complexioned 
people who entered the peninsula many thousands of 
years ago, coming apparently both from the eastward 
through the Balkans and from the southward by way of 
Northern Africa. Settling the entire peninsula, together 
with its island appendages, Sicily and Sardinia, they made 
Italy for a while a solidly Mediterranean land. 

Presently, however, their title to sole ownership was 
challenged. Through the Alpine passes to the north began 
to flow that succession of invasions which has so pro- 
foundly modified Italy’s destiny. At first these invaders 
were men of the round-headed, thick-set Alpine race, who 
gradually conquered the Po valley, expelling or absorb- 
ing the Mediterraneans and turning Northern Italy into 
the predominantly Alpine land which it has ever since 
remained. Later on, tall, blond Nordics crossed the Alps, 
conquering the mixed Alpine and Mediterranean popu- 
lations of Northern Italy, and establishing themselves as 
ruling aristocracies. In time these mixed tribes under 
Nordic leadership pushed southward, modifying the racial 
make-up of Central Italy, but rarely penetrating to the 
extreme south, which remained almost solidly Mediter- 
ranean in blood. 

Rome is the leading example of the peoples which 
arose as the outcome of these prehistoric migrations. 
The Roman people in its early days was clearly of di- 
verse racial origin. Like most of the great peoples of 
antiquity, 1t was composed of a ruling aristocracy differ- 
ing sharply in race from the mass of the population. The 
Roman patricians, the ruling class, were apparently Nor- 


100 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


dics with a perceptible dash of Alpine blood. This is clear 
from the busts which have come down to us, most of 
which show plainly Nordic—sometimes startlingly Anglo- 
Saxon—features, combined with a broadish head betray- 
ing an Alpine strain. 

The predominantly Nordic racial make-up of the 
Roman ruling class is made equally clear by a study of 
the Roman temperament, which was plainly Nordic in 
its political and military ability, love of order and stern — 
devotion to duty; yet also showed an Alpine cross by its 
rigidity, limited vision, and lack of creative imagination. 
The Roman plebeians seem to have been mainly Medi- 
terraneans, steadied by a fairly strong Alpine infusion and 
with a few Nordic traces. 

It is interesting to observe how sharp was the con- 
sciousness of racial differences between the two orders of 
society in early Rome. The patricians—as Nordic aris- 
tocracies have always done—long kept the purity of their 
blood by stern prohibition of intermarriage with the 
plebeians, thus maintaining their hold upon the state and 
impressing their spirit so deeply upon Roman institu- 
tions and customs that their ideals persisted long after 
the patrician class had lost its Nordic character. 7 

This nature of the old Roman spirit needs to be empha- 
sized because it has been so widely misunderstood. The 
prevailing idea is that the early Romans were small, dark 
people—in other words, Mediterraneans. This is a seri- 
ous error, because it misinterprets the very source of 
Latin civilization, As a matter of fact, a glance at Roman 
ideals and institutions shows that these were patently 
Nordic with Alpine modifications. The truth is that down 


THE MEDITERRANEAN SOUTH 101 


to the fall of the republic—when Rome ceased to be ra- 
cially Roman—the spirit of Roman society was emphati- 
cally un-Mediterranean. To think of the stern, practical, 
unimaginative Roman patrician as a typical Mediter- 
ranean is nothing short of ludicrous. It would have been 
clean against the Mediterranean race soul, which, wher- 
ever found in anything like racial purity, whether in an- 
cient Greece or in modern Ireland, is always basically the 
same. 

To find the Mediterranean spirit in ancient Italy we 
must look, not to Rome, but to those states of southern 
Italy and Sicily which were Rome’s early rivals. Here, 
indeed, we discover the Mediterranean soul at its best— 
its artistic gifts, its hot emotions, its quick imagination, 
its love of form, color, and life; here also we find that 
extreme individualism and political instability which have 
ever been Mediterranean weaknesses and which brought 
southern Italy under Roman rule. 

The Roman period needs to be examined not only be- 
cause it set an indelible stamp upon Italian ideals and 
culture, but also because it produced important racial 
changes in the Italian population. Modern Italy can, in 
fact, be understood only in connection with the Roman 
past. 

- The legacy of Rome was both good and evil. Rome 
made Italy for centuries the centre of the world and be- 
queathed a wealth of glorious memories which must ever 
stir Italian hearts. To-day, as in other days, Italians are 
steeped in the Roman tradition, and Italian leaders from 
Rienzi to Mussolini turn naturally to ancient Rome for 
inspiration. The Fascisti, with their legions, their classic 


102 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


salute, and their symbol of the fasces—the ax bound with 
rods—are indulging in no vain theatricalities; these things 
are the instinctive expressions of a people with whom old 
Rome is still a burning memory. 

Such is the bright side of Rome’s legacy to modern 
Italy. Yet there is a darker side. Rome, though mistress 
of the world, dealt the Italian homeland wounds which 
fester through the ages. The evil aspects of Roman so- 
ciety, the drain of foreign conquests and civil strife, the 
curse of slavery—these and other baneful factors im- 
poverished and degenerated the population not only of 
Rome itself but of all Italy, so that when the Roman 
Empire finally fell it left behind an exhausted, enfeebled 
stock, unable either to carry on the traditions of Roman 
civilization or to defend itself against its enemies. For 
centuries Italy became a mere geographical expression, 
the helpless prey of foreign invaders. 

Particularly deep and lasting was the racial damage 
suffered by the south. Northern-and Central Italy gradu- 
ally recovered energy and ability, owing both to the vi- 
tality surviving in the native stock and to the incoming 
of superior new blood. But the population of southern 
Italy and Sicily was so thoroughly drained and degen- 
erated during Roman times that it has ever since been 
inferior in quality. Here, as in some other parts of the 
Mediterranean basin, the Mediterranean stock to-day 
ranks below its level in ancient times. The early Medi- 
terranean inhabitants of Southern Italy and Sicily were 
vigorous, gifted peoples, who produced gracious, colorful 
civilizations. 

These civilizations, however, faded out in a cycle of 


THE MEDITERRANEAN SOUTH — 103 


strife ending in Roman rule. The south fell on evil days. 
The countryside passed into the hands of Roman land 
speculators who parcelled it out into great estates—lati- 
fundia—worked by gangs of slaves mostly drawn from 
inferior Asiatic and African stocks. The dwindling rem- 
nants of the native population crowded into the cities, 
became pauperized proletarians, and intermarried with 
freed slaves and nondescript immigrants, also largely 
drawn from the Levant and North Africa. It is from this 
population of later Roman times that the modern South 
Italians and Sicilians mainly descend. In them the pres- 
ence of Asiatic and North African strains is to-day plainly 
visible, these strains having been not only implanted in 
Roman times but further reinforced during the Middle 
Ages, especially in the period when Southern Italy and 
Sicily fell under Saracen rule. 

Far happier was the course of events in Northern and 
Central Italy. To begin with, these regions were not ra- 
cially impoverished during the Roman period to anything 
like the same extent as the south, while comparatively 
little admixture of inferior Levantine and North African 
elements took place. Furthermore, the fall of Rome was 
accompanied by a series of barbarian invasions, which, 
however destructive at the time, brought in much good 
new blood. These invaders were mostly Nordics, and the 
Nordic stream from beyond the Alps continued to flow 
for centuries, leavening the populations of Northern and 
Central Italy with Nordic energy and creative ability. 

The growing vigor of the Northern Italian stock pres- 
ently displayed itself by the rise of strong city states like 
Venice and Florence, and by a splendid outburst of ar- 


104 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


tistic and literary ability crowned by geniuses like Dante, 
Michelangelo, and Raphael. It is true that the constant 
civil wars and foreign invasions which afflicted Italy down 
to recent times killed out much of the best stock, so that 
the population of Northern and Central Italy to-day is 
not the equal of the population five centuries ago. Still, 
the present population of these regions is unquestionably 
a good stock, physically sound and revealing its latent 
qualities by its ability to produce strong, gifted person- 
alities. , 

The rise of modern Italy to political unity and material 
prosperity during the past century was made possible 
largely by a series of remarkable leaders like Mazzini, 
Garibaldi, and Cavour; while the present Fascist move- 
ment has brought to the front a number of distinctly able. 
men, culminating in the extraordinary dynamic figure of 
Mussolini. 

In all these Italian movements, from the Middle Ages 
to the present day, one basic fact is strikingly clear— 
the startling difference between north and south. Almost 
everything worth while comes from Northern and Central 
Italy. The south contributes practically nothing of value. 
Of the few men of ability which the south has given to 
modern Italy, the majority were descended from North- 
ern ancestry. 

Any one who has travelled in Italy realizes the sudden 
change which takes place south of Rome. Rome is, in- 
deed, the dividing line between two sharply contrasted 
regions. Northward are progress and prosperity; south- 
ward lie backwardness and poverty. ‘This is precisely 
what the racial situation would lead us to expect. The 


THE MEDITERRANEAN SOUTH _ 105 


two halves of Italy are inhabited by very different breeds 
of men. The northern half contains the best of the old 
Mediterranean stock, plus a strong Alpine element and a 
considerable leavening of Nordic blood. The southern 
half is peopled by a racially impoverished Mediterranean 
stock, long since drained of its best strains and in places 
mongrelized by inferior Levantine and African elements. 

By recognizing the peculiarities in Italy’s racial make- 
up, by realizing the wide differences which exist not merely 
between specific racial elements in the population but also 
between the characters of similar racial stocks in different 
regions, we can get a far clearer idea of the course of Italian 
national life than would otherwise be possible, while much 
that at first sight seems strange becomes understandable. 

When Italy at last became a united nation half a cen- 
tury ago, she was faced by a multitude of problems re- 
quiring delicate handling and special treatment. In the 
economic field Italy has been distinctly successful. Al- 
though primarily an agricultural country, Italy has, 
nevertheless, built up a prosperous industrial system— 
of course, in the north—despite the handicaps imposed 
by lack of coal and other raw materials. Socially, Italy 
has also progressed, the general level of well-being, edu- 
cation, and other social factors being markedly higher in 
the north and distinctly better even in the backward 
south. 

Italy’s most serious difficulties have been in the field of 
politics. To forge a real national state out Of such diverse 
and long-sundered elements was a herculean task. Par- 
ticularly difficult was the creation of political institutions 
’ congenial to the Italian character. Certainly the course 


106 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


of Italian political life has hitherto left much to be de- 
sired. 

Italy started out with a set of political institutions 
modelled on the parliamentary, democratic ideals of Eng- 
land and France. But this borrowed system did not prove 
a brilliant success. Once the patriotic fervor of the first 
days had died away, Italian political life was controlled 
by a caste of professional politicians who gradually evolved 
a system known as trasformismo—a sublimated “pork 
barrel” which ate the heart out of Italian political life. 
Behind resounding party platforms and fine phrases the 
professional politicians framed deals and made elections, 
keeping one eye on the people and the other on the 
treasury. When public opinion got too much aroused 
there would be an election and a change of government; 
but this really meant little more than a shuffle of political 
offices among different gangs of the same professional 
crowd. The situation was further complicated by the 
fact that there were, not two well-defined political par- 
ties as in America, but a number of political groups, so 
that ministries were usually formed from blocs, bound 
together more by the desire to get office than to do any- 
thing constructive once they were in power. The upshot 
was that Italian political life was wasteful, inefficient, and, 
above all, purposeless. As for the general public, con- 
tinually duped as it was by this political shell game, it 
became increasingly bored and disgusted with the whole 
business—which was just what the professional politi- 
cians wanted, as lack of public interest left them a freer 
hand to play their political games. 

In the years just preceding the Great War, to be sure, 


THE MEDITERRANEAN SOUTH 107 


signs of vigorous popular discontent began to appear. 
This was best shown by the rise of several new political 
groups which stood frankly outside the old political sys- 
tem, and possessed genuine programmes of action instead 
of mere party phrases. The most forceful of these new 
groups were: the Syndicalists, who wanted a social revo- 
lution, and the Nationalists, who demanded a strong, im- 
perialistic foreign policy which should make Italy a greater 
power in the world. Bitterly hostile to each other though 
they were, Syndicalists and Nationalists alike condemned 
trasformismo and preached the need of political realities. 
However, they were but minorities controlling few elec- 
toral seats, and so had little direct effect on Italian par- 
liamentary life. 

Then came the war. After grave setbacks, Italy emerged 
victorious, only to have her aspirations disappointed at the 
peace settlement. Exhausted, disillusioned, and exasper- 
ated, Italy fell a prey to internal disorders which threat- 
ened civil war or revolution. The old political caste, which 
had badly mismanaged the war, proved quite unable to 
face the crisis at home. Things went from bad to worse. 
A succession of weak governments did nothing but tem- 
porize and play petty politics. Italy seemed on the verge 
of chaos. 

Then came—Fascismo! A small but determined mi- 
nority headed by able leaders, chief among them Musso- 
lini, banded themselves together, fought and defeated the 
Bolshevik elements who were planning a social revolu- 
tion, then turned upon the government—which had been 
supinely looking on—overthrew it and established a frank 
dictatorship. or nearly two years Mussolini and his 


108 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


Fascist Blackshirts have been the undisputed masters of 
Italy. 

With the material results of Fascist rule the world is 
passably acquainted. The order, efficiency, and pros- 
perity which it has brought to Italy are well known. What 
is not so well known, however, is the spirit of Fascismo 
and the exact character of its ideals. Fully to appreciate 
Fascismo’s significance one must go to Italy and meet 
personally the Fascist leaders. To do so is a rare and > 
stimulating experience. In present-day Italy one imme- 
diately gets a sense of freshness and vitality. People are 
thinking frankly and acting boldly. Theory and prec- 
edent are disregarded in favor of natural impulse and 
common sense. 

To think of Fascismo as a mere reaction against Bol- 
shevik plots and governmental weakness is to miss utterly 
its real spirit and its larger meaning. Fascismo goes much 
deeper than that. It is nothing less than a vivid and vital 
outpouring of the Italian spirit, seeking to forge new in- 
stitutions and new ideals in harmony with the mind and 
soul of the Italian people. That is what gives it both its 
present strength and its lasting significance. Specific acts 
of the Fascist government may be wise or unwise; the 
whole Fascist régime may be but a pioneering venture, 
destined soon to evolve into something quite different; 
nevertheless, all this does not touch the basic fact that 
Fascismo has set a stamp upon Italian life and thought 
which will endure. 

The kernel of Fascist philosophy is realism. Probably 
the Fascist spokesmen will object to my use of the word 
“philosophy’’; because so sternly realistic are the Fasci- 


THE MEDITERRANEAN SOUTH _ 109 


sti that they deny having any such thing. Hating theo- 
ries as they do, they strive to keep their minds from 
crystallizing around general ideas. Instead, they seek to 
face specific situations as these arise, to judge them from 
the observed facts of the case and to deal with them in 
the light of common sense. Precedent, consistency, logic 
—these things are, in Fascist eyes, mere nonsense. In 
fact, the Fascisti claim that it is just because of undue 
reverence for such things that not merely Italy but the 
world in general is where it is to-day. According to the 
Fascisti, the world has long been going on a wrong tack. 
For the past century or more, say the Fascisti, we have 
become increasingly obsessed by theoretical abstractions 
condensed into phrases or single words which we have set 
up like idols and to which we have superstitiously bowed 
down. 

Consider some of our present-day idols. Their names 
are Democracy, Liberty, Equality, Rights, Parliamentary 
Government, and more besides. Look at them closely. 
What do they really mean? In themselves, they mean 
nothing. ‘Theoretical abstractions that they are, they 
have no concrete significance. Yet there they sit, like 
gods in a heathen temple, paralyzing the creative thought 
and energy of mankind! Before them we meekly lay our 
problems. 

Is this not so? Look you! A situation confronts us. 
What do we do? Do we study the special facts of the 
case and then act according to those facts in the light of 
our common sense? We may do this in our private lives, 
but we rarely do so in public matters. Instead, we seek 
the will of our idols! In other words, we try to find a 


110 RACIAL, REALITIES IN EUROPE 


solution which shall be “democratic” or which may not 
offend such “sacred principles” as liberty and equality. 

“What arrant nonsense!” cries Fascismo. ‘And what 
dangerous nonsense, too! Such idolatrous blindness gets 
us nowhere; or, rather, lands us in a bog of troubles. 
Therefore, down with our idols! Down with Democracy ! 
Down with Equality ! Out with the word ‘Rights’—save, 
perchance, when coupled with the word ‘Duties’! Sweep 
these false gods into the dust-bin along with the other 
fallen idols of the past! Thus, and thus only, may we 
clear our vision, free our common sense and regain the 
path of true progress.” 

Such is the uncompromising realism of Fascismo. The 
Fascisti have, indeed, the courage of their convictions. 
No “established institutions” for them. Relentlessly they 
ask: “Does it work? Is it efficient? Is it suited to our 
people?”’ And if the answer is no—out it goes. 

The same is true of ideas. Mussolini’s special publica- 
tion is called Gerarchia. Significant name! ‘“ Gerarchia” 
is the Italian word for “hierarchy,” and in its pages we 
find a theory of society which flouts the doctrines of de- 
mocracy and equality in no uncertain fashion. Instead 
of preaching men’s equality, Gerarchia stresses their in- 
equality. Men being thus unequal, democracy, in the 
ordinary sense of the word, is an absurdity. Mussolini’s 
ideal social structure takes the form, not of a level plain, 
but of a towering pyramid. He glimpses a society in which 
individuals will be ranked according to their natural 
capacities and limitations. 

For even their most cherished ideals the Fascisti insist 
upon a realistic basis. For example, the Fascisti are noth- 


THE MEDITERRANEAN SOUTH i1il 


ing if not patriotic; the power and glory of Italy are ever 
in their minds. And yet their patriotism is neither mystic 
nor sentimental; on the contrary, it is rooted in realism. 
I well recall a discussion I had on this point with one of 
the Fascist leaders. The talk turned on the nature of 
Italian nationalism. 

“T will explain to you,” said the Fascist leader, “how 
our nationalism differs from the nationalism of most 
other peoples. Elsewhere you will find nationalism largely 
based upon abstract rights and historical precedents. We 
Fascisti disregard all this as beside the point. For us 
there are no abstract rights—not even the right of a na- 
tion to bare existence. A nation, like an individual, must 
deserve its existence—and must continue to deserve it. 
For example, we Fascisti do not claim that our Italy 
acquires any special rights because, on this geographical 
area, there was a Rome, a Cinquecento, a Risorgimento ; 
because its soil nourished a Dante or a Julius Cesar. No, 
our belief in Italy’s present and future greatness rests 
upon what we living Italians are, do, and will do.” 

Bold words, these—and very refreshing to one who, 
like myself, had recently been in Central Europe and the 
Balkans, where I had listened to long, labored nationalist 
arguments often based upon a conquest by King So-and- 
So or a victory of General What’s-His-Name, gained per- 
haps many generations before. 

This bold spirit and confident optimism of the Fascisti 
undoubtedly spring in great part from the fact that Fa- 
scismo is emphatically a young man’s movement. Not for 
nothing does Fascismo’s inspiring marching song begin 
with the words, ‘Giovanezza! Giovanezza!”—“Youth! 


112 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


Youth!” Fascismo has swept old-line politicians and 
bureaucrats wholesale into the discard. Mussolini him- 
self is only forty, while few of the Fascisti leaders are 
more than forty-five. 

As already remarked, Fascismo is clearly a spontaneous 
Italian product. Its methods and ideals are precisely 
what a study of Italy’s history and racial make-up might 
lead us. to expect. Mediterraneans everywhere instinc- 
tively crave strong, dynamic personalities to lead them, — 
while Alpine stocks seem to do best under the guidance 
of able ruling minorities. Mussolini and his lieutenants 
therefore appear well fitted to accomplish much for Italy, 
and to lead their people along paths suited to the national 
character. 

Perhaps we may even be about to witness the creation 
of new political institutions better suited to a mixed people 
of Mediterranean-Alpine origin like the Italians than were 
the parliamentary, democratic forms borrowed from 
England when Italian political unity was attained half 
a century ago. The fact is that democratic parliamentary 
institutions have been a real success only among peoples 
largely Nordic in blood. The idea that they can be ap- 
plied indiscriminately to peoples of all races is precisely 
an example of that abstract theorizing against which Fa- 
scismo is to-day voicing so healthy a protest. 

From Italy let us now turn to consider Spain and Por- 
tugal. These two nations together occupy the Iberian 
Peninsula, the great land block which forms the south- 
western corner of Europe, washed by the waters of the 
Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, and almost 
touching Africa at the Straits of Gibraltar, 


THE MEDITERRANEAN SOUTH 113 


The Iberian Peninsula differs widely from Italy in 
form, climate, and internal structure. In the first place, 
it is much larger. This greater size, together with its 
square shape and higher average elevation, produces 
natural conditions very unlike those prevailing in Italy. 
The Iberian Peninsula consists mostly of an immense 
plateau bordered by mountain ranges which rise sharply 
from the sea. Only in a few places are there considerable 
coastal plains. Cut off from the moist sea winds by its 
mountain ranges, the interior plateau tends to be dry and 
barren, so that population has always been concentrated 
along the fertile seaboard. This is one reason why the 
Iberian Peninsula has rarely attained political unity. 
Grouped along the coasts, its inhabitants have lived with 
their backs to one another, looking outward over the sea 
rather than inward toward their neighbors. In fact, on 
the western coast, where isolation is most pronounced, a 
separate nation, Portugal, arose with a distinct language 
and culture of its own. The rest of the peninsula kept 
more together and in time formed the Spanish nation; 
but even in Spain we find marked distinctions between 
different regions which have never been obliterated. 

If the Iberian Peninsula had been more open to foreign 
penetration it might have been the seat of several dis- 
tinct nations instead of merely two. This, however, has 
been prevented by its isolation. Lying off the main line 
of European land migrations, and separated from the rest 
of the European Continent by the almost unbroken moun- 
tain wall of the Pyrenees, the Iberian Peninsula has tended 
to live a life apart. For this reason it has undergone rela- 
tively few invasions and few racial changes, and its popu- 


114 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


lation is to-day more homogeneous in blood than any 
other part of the European Continent except Scandinavia 
—likewise a region of geographical isolation. 

The Iberian Peninsula is racially a distinctly Medi- 
terranean land. In both Spain and Portugal the popu- 
lation is mainly of Mediterranean blood. Nevertheless, 
the two peoples differ from each other to a considerable 
extent both in racial make-up and in the innate quality — 
of their Mediterranean stock. For this reason, as well as 
from considerations of language and historic pasts, sepa- 
rate consideration is desirable. 

Of the two nations, Spain is very much the larger 
and more important. Occupying nearly seven-eighths of 
the entire Iberian Peninsula, Spain has an area of more 
than 190,000 square miles and a population of a trifle 
more than 21,000,000 souls. The Spanish people is and 
always has been mainly of Mediterranean stock. At vari- 
ous times, to be sure, Alpine and Nordic invaders have 
entered Spain by way of the Pyrenees, but these elements 
have never greatly changed the racial make-up of the 
general population. What Alpine blood there is in Spain 
is confined to the mountainous regions of the northwest. 
Here the local population differs from the rest of Spain 
both in physical type and in temperament, being more 
stolid, tenacious, and laborious than elsewhere. 

Nordic blood is not concentrated in any one locality, 
but is mainly scattered through the upper and middle 
social classes, though Nordic traits are found more fre- 
quently in the north than in the south. Pure blond types 
are, however, nowhere common. In Southern Spain there 
are many evidences of North African blood, with occa- 


THE MEDITERRANEAN SOUTH = 115 


sional negroid traces. These North African and negroid 
traits are mainly due to the long Moorish occupation of 
Southern Spain. 

Formerly Spain possessed a much larger proportion of 
Nordic blood. This Nordic element was most numerous 
after the fall of the Roman Empire, when Spain was 
overrun by a number of Teutonic tribes such as the Suevi, 
Vandals, and Visigoths, who established themselves as 
ruling aristocracies and for a time turned Spain into a 
superficially Nordic land. Though greatly diminished by 
the Moorish invasions, Nordic blood remained relatively 
abundant among the upper classes, especially in the north, 
down to comparatively recent times. 

The Nordic spirit played a part during Spain’s period 
of greatness, which lasted for nearly two centuries after 
Columbus’s discovery of America. During that period 
Spain was far and away the greatest power on earth, 
being at once the owner of most of the New World and 
the master of a large part of Europe. 

Yet those two centuries of power and glory proved to 
be Spain’s undoing. The flower of the nation was drained 
away to subdue a savage continent or to die on European 
battle-fields. The bold conquistadores in America, the 
dauntless Spanish infantry in Europe alike represented 
the pick of both the Nordic and Mediterranean elements. 
Generation after generation these men went forth by 
hundreds of thousands—to return no more. As a melan- 
choly Castilian proverb of those days well put it, “Spain 
makes men—and wastes them !”’ 

And while Spain’s bravest and boldest were dying 
abroad, the most intelligent who remained at home were 


1146 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


being weeded out by a number of unfavorable social fac- 
tors. The monastic ideal became so wide-spread that vast 
numbers of men and women, representing on the average 
the superior elements of the population, entered celibate 
orders, died childless, and thus deprived the race of their 
valuable inheritances. Furthermore, the intolerant spirit 
of the times ruthlessly killed out all who ventured to differ 
from orthodox ideas. During this period the number of 
persons imprisoned, burned alive, or driven into exile by 
the Spanish Inquisition was fully 300,000. 

The combined result of all these drains upon Spain’s 
energy and intelligence was the dramatic collapse of 
Spanish power in the middle of the seventeenth century. 
From her proud rank of the world’s leading nation, Spain 
sank almost to the position of a third-rate power—a posi- 
tion in which she has ever since remained. This sudden 
collapse from grandeur to obscurity long puzzled his- 
torians. To-day, with our knowledge of racial matters, 
the reason is perfectly plain. Like a prodigal spendthrift, 
Spain drew recklessly upon her racial reserves for tasks 
beyond her strength. When the last reserves had been 
spent, Spain fell into hopeless weakness—because she had 
mortgaged her racial future. 

Modern Spain is, indeed, a striking example of raciai 
impoverishment. Racial impoverishment should be clearly 
distinguished from other biological ills like degeneracy 
and mongrelization. The Spanish people of to-day is not 
degenerate, while there is little admixture of inferior 
alien strains except in certain portions of the South. What 
is wrong with modern Spain is that its population has 
been so drained of creative energy and intelligence that 


THE MEDITERRANEAN SOUTH 117 


it produces little except mediocrity. Very rarely does 
Spain produce strong, gifted leaders. Herein Spain differs 
markedly from Italy, which has retained the power to 
breed such commanding personalities. 

Lack of able leaders is especially serious in a racially 
Mediterranean country like Spain, because Mediter- 
ranean peoples always need strong, dynamic personali- 
ties to awaken their enthusiasm and bring out the best 
that is in them. No people to-day displays more typically 
Mediterranean characteristics than does the Spanish. In 
fact, the population of present-day Spain is racially far 
more Mediterranean than it was some centuries ago, 
owing to the virtual disappearance of its once numerous 
Nordic element. The Spanish people is probably the 
purest Mediterranean stock now in existence, as is 
well shown by the Spanish temperament, which is just 
about what we might expect from a study of Spain’s 
racial make-up—bearing in mind, of course, the fact that 
Spain has been drained of much of the intelligence and 
artistic gifts which are normally found in unimpoverished 
Mediterranean stocks. 

Mediterranean temperament comes out most clearly in 
Spain’s political life. The key-note of the Spanish national 
spirit is an almost boundless individualism. Ideas and 
principles, as such, are at a discount; they must be per- 
sonalized. That is why Spanish political parties crystallize 
about some magnetic leader who knows how to win the 
personal loyalty and devotion of his followers. Further- 
more, Spain has not yet evolved a governmental system 
suited to the character of its people. Even more than in 
Italy, the centralized bureaucracy borrowed from France 


118 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


and the parliamentary institutions borrowed from Eng- 
land have alike failed to work successfully. 

Spanish parliamentarism in particular was from the 
first a sickly growth. Despite high-sounding constitu- 
tional forms and phrases, all real power soon came to be 
lodged with a caste of professional politicians who in- 
vented a system even more corrupt and oppressive than 
Italian trasformismo. This Spanish political system is 
known as caciquism. Caciquism is a magnified and nation- © 
wide Tammany Hall. The system is worked by a knot of 
big bosses—caudillos—at the capital, Madrid, and is en- 
forced by a swarm of local bosses known as caciques, who 
make the elections as Madrid commands and take their 
pay in local offices, power, and plunder. When the country 
cries too loud, a safety-valve is found in an electoral change 
of government; but the relief is a sham, for the Spanish 
political parties play the game of rotation in office to per- 
fection and hand over the treasury to one another at the 
precise psychological moment. The chief result of a Span- 
ish election, therefore, is the coming to power of an alter- 
nate gang of caudillos and caciques zealously imbued with 
the Jacksonian maxim, “To the victors belong the spoils.” 
Their personal loyalty to their chief may be strong, but 
their devotion to the public welfare is usually conspicu- 
ous by its absence. All this is well known to the Spanish 
people, which accordingly takes little interest in politics, 
and views the kaleidoscopic shifts of ins and outs with a 
cynical and sullen indifference. 

This deplorable state of affairs has led to the recent 
breakdown of Spanish parliamentarism, when the gov- 
ernment was overthrown by a revolt headed by General 


THE MEDITERRANEAN SOUTH © 119 


Primo de Rivera, who established a dictatorship. On the 
surface, this looks like another Fascist movement, and 
General Rivera has been hailed as the Spanish Mussolini. 

Closer inspection, however, reveals wide differences 
between the Spanish and Italian movements. Fascismo 
was a spontaneous, popular growth, backed by a large 
part of the youth and brains of Italy and headed by a 
remarkable personality associated with a considerable 
group of able leaders. It displayed from the first not only 
boldness and determination but also creative energy and 
original ideas. The Spanish movement, on the other 
hand, was primarily the work of discontented army offi- 
cers. It was a military rather than a popular revolt, and 
it bears a close resemblance to other military revolts 
which have occurred in Spanish history. Although the 
Directory, as the new government is called, has been in 
power many months, it has done nothing comparable to 
what Fascismo has achieved, and it has not succeeded in 
gaining a like measure of public confidence and support. 
As for General Rivera himself, he is obviously no Musso- 
lini. 

What will happen in Spain is, of course, highly uncer- 
tain. Perhaps if Italy succeeds in working out a con- 
structive solution of her problems, Spain may profitably 
adopt this solution, adapted to her somewhat similar 
circumstances. But so far as present indications go, Spain 
does not seem to be originating a constructive programme, 
as Fascist Italy appears to be doing. 

From Spain let us pass to Portugal. This small coun- 
try, with an area of 34,000 square miles and a population 
of 5,600,000, has neither a prosperous present nor a hope- 


120 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


ful future. Like Spain, Portugal enjoyed a time of great- 
ness, but the time was short and was purchased at the 
expense of an even more pronounced decline. The reasons 
were similar. Portugal, like Spain, was suddenly thrust 
into a position for which she was not fitted, consumed her 
strength and vitality in tasks too heavy for her to bear, 
and sank exhausted into lasting impotence. 

Both countries rose to greatness at the same time. At 
the very moment when Columbus was discovering Amer- © 
ica for Spain, the Portuguese navigator, Vasco da Gama, 
was starting on his memorable voyage around Africa to 
India. This gave Portugal a great colonial empire in the 
East, while other Portuguese explorers soon gave their 
country an American colonial empire in Brazil. From her 
colonies Portugal rapidly drew such wealth that she be- 
came a great power, her capital, Lisbon, being one of the 
most splendid cities in Europe. 

This wealth and power was, however, literally squeezed 
out of Portuguese blood. To conquer and hold Portugal’s 
vast colonial empires required great fleets and armies 
which took the very cream of the Portuguese stock. At 
the beginning of their heroic period the Portuguese were 
an almost purely Mediterranean stock, energetic, intel- 
ligent, and with marked literary and artistic qualities. 
The great days of Portugal produced not only bold sailors 
and brave soldiers but also poets and artists whose names 
will live long in history. 

And then, in a trifle over a hundred years—it was all 
over! Portugal collapsed, as Spain was to collapse a little 
later. The only difference was that in Portugal’s case the 
collapse was far more complete. The drain on the Portu- 


THE MEDITERRANEAN SOUTH 121 


guese stock had been frightful and the resulting racial 
impoverishment was therefore even more lamentable. 
The peasantry had largely abandoned the countryside. 
Drawn to the cities and to the colonies by the lure of 
gold and adventure, or conscripted wholesale into the 
fleets and armies, they had sailed overseas, to die or to 
settle as fate might decree, but rarely to return. 

Furthermore, upon this racially impoverished people 
there fell a fresh misfortune—the incoming of inferior 
alien blood. The half-deserted countryside passed into 
the hands of great landowners who imported gangs of 
negro slaves drawn from Portugal’s African colonies. This 
was particularly true of Southern Portugal, where a semi- 
tropical climate and a fertile soil made negro slavery 
highly profitable. In time the population of Southern 
Portugal became distinctly tinged with negro blood, 
which produced a depressing and degrading effect upon 
the national character. 

The history of modern Portugal has not been a happy 
one. Misgovernment and turbulence have been the out- 
standing features of its political life. Attempts to apply 
democratic parliamentary institutions have been melan- 
choly failures. Fourteen years ago monarchy was over- 
thrown and a republic was set up, but this appeared to 
increase rather than diminish political instability. The 
Portuguese Republic has been one long story of disorders, 
cabinet crises and revolutions suggesting Central Amer- 
ica, and no signs of improvement are in sight. From 
present-day Portugal the world has apparently little 
either to expect or to hope. 


CHAPTER VI 
ALPINIZED GERMANY 


MopErRN Germany is the victim of a tragic delusion: the 
delusion of believing that she still is what she was in the 
past. The terrible spectacle of post-war Germany should 
teach people everywhere that exact knowledge and clear 
thinking on racial problems is a vital necessity, while 
ignorance or self-deception in such matters may mean a 
people’s undoing. 

Germany’s fundamental mistake during the generation 
before the Great War lay in misreading history and per- 
verting biology—the science of race. On this basic error 
the Germans built up a gigantic delusion which in some 
sections of German public opinion came to amount al- 
most to what insanity experts call a “mania of grandeur.” 
That phrase just fits the extreme ‘‘Pan-German”’ propa- 
ganda so many German professors and publicists spread 
broadcast before and during the war, and which most 
Germans swallowed as gospel truth. Describing past 
glories as present realities and juggling racial facts to fit 
nationalistic hopes, these propagandists preached the doc- 
trine that the modern Germans were a “chosen people,” 
vastly superior to everybody else in every respect. The 
effect of this doctrine upon German public opinion was 
as dangerous as it was deplorable. Germans tended more 
and more to overrate themselves and to underrate their 


neighbors. Losing their sense of reality and proportion, 
122 


ALPINIZED GERMANY 123 


anything that they keenly desired seemed to be within 
their power to attain. 

Of course, Germany had no monopoly of such feelings. 
Pre-war Europe seethed with fanatical nationalist propa- 
gandas and imperialistic foreign policies. But pre-war 
Germany seems to have evolved a peculiarly high-flown 
jingoism, and to have mixed nationalistic and racial ideas 
into a specially explosive compound. One of the most 
hopeful aspects of the present situation is that post-war 
Germany appears to be getting into a much saner frame 
of mind. The old false doctrines are largely discredited, 
while an influential body of scholars and popular writers 
are educating their public to a truer knowledge of race 
and history, emphasizing German shortcomings and 
preaching a frank facing of facts, no matter how distaste- 
ful these may be. Indeed, if this realistic movement con- 
tinues at its present rate, the Germans may soon come 
to have a far clearer outlook than some of their neighbors, 
notably the French, who, as we observed in a previous 
article, to-day show a disregard for historic facts and 
racial truths which if continued will cost them dear. 

Despite all that has been written about pre-war Ger- 
many’s state of mind, its exact nature has seldom been 
realized, and can be realized only by getting a clear idea of 
Germany’s history together with the racial changes which 
have taken place in its population. No country has had 
a more checkered past than Germany, while few countries 
have undergone greater shifts in racial make-up. Un- 
happily for Germany, its history has been full of ill-fortune, 
while most of the racial changes that have occurred have 
been unfavorable ones. Even at the height of her power 


124 RACIAL RHALITIES IN EUROPE 


and prosperity in the period just before the late war, 
modern Germany occupied no such commanding posi- 
tion in Europe as had the Germany of a thousand years 
before. As for the modern German population, it cannot 
compare in quality with the population of form.r times. 
In her early days, Germany was inhabited by a very 
high-grade Nordic population. To-day, throughout the 
greater part of Germany, the tall, blond Nordics have 
been largely replaced by members of the thick-set, round-— 
headed Alpine race, which ranks below the Nordic in 
both energy and intelligence. Furthermore, both the 
Nordic and Alpine elements in modern Germany seem 
to have been somewhat racially impoverished—drained of 
many of their ablest strains owing to the misfortunes 
which have afflicted Germany at various times in her 
troubled history. 

When Germany emerged into the light of history about 
2,000 years ago, she appeared as a land of dense forest 
and marsh inhabited by a great number of tribes of pure 
Nordic blood. Such was the ‘‘Germania” of the Romans, 
and such were the original Germans or “'Teutons.”” These 
early Germans were barbarians—but “noble”’ barbarians. 
The Romans recognized the Germans as their most for- 
midable foes. After suffering one or two terrible defeats 
among the German forests, Rome gave up all thought of 
conquering Germany, building elaborate fortifications 
manned by her best legions to keep the dreaded barbarians 
out of the empire. Even in their prime the Romans re- 
garded the Germans with respect, not unmixed with fear. 
Tacitus and other Roman writers frankly praised the 
Germans’ high qualities. In Roman eyes this strange 


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talians Finns & Esths 
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Samoyeds 


| French 
Spanish 


MONGOLIAN UNCLASSIFIED 


Bulgarians 

| Slovenes 
Czecho-Slovaks 
Poles 

Great, White, & Little Russians 
Serbs 
Croats 
Serbs & Croats 


INDO EUROPEANS 


SLAVIC 


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ALPINIZED GERMANY 125 


Teutonic northland, clothed with primeval forests peopled 
by huge blond giants pressing ever southward out of the 
unknown, was an abode of mystery. Almost in awe, the 
Romans termed it “the womb of peoples.” 

Centuries passed. Rome declined, and the Nordic bar- 
barians beat more and more fiercely upon the frontiers. 
Indeed, Rome would have fallen much earlier, if she had 
not taken many Germans into her service. In Rome’s 
last days her best legions and her ablest generals were 
chiefly of German blood. . Yet even this clever policy 
could not avert ultimate ruin. Decayed to her very mar- 
row, Rome finally collapsed, and the German tribes swept 
all over western Europe. France, Italy, and Spain were 
alike engulfed by the Teutonic tide, while other Teutonic 
Nordics, going by sea, conquered Britain and made it 
“England.” 

For a time all western Europe was Nordicized. The 
leaders of the invading Nordics became the ruling-class, 
while their followers settled down on the land as yeoman 
farmers. The native Alpine and Mediterranean inhabi- 
tants of the former Roman provinces, greatly lessened in 
numbers, were either reduced to serfdom or were driven 
into the remoter or less fertile regions. Even in Italy 
and Spain the Nordic conquerors must at first have formed 
a large percentage of the population, while France be- 
came mainly Nordic in blood. ) 

Then began the long process of de-Nordicization which 
has gone on steadily till to-day. This ebbing of the Nor- 
dic tide first showed itself in Italy and Spain. Handi- 
capped by too warm a climate for their northern con- 
stitutions and absorbed by intermarriage with the more 


126 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


numerous native populations, the Nordic element in 
Italy and Spain rapidly diminished, except among the 
upper classes, which, protected from field labor by their 
rank, and guarded against frequent intermarriage with 
the native masses by race-pride or caste laws, retained a 
larger proportion of Nordic blood. 

All over Western Europe, however, the chief reason for 
Nordic decline seems to have been war—the great scourge 
of the Nordic race. Energetic and warlike by nature, — 
Nordics never fight so fiercely as when fighting each other. 
The fall of Rome heralded a perfect welter of inter-Nordic 
wars. Overrunning Western Europe not as a united people 
but as independent tribes, the Teutonic invaders fought 
endlessly over the spoils, slaughtering each other whole- 
sale, and thus reducing their numbers as against the sub- 
ject Alpine and Mediterranean populations, who took al- 
most no part in the fighting and, therefore, increased in 
numerical strength. 

Finally one of these Germanic tribes, the Franks, gained 
the ascendancy and, under a great leader, Charlemagne, 
temporarily united most of Western and Central Europe 
beneath his sway. Reviving the Imperial tradition, he 
assumed the title of Roman Emperor, and called his state 
the Roman Empire. Charlemagne’s experiment is one of 
the most fascinating of historical ‘“might-have-beens.” 
If it had succeeded, a great new civilization might have 
arisen, Nordic in character and anticipating modern 
civilization by nearly a thousand years. The materials 
for a new civilization were there. The Nordic masters of 
Europe were no longer the rude barbarians who had over- 
run the decayed Roman Empire. They had shown their 


ALPINIZED GERMANY 127 


intelligence and capacity by the rapidity with which they 
had assimilated the remnants of classic civilization and 
were creatively adapting it to their own temperaments 
and times. If peace and political stability could have 
been maintained, the germs of culture which were be- 
ginning to sprout would probably have soon come to 
brilliant bloom. 

And, as already remarked, the new civilization would 
have been essentially Nordic in character. Despite its 
“Latin” trappings, Nordic blood and the Nordic spirit 
were the driving forces in Charlemagne’s Empire. This 
fact is too often misunderstood. The term “Roman”’ has 
a southern ring, while the name “Charlemagne” suggests 
a Latin-French personality. As a matter of fact, nothing 
could be further from the truth. ‘‘ Charlemagne” is merely 
Old French for ‘Charles the Great.’’ And Charles the 
Great was a Teutonic Nordic to the very marrow of his 
bones. This mighty monarch, with his blue eyes and 
long golden beard, spoke Old German and held his court 
at Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle), a city of western Germany. 
His empire was a thoroughly Nordic creation. 

Charlemagne’s experiment, however, was not destined 
to endure. His successors did not inherit his greatness, 
and his empire rapidly fell to pieces, plunging Europe into 
the gloomy welter of the Dark Ages. The Teutonic Nor- 
dics not only continued to weaken each other by frat- 
ricidal wars, but became divided by such differences in 
language and culture that they lost practically all sense 
of racial solidarity. Hitherto, the Nordic conquerors of 
Western Europe had retained a certain kindred feeling. 
Fiercely though they quarrelled, they had yet felt them- 


128 RACIAL, REALITIES IN EUROPE 


selves nearer to one another than to their Latin subjects, 
and they had been proud of their Teutonic customs, 
speech, and free ideals. Now, however, the Nordics of 
Western Europe, diminished in numbers and alienated 
from their eastern kinsmen by constant wars, adopted 
the language and culture of their subjects, and thus be- 
came Latinized. Such was the germ of the modern French, 
Spanish, and Italian nationalities. This, however, not. 
only made henceforth impossible the creation of a great 
“‘Pan-Nordic”’ state and civilization like that foreshad- 
owed in Charlemagne’s Empire, but also hastened the 
decline of the Nordic element in Western Europe by break- 
ing down Nordic race-consciousness, and thus increasing 
intermarriage with the subject Alpine and Mediterranean 
elements. 

Meanwhile the Nordics of Central Europe retained 
their language and racial consciousness, and began to 
build up a separate political organization which was the 
foreshadowing of German nationality. This nucleus of 
later Germany was almost purely Nordic in race, but its 
political frontiers differed widely from the borders of 
either the ancient Germania or modern Germany. The 
Germania of Roman times had included all of Central 
urope north of the Rhine and the Danube, and had 
stretched eastward through what is now Poland to West- 
ern Russia. The fall of Rome, however, had caused a 
great change in the situation. The Germanic tribes which 
had been piling up for centuries against the Roman fron- 
tiers along the Rhine and Danube burst over Europe like 
a dammed-up flood set free. But this hsd left the Ger- 
manic homeland half depopulated, and into the half- 


ALPINIZED GERMANY 129 


empty territories came new peoples—the Slavs. The 
Slavs were racially of Alpine stock. Their homeland was 
in Southeastern Europe, centring about the Carpathian 
Mountains. The westward migrations of the Teutonic 
Nordics gave the Slavs their opportunity, and they rap- 
idly overran the whole eastern portion of ancient Ger- 
many. 

These Slavs were very different folk from the Nordic 
Teutons. Almost pure Alpines in blood, they displayed 
typical Alpine race-qualities. For example, their occu- 
pation of Eastern Germany was not so much a conquest 
as an infiltration. Much less warlike than the Teutons, 
they entered Germany, not as large organized tribes but 
as loose hordes, settling here and there upon the lands 
which had been abandoned by the Teutonic tribes who 
had migrated into the Roman Empire. What gave the 
Slavs .uccess was their vast numbers. There seems to 
have been comparatively little fighting between the two 
races. Like a slowly rising tide, the Slavs simply engulfed 
the remnants of the Teutonic inhabitants. The racial 
result was, however, none the less decisive, because East- 
ern Germany was transformed from a solidly Nordic 
into an almost solidly Alpine land. And for a long period 
this process went steadily on. In time the Slav tide flowed 
so far westward that it reached the line of the river Elbe. 
In other words, of the ancient Germania, only the extreme 
western portion lying between the rivers Elbe and Rhine 
remained Nordic in blood. This was the situation when 
Charlemagne united the Teutonic Nordics and founded 
his short-lived empire about the year 800 A. D. 

When Charlemagne’s Empire broke up and the Nordic 


130 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


elements of Western Europe became Latinized, the re- 
maining Nordics who had retained their old language and 
racial consciousness began (as already remarked) to form 
a separate state of their own. Although they retained 
only that part of their German homeland which lay be- 
tween the Rhine and the Elbe, they had become pos- 
sessed of much former Roman soil. A broad band of terri- 
tory west of the Rhine (including not only Germany’s 
present Rhine provinces but also most of Belgium and 
much of Northern France) had been so thoroughly over- 
run at the fall of the Roman Empire that the old Latin- 
ized population had disappeared, replaced by the Teu- 
tonic invaders. Therefore, the inhabitants of these regions 
did not become Latinized like their kinsmen further west, 
but kept their Germanic speech and united politically 
with their eastern brethren. Such was the political group- 
ing which was the nucleus of German nationality. Its 
frontiers were obviously very different from those of 
modern Germany, since it included much of what is now 
France, Belgium, and Holland, while on the other hand, 
it did not include Germany’s present eastern provinces. 
It is precisely these wide shifts of frontiers at different 
periods which have caused so many of Germany’s troubles. 

However, this nucleus of modern Germany made a good 
start. Rapidly growing in power, it turned its attention 
chiefly eastward toward the lost homelands. A mighty 
movement of conquest and colonization began, known in 
German history as the Drang nach Osten—“The March 
to the East.”’ Falling upon the barbarous and ill-organ- 
ized Slav tribes, the Germans rapidly conquered them and 
soon brought most of what is now known as Eastern Ger- 


ALPINIZED GERMANY 131 


many and Austria under their sway. Politically and cul- 
turally, these conquests were permanent. Racially, how- 
ever, they were far from complete. The Slavs submitted 
to their German conquerors, who settled down as mas- 
ters. The racial situation was thus like that in Western 
Europe after the fall of Rome. The Teutonic Nordics 
everywhere formed the ruling aristocracy. Also, the free 
peasants and the townsfolk were mostly Nordic in blood. 
As for the Slavs, reduced to serfdom, they adopted the 
German language and in time came to think of themselves 
as “Germans.” But change of speech did not change 
their blood. Racially they remained what they had 
always been—Alpines. Thus Eastern Germany became 
what it still is—a land of mixed racial stocks. At first, 
however, these stocks remained distinct. There was little 
intermarriage, the Teutonic Nordics looking down on the 
Alpine Slavs as an inferior race. Therefore, although 
Germany came to include many Alpine elements within 
its borders, the German spirit and culture long remained 
purely that of the ruling Nordic stock. 

So rapidly did this early Germany progress that it 
presently became the most powerful state in Europe. 
Indeed, it soon revived the memory of Charlemagne’s 
Empire. Invading Italy, then in a condition of turbulent 
weakness, the German monarch had himself crowned 
at Rome, proclaiming his combined realms “The Holy 
Roman Empire.” 

This, however, was a fatal mistake. The annexation of 
Italy proved to be medieval Germany’s undoing. Rap- 
idly though Germany had grown, it still lacked political 
cohesion. If the early German monarchs had devoted 


1322 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


their energies to that task, Germany might have become 
a, unified nation which would have been the most powerful 
state in Europe and the centre of European civilization. 
Instead of this, the German rulers wasted their strength 
on imperial dreams and costly foreign adventures. Italy, 
in particular, was a never-ending drain. Continually re- 
belling against German rule, it had to be continually re- 
conquered, In these expeditions the power of Germany | 
was consumed. Time after time a German monarch would 
lead a glittering host across the Alps, fight his way to 
Rome, and there be crowned emperor. But to do this he 
usually had to bankrupt his treasury, while of the splen- 
did knights and stalwart men-at-arms who followed his 
standard the majority would find Italian graves through 
battle or disease, comparatively few ever returning to 
their German homes. Meanwhile, back in Germany, 
ambitious nobles would be undermining the royal au- 
thority and building up their local power. As time passed, 
Germany fell into disunion and disorder. Instead of grow- 
ing together, it fell apart. Outlying regions like Holland 
and Switzerland gradually ceased to feel themselves “ Ger- 
man,” and finally split off as independent states. The 
main body of Germany sank into a loose confederation 
troubled by endless domestic quarrels. Once more, as in 
Charlemagne’s day, the Teutonic Nordics had lost their 
chance of political power and security. 

However, despite its political shortcomings, medieval 
Germany produced a brilliant civilization. In numberless 
noble castles and fine cities, chivalrous knights and fair 
ladies, poets, thinkers, artists, and craftsmen combined 
to make a society of peculiar variety and charm. Medieval 


ALPINIZED GERMANY 133 


Germany was indeed rich in the fruits of the Nordic spirit. 
For it was the Nordic spirit which pulsed through this 
virile civilization. Germany was still mainly Nordic in 
blood, and this blood was mainly of high quality. 

Then came the darkest time in Germany’s history: the 
Thirty Years’ War (1618 to 1648). This frightful catas- 
trophe dealt Germany a blow from which she has never 
recovered, The Thirty Years’ War was the climax of 
centuries of political disunion envenomed by religious 
fanaticism. It quickly developed into a horrible butchery 
in which the Germans slaughtered each other wholesale. 
For thirty long years the flower of the German race was 
sacrificed. As the war went on, neighboring nations took 
a hand in the grim game and fought out their quarrels 
on German soil. When the war at last ended, Germany 
was completely ruined. Her civilization had been trampled 
into the mud and blood of her battle-fields, while her 
racial stock was hideously mutilated. Germany had 
lost nearly two-thirds of her entire population. In some 
regions the loss of life was almost unbelievable: in Wuer- 
temberg, for example, over nine-tenths of the population 
had perished, while the city of Berlin contained but 300 
residents. And far more serious than the loss in numbers 
was the loss in quality. Perhaps never in the world’s 
history has so much superior human stock been destroyed 
in so short a time. In those thirty years the German stock 
had been changed almost beyond recognition. Gone were 
nearly all those fine strains which had been Old Germany’s 
strength and glory. This was particularly true of Ger- 
many’s “gentle blood.” The type that we call the “gen- 
tleman’”’ had been numerous in medieval Germany, 


134 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


After the Thirty Years’ War it was almost extinct in 
Germany, and is still comparatively rare. The tactless- 
ness and lack of innate courtesy characteristic of modern 
Germans seems mainly due to this scarcity of ‘‘gentle”’ 
blood. When the Thirty Years’ War was over, about all 
that was left alive in Germany was a brutalized soldiery 
and the toughest of the peasantry. It was this hard, 
coarse-grained remnant that sired modern Germany... 
The fact that so much intelligence and ability should 
nevertheless have been passed on to succeeding genera- 
tions proves the soundness of Old Germany’s human 
stock. 

Besides a general lowering of quality, the Thirty Years’ 
War produced marked changes in Germany’s racial make- 
up. The outstanding fact was a sweeping replacement of 
the Nordic by the Alpine element. In this, as in other 
wars, the fighting Nordics were the worst sufferers. Also, 
the post-war period continued the process of racial dis- 
placement. The Thirty Years’ War was followed by a 
generation of squalid poverty. In these wretched condi- 
tions the Alpines, more stolid and coarser fibred than the 
Nordics and with lower living-standards, had a better 
chance of survival. The upshot was that when Germany 
emerged into better times she was racially much changed. 
Instead of being predominantly Nordic, as she had been 
hitherto, Germany had become mainly Alpine in blood. 
And the race-lines which were then laid down were sub- 
stantially those which exist to-day. The Nordic elements 
of Southern and Eastern Germany had been largely de- 
stroyed, the peasantry being practically pure Alpines, 
while such Nordic blood as did remain was confined chiefly 


ALPINIZED GERMANY 135 


to the upper classes. Only in Northern Germany, par- 
ticularly in the northwest (where the Slav tide had never 
penetrated), did the population remain essentially Nor- 
dic in type. 

Another important point which should be noted is that 
it was during this period that there took place the ex- 
tensive racial intermixture which characterizes modern 
Germany. Before the Thirty Years’ War there seems 
to have been comparatively little intermarriage between 
Germany’s racial stocks. The Alpines were mostly serfs 
bound to the soil, while the Nordics of all classes—nobles, 
burghers, and free peasants alike—appear to have pos- 
sessed a strong racial consciousness and pride of ancestry. 
Society in Old Germany was decidedly aristocratic, and 
intermarriage between classes was therefore relatively 
infrequent. The Thirty Years’ War, however, shattered 
the old social fabric and greatly mixed the population. 
In time, to be sure, society re-formed, largely along racial 
lines, the superior intelligence and energy of Nordic blood 
rising naturally into the upper and middle social classes. 
But the old clearness of race-lines was blurred. Even the 
upper classes now contained much Alpine blood, while 
the general population, especially in Central Germany, 
became the mixed stock which it so evidently is to-day. 

This general “ Alpinization”’ of German blood produced 
corresponding changes in German ideals and institutions. 
The spirit of Old Germany had been a Nordic spirit. Its 
strong individualism and energetic originality in thought 
and action was like that of other Nordic lands such as 
England and the Scandinavian nations. After the Thirty 
Years’ War, however, the German spirit became largely 


136 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


Alpine in character. The mass-nature of German public 
opinion, its reliance upon authority, and its submissive- 
ness to strong, masterful minorities are all typically Al- 
pine traits. 

The Thirty Years’ War is thus the key to a correct 
understanding of modern Germany. It is also the key 
which locks an iron door between modern Germany and 
its medizval past. Those two Germanys are profoundly 
different in character—and unfortunately Old Germany 
was by far the superior. Modern Germany was born in 
the Thirty Years’ War; its destiny was irrevocably de- 
termined in the fatal year 1618, more than three centuries 
ago, when Old Germany committed suicide. Thenceforth 
Germany’s position in Europe was immensely weakened, 
while her future in the world at large was gravely com- 
promised. For two centuries Germany remained a mere 
geographical expression, racked by internal disunion and 
preyed upon by ambitious neighbors. Not until the year 
1871 did Germany attain political unity and gain a posi- 
tion of power and security comparable to that which she 
had enjoyed hundreds of years before. 

The German Empire founded in 1871 was largely the 
work of a commanding personality—Bismarck. Bismarck 
is a much misunderstood figure. Though often denounced 
as a brutal militarist, Bismarck was in reality a great 
statesman with keen vision and a firm grasp on realities. 
He knew that Germany needed above all things to con- 
solidate her new-won unity. Realizing as he did the latent 
dangers of Germany’s position, with no natural frontiers 
to east or west to guard against possible attack from 
France and Russia, he felt that Germany should be well- 


ALPINIZED GERMANY 137 


armed, but he did not believe that Germany should en- 
gage in ambitious foreign policies. So long as he remained 
at the helm of the ship of state, German foreign policy 
was conservative, aiming chiefly at the maintenance of 
the then-existing European political situation. 

Bismarck was forced from power by the young Em- 
peror William II in the year 1890, and it is then that Im- 
perial Germany began its policy of expansion which cul- 
minated in the Great War. However, we must be careful 
to understand the facts of the case if we are to get a clear 
idea of what actually occurred. The notion that in 1890 
Germany deliberately began plotting the conquest of the 
world, with Kaiser Wilhelm the arch-villain of the plot 
(as is still widely believed), is an absurdity of war-hysteria 
and propaganda. The truth of the matter is that Kaiser 
Wilhelm was a rather flighty personality, well-meaning 
but torn between romantic dreams of German greatness 
and common-sense warnings against the dangers which 
an expansive foreign policy might involve. Unfortu- 
nately, he kept the warnings well hidden but voiced his 
romantic dreams in flamboyant speeches which inflamed 
German ambitions and alarmed Germany’s neighbors. 

German public opinion was by this time getting into a 
mood which needed curbing rather than spurring. The 
chief reasons for this state of mind were intense patriotic 
exuberance and increasing economic prosperity. The at- 
tainment of political unity after centuries of disunion and 
weakness, and the sudden rise to a leading position in 
Europe, made Germans glow with pride and exultation. 
Patriotic optimism stressed the bright spots in Germany’s 
past. The glories of Old Germany were acclaimed, while 


138 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


darker days were forgotten. All this was natural and 
might not have been harmful if Germany’s leaders had 
kept their feet on the ground. Unhappily, Germany’s 
rapid rise to power and prosperity swept most of Ger- 
many’s spokesmen into the prevailing tide of boundless 
optimism. Germany’s economic development, in partic- 
ular, was truly extraordinary. In the forty-three years 
which elapsed between the founding of the German Em- 
pire and the outbreak of the Great War, Germany under- 
went a prodigious economic transformation, changing 
from a mainly agricultural country to one of the leading 
industrial nations of the world. This implied a vast in- 
crease in wealth and in population. In 1870 there were 
about 40,000,000 Germans; in 1914 there were nearly 
70,000,000. 

And this, in turn, produced a natural trend toward an 
expansive foreign policy. Germany, having become a 
“Great Power,” aspired to a “place in the sun” propor- 
tionate to her new greatness. Unluckily for herself, Ger- 
many found her path blocked by grave difficulties. The 
hard fact was that Germany had come late into the game 
of empire. While she had lain disunited and impotent, 
other peoples had moulded the course of world-history. 
Europe had crystallized into nations just as patriotically 
self-conscious as Germany herself, and some of these na- 
tions had staked out most of the desirable spots in other 
parts of the world as colonial domains which they were 
determined to retain. Germany was thus faced by a firmly 
established world-situation, and it should have been clear 
to her that any attempt to alter this general situation 
would inevitably alarm all the “satisfied” Powers and 


ALPINIZED GERMANY 139 


draw them together in mutual sympathy against the 
common disturber. 

If, then, Germany was resolved to undertake an ex- 
pansive foreign policy, her best course would have been 
to limit her ambitions to certain definite aims, concen- 
trate on these, and try to avoid rousing the fears of all 
not directly concerned. Germany’s obvious line of ex- 
pansion was through Central Europe and the Balkans 
to the Near Hast. Here she could count on a powerful 
ally—Austria, a country controlled by kindred German 
elements. Such a policy would, of course, imply the pos- 
sibility of war with Russia, backed by France, who had 
never forgotten her defeat by Germany in 1870 and who 
had allied herself with Russia to obtain protection and 
possible revenge. However, in such a war Germany might 
hope to be victorious, provided France and Russia were 
not joined by England. And, though England would of 
course not relish a German domination of Central Europe, 
she might stay neutral if Germany did not threaten her 
more vital interests—particularly her command of the sea. 
To placate England should, therefore, have been Ger- 
many’s constant endeavor. Instead, Germany launched 
into an aggressive naval and colonial policy which alarmed 
England and drove her into the arms of France and Rus- 
sia. Europe became an arena of rival ambitions and clash- 
ing foreign policies which culminated in the Great War— 
and Germany’s undoing. Handicapped from the start by 
too many foes, Germany made fresh enemies by her des- 
perate war-measures, and finally went down in defeat and 
ruin. Weltmacht oder Niedergang —‘‘World-Power or 
Downfall!” had been Germany’s furious battle-cry as 


1440 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


she dashed herself upon her enemies’ iron ring. And the 
answer was: Downfall! 

This grim tragedy is too vast for petty causes. To lay 
Germany’s blunders solely at the door of a handful of 
reckless militarists headed by the Kaiser (as is so often 
done) is nothing short.of an absurdity. Germany’s for- 
eign policy could never have been carried on unless it 
had been approved or acquiesced in by the bulk of Ger- 
man public opinion. And pre-war Germany’s state of 
mind displayed a fanatical pride and self-confidence which 
had lost all sense of reality and proportion. Believing 
themselves to be far and away the greatest people on 
earth, the Germans had come to think that almost any- 
thing lay within their power of accomplishment. They 
were thus in a mood to take big risks. 

That mood was induced, not merely by their present 
power and prosperity, but perhaps even more by a mis- 
reading of history and a perversion of racial truth. Gaz- 
ing backward into the past, the Germans saw visions of 
that Old Germany which had been the leader of Europe, 
and soon came to identify the ‘Holy Roman” with the 
modern German Empire. They did not stop to consider 
how times had changed; how other nations had developed, 
and how they themselves might differ from the Germans 
of former days. Here is where a genuine understanding 
of racial realities might have helped to clear their eyes, 
for it was during the closing years of the nineteenth cen- 
tury that knowledge of racial matters became definite 
and the importance of biology—the science of race—began 
to be appreciated. 

Unhappily, this new science was, in Germany, quickly 


ALPINIZED GERMANY 141 


perverted into a weapon of jingo propaganda. A power- 
ful group of national-imperialists, headed by popular 
writers like Houston Stewart Chamberlain, seized upon 
biology and prostituted it to their own ends. The Pan- 
Germans asserted that modern Germany is the seat of the 
tall, blond race which has been the moving spirit of West- 
ern civilization; that this modern Germany is racially 
almost purely Nordic; and that Nordics outside the Ger- 
man nationalistic group are either unconscious or rene- 
gade Teutons who should be brought into the German 
fold. To any one who has good eyesight and a fair sense 
of humor, let alone any knowledge of history and racial 
realities, a single glance at the average modern German is 
enough to show the absurdity of these assertions. Humor 
has, however, never been an Alpine characteristic, so the 
Germans swallowed this propaganda wholesale, and came 
to think of themselves more and more as a Herrenvolk— 
a “ Master-Race.” 

The truth is, of course, that the Pan-Germans were 
thinking in terms of national-imperialism instead of race, 
and that they were using pseudo-racial arguments as 
camouflage for essentially political ends. Instead of being 
almost purely Nordic, modern Germany is predominantly 
Alpine in race. Probably not more than two-fifths of all 
the blood in Germany is Nordic, while unmixed Nordic 
blood is limited to the extreme north and northwestern 
parts of the country. It has been estimated that of the 
70,000,000 inhabitants of the German Empire in the year 
1914, only 9,000,000 were purely Nordic in type. 

Indeed, one of the chief results of the late war has been 
a still further diminution of Germany’s Nordic blood. 


142 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


The past decade has witnessed a drain on German vitality 
second only to that suffered in the Thirty Years’ War. 
During the four war-years over 2,000,000 German sol- 
diers were killed, and at least 1,000,000 civilians died 
from war-time causes—especially starvation. Also, the 
great drop in the birth-rate during the war-period pre- 
vented fully 3,500,000 Germans from being born. Statis- 
tics for the post-war period indicate further heavy vital 
losses. The birth-rate, though recovering, is lower than 
before the war, the death-rate (particularly the infant 
death-rate) is higher, while disease is much more com- 
mon. And all signs point to the fact that it is the Nordic 
portion of Germany’s population that is suffering the 
heaviest losses. The late war, like other wars, took a dis- 
proportionate toll of Nordic life, while post-war economic 
and social conditions are less favorable to the Nordic 
than to the Alpine elements. The social classes hardest 
hit by the present deplorable financial situation are pre- 
cisely those that contain the most Nordic blood. Every- 
where it is upper and middle classes (particularly the pro- 
fessional and intellectual classes) who are ruined, half- 
starved, and unable to raise families. On the other hand, 
the racially mixed working classes of the cities and towns 
are, generally speaking, in less dire straits, while the mainly 
Alpine peasantry is relatively prosperous, well-fed, and 
raising plenty of children. 

In fact, the same process is going on in Germany to-day 
that went on during and after the Thirty Years’ War: a 
decline of the Nordic as compared to the Alpine stock, 
and an elimination of the more intellectual and cultured 
elements of both races in favor of those with tougher 


ALPINIZED GERMANY 143 


fibre and lower living standards, able to survive under 
hard and squalid conditions of life. These changes in the 
character of Germany’s population are of far greater and 
more lasting significance than financial matters like the 
mark and reparations which engross most of the world’s 
attention. I well remember a rather grim chat with a 
German industrialist when I was in Germany last year. 
We were discussing Germany’s economic and social 
troubles. “You know,” said he, “I’m fundamentally an 
optimist. Things look pretty black, but in the long run 
they’ll come better, because our people can stand any- 
thing. We Germans can take a lot of punishment; we’re 
just too tough to kill. A process of ruthless selection is 
now going on—a brutal struggle in which the fittest to 
the new conditions will survive. There may be less ‘cul- 
ture,’ but there’ll be more ‘guts.’ The French are making 
a big miscalculation. They hope to break us; instead, 
they’re getting us in trim. If they want to make us Ger- 
mans a supremely tough people, they’re going about it in 
just the right way.’ He was a large, thick-set man, with 
big teeth and a “hard-boiled” laugh. As I watched him, 
I thought that he was a very good type of the New Ger- 
many that he had in mind. 

Whatever may be the final outcome, Germany’s imme- 
diate prospects are troubled and uncertain. ‘The Ver- 
sailles Treaty imposed upon Germany conditions more 
drastic than any before laid upon a beaten nation in mod- 
dern times. By the terms of the Versailles Treaty, Ger- 
many lost outright fully one-tenth of her pre-war area 
and population—a loss of over 27,000 square miles of 
territory and more than 7,000,000 people. This involved 


144 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


the loss of much of her mineral wealth, especially iron and 
coal—the sinews of industrial life. Besides, Germany lost 
all her colonies and many other things like shipping and 
wealth invested abroad. She was also assessed a tre- 
mendous war-indemnity. Lastly, she had to submit to a 
prolonged military occupation of much of her remaining 
territory by her late enemies and to general measures of 
supervision and control which restrict her sovereignty. 
In fact, Germany cannot to-day be considered an in- 
dependent nation. This situation all Germans bitterly 
resent. Disarmed as they now are and surrounded by 
well-armed and watchful neighbors, few Germans believe 
that defiance of the Versailles settlement is now possible. 
Nevertheless, they consider the present situation intoler- 
able, and they are determined sooner or later to recover 
full independence and a revision of the Versailles settle- 
ment in one way or another. 

This determination will probably survive even fresh 
misfortunes. Whatever their shortcomings, the Germans 
are not decadent. On the contrary, they are an unusually 
tough combination of Alpine and Nordic stocks, both 
racial elements having been rigorously selected by long 
periods of ill-fortune. Present-day Germany may lack 
much of the high-spirited individuality and initiative that 
old-time Nordic Germany displayed, but in return she 
has the Alpine’s dogged tenacity and willingness to obey 
the commands of masterful ruling minorities. That was 
the secret of Imperial Germany’s disciplined power be- 
fore and during the late war. The chances are that a 
similar régime in Germany will ultimately arise. 


CHAPTER VII 
DISRUPTED CENTRAL EUROPE 


BretwEEN the open plains of Northern Europe and the 
broken mountain country of the Balkan Peninsula lies 
the great inland basin of the Danube. The Danube river- 
basin is the heart of Central Europe. It is a well-defined 
geographical area. Bounded on every side by highlands 
or mountain-ranges, it possesses a distinct general unity. 
Internally, however, the Danube basin is divided into two 
portions of unequal size. The smaller western portion is 
mainly hilly or mountainous country; the larger eastern 
portion is a vast plain. 

Nature thus seems to have designed the Danube basin 
to be politically either one nation or two nations in more 
or less intimate association. That has, in fact, been the 
tendency during much of its history—a tendency which 
was fairly well realized in the ‘ Dual” Empire of Austria- 
Hungary. But the recent break-up of that empire at the 
close of the late war reveals dramatically the presence of 
other factors hostile to the geographical trend. If the 
Danube basin had been isolated by more inacessible bar- 
riers, political unity would probably have been a certainty. 
The Danube basin, however, lies in the heart of Europe, 
and its natural boundaries, while well defined, have not 
been sharp enough to keep out penetration from all sides. 
The result has been a confused series of invasions, con- 


quests, and settlements which have overlaid natural unity 
145 


146 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


with human diversity. Instead of being inhabited by one 
or, at most, two races building up a home-made culture 
and political organization, the Danube basin has been a 
battle-ground of diverse stocks, streaming in from dif- 
ferent directions and seeking either to conquer their rivals 
or to annex their particular part of the Danube basin to 
homelands lying beyond its natural frontiers. These con- 
flicts of race, language, and nationality have disrupted 
the half-formed political unity of the Danube basin more 
than once in the past, and they have just done it again. 
The peace treaties which closed the late war shattered 
the Dual Empire of Austria-Hungary and remade the 
Danube basin into a political crazy-quilt, with frontiers 
running in defiance of geography and economics, and 
only imperfectly corresponding even to those divisions of 
language and nationality which were the excuse for mak- 
ing the new borders. 

Of the Dual Empire two diminished remnants are left: 
the Republic of Austria and the Kingdom of Hungary. 
The Dual Empire was one of the largest and most populous 
states in Europe. It had a total area of 260,000 square 
miles and a population of 52,000,000. Of this total, Aus- 
tria possessed about 116,000 square miles of territory 
with 29,000,000 population, while Hungary had 125,000 
square miles with 21,000,000 people. In addition, there 
was the dependency of Bosnia-Herzegovina—a, federal 
territory held in common by the two halves of the em- 
pire, with an area of 20,000 square miles and about 2,000,- 
000 population. Contrast these figures with the present 
situation: the Republic of Austria has an area of 32,000 
square miles and a population of 6,500,000, while the 


DISRUPTED CENTRAL EUROPE § 147 


present Kingdom of Hungary has an area of 35,000 square 
miles and a population slightly under 8,000,000. In other 
words, as a result of the late war, Austria has lost three- 
fourths of her territory and four-fifths of her population, 
while Hungary has lost over two-thirds of her territory 
and almost two-thirds of ber population. These lost lands 
and people have gone chiefly to Czechoslovakia, Jugo- 
slavia, Poland, and Rumania—states which we will dis- 
cuss in subsequent chapters, since they are linked with 
Eastern Europe or with the Balkan Peninsula as well as 
with the Danube basin. In the present chapter we will 
limit our survey to Austria and Hungary, which are dis- 
tinctly Danubian states. 

The foundations of Austria and Hungary were laid in 
the period following the fall of the Roman Empire. In 
that same period likewise originated the germs of their 
present misfortunes. The fall of Rome was followed by 
centuries of turmoil. All over Europe mighty movements 
of population took place. And nowhere were these move- 
ments more violent than in the Danube basin. Wave 
after wave of conquest and migration swept across its 
broad surface, causing endless complications. Race, 
speech, and culture became overlaid and confused. 

The racial changes were especially sweeping. In very 
ancient times the Danube basin and the adjacent moun- 
tainous regions were alike occupied by populations be- 
longing to the round-skulled Alpine race. Later on, blond 
Nordic tribes seem to have expelled the Alpines from 
most of the Danube basin, though the surrounding high- 
lands appear to have remained largely in Alpine hands. 
This was particularly true of the mountainous region to 


1448 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


the northeast—the region known as the Carpathians. In 
the Carpathian highlands the Alpines steadily amassed 
strength and numbers until, in the period following the 
fall of Rome, they burst out in all directions as the Slav- 
speaking peoples. In a previous chapter we saw how the 
Slavs overran the lands now known as Eastern Germany, 
Poland, and Western Russia. But while this was going 
on, another great Slav tide surged from the Carpathians 
over the Danube basin and into the Balkan Peninsula, 
which was thereby transformed into the predominantly 
Slav land that it has ever since remained. For a time the 
whole of Central and Eastern Europe became one vast 
Slavdom stretching unbroken from the Baltic to the 
Adriatic Sea. 

This Slav supremacy was, however, of short duration. 
From east and west two new streams of conquest set in 
which soon deprived the Danube basin of its Slav char- 
acter. Out of the remote East came a series of Asiatic 
nomad hordes, of Finnish, Turkish, and Mongolian blood. 
These wild horsemen, ranging far and wide on their shaggy 
ponies in quest of plunder, found the Hungarian plains 
(so like their Asiatic homelands) particularly attractive. 
Slaughtering or enslaving the Slavs, they settled down as 
masters. The last of these Asiatic invaders were the Mag- 
yars, or “ Hungarians,”’ who absorbed their nomad prede- 
cessors and built up a powerful state which was to endure. 
Such was the origin of modern Hungary. 

While the Asiatic nomads were overrunning the Hun- 
garian plains from the east, the other stream of conquest 
already referred to was flowing from the west down the 
valley of the Danube. These western conquerors were 


DISRUPTED CENTRAL EUROPE = 149 


the Germans. Having occupied western Europe after the 
fall of Rome, the Teutonic Nordics turned their arms 
eastward, and the conquest of the Danube valley was 
merely part of the great eastward movement which was 
redeeming their old German homelands from the Slav 
invaders. The Germans and the Magyars presently col- 
lided with one another. After much fierce fighting they 
divided the Danube basin between them, the boundary 
being practically that which exists between Austria and 
Hungary to-day. This frontier is clearly traced by na- 
ture, being the place where the river Danube leaves the 
hilly country of Austria and enters the great Hungarian 
plain. Thus the Danube basin was partitioned between 
two conquering stocks: the Nordic Teutons and the 
Asiatic Magyars. 

This dual conquest of the Danube basin had important 
consequences. In the first place, it dealt a terrible blow 
to the Slavs. The Slav world was thereby cut in twain, 
the Slav peoples of the Balkans being thereby sundered 
from the main body of their kinsmen by a broad band of 
Germans and Magyars. Politically and culturally, the 
cleft remained absolute. Racially, however, the situ- 
ation was not so definite. Here emerges a second point 
which must be remembered: the way in which, through- 
out the Danube basin, race-lines are blurred and cross- 
cut by non-racial factors like language, culture, and na- 
tional consciousness. Neither the Teutonic Nordics in 
Austria nor the Asiatic Magyars in Hungary destroyed 
the earlier populations. Instead, they imposed them- 
selves as conquerors and ultimately intermarried exten- 
sively with the subject elements. For this reason both 


150 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


the Austrians and the Hungarians became racially mixed 
peoples, pretty thoroughly crossed by various racial ele- 
ments. To be sure, the Teutonic and Magyar strains re- 
mained dominant and gave the political and cultural tone 
to their respective countries; nevertheless, the physical 
type and temperament of both stocks rapidly altered. 
The Austrian Germans differ distinctly from their kins- 
men even of South Germany, and differ still more widely 
from the pure-blooded Teutonic Nordics of North Ger- 
many. As for the Magyars, they underwent an even 
profounder transformation. The modern Magyars are so 
saturated with Alpine and Nordic blood that they have 
lost most of their ancestral Asiatic traits and have become 
almost wholly ‘European”’ in appearance. 

Throughout the Middle Ages, Austria and Hungary 
erew in power and prosperity. As yet they were entirely 
independent of one another, their political interests lying 
in different directions. Hungary was concerned chiefly 
with east European or Balkan matters, while Austria be- 
came linked more and more closely to Germany. Aus- 
tria’s fortunes presently came to be guided by a famous 
princely family, the House of Habsburg. The Habsburgs 
gradually raised Austria from a frontier district to the 
most powerful German state and made their capital, 
Vienna, one of the chief cities of Europe. 

Habsburg Austria steadily prospered, but Hungary 
was destined to be stricken down by a terrible foe—the 
Turks. At the close of the Middle Ages the Ottoman 
Turks burst into Europe, overran the Balkan Peninsula, 
and then attacked Hungary. In the fateful year 1526, 
the flower of the Hungarian nation was annihilated in a 


DISRUPTED CENTRAL EUROPE 151 


great battle and Hungary fell under Turkish rule. For 
nearly 200 years Hungary was a Turkish province. Then 
the Habsburgs drove out the Turks, but for the Hun- 
garians this meant little more than a change of masters, 
since they now fell under Habsburg sway. Hungary was 
only the shadow of its old self. The best of the Hungarian 
stock had been killed by the Turks or had fled into exile, 
and when the Austrians expelled the Turks, the land lay 
half-depopulated. Herein was the root of Hungary’s later 
misfortunes. Down to the time of the Turkish conquest 
the Hungarian plains had been inhabited almost entirely 
by a “Hungarian” people—that is to say, by a population 
which, though of mixed Magyar and European blood, was 
Magyarized in speech and culture, and therefore felt itself 
Magyar in nationality. Only in the mountainous border 
districts had the old Alpine populations kept their Slav 
speech and self-consciousness. After the Turkish con- 
quest, however, the situation radically altered. ‘The non- 
Magyar mountaineers descended into the half-deserted 
plains, turning many regions once Magyar into Slav- 
speaking areas. Indeed, the Habsburg rulers of Hungary 
intensified this process by systematic colonization, in- 
viting in settlers from many lands, who turned parts of 
Hungary into racial checker-boards, with almost every 
village differing in blood, customs, and language from its 
neighbor. 

The Magyars hated their Habsburg masters and longed 
for their old independence. However, Austrian rule did 
promote Hungary’s material prosperity. ‘The Danube 
basin is an economic whole, and now that it was politic- 
ally united the natural economic tendencies could work 


152. RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


unchecked. “Down to the middle of the nineteenth cen- 
tury the Habsburg Empire was in some respects the most 
powerful state in Europe. Steadily expanding, it annexed 
many territories lying outside the Danube basin, parts 
of northern Italy, Poland, and the Balkans being in- 
cluded within its frontiers. Furthermore, through its 
historic connection with Germany, it was the leading 
German state. 

The nineteenth century, however, raised up an enemy 
to the Habsburg Empire which was destined to be its un- 
doing. This enemy was not a rival state but an idea: 
the idea of Nationality. The nineteenth century has often 
been called the Age of Nationality. All over Europe men 
began thinking in nationalistic terms, and desiring to re- 
mould their political institutions on nationalistic lines. 

Right here we should understand the true meaning of 
Nationalism, and should closely distinguish it from Race, 
with which Nationalism is so often confused. Nationalism 
is, at bottom, a state of mind. Nationalism is a belief, held 
by a large number of persons, that they constitute a “Na- 
tionality ’’; it is a sense of belonging together as a ‘‘ Nation.” 
This “‘ Nation,” as visualized in the minds of its believers, 
is a people organized under one government and dwelling 
together in a distinct territory. When the nationalist 
ideal is realized, we have what is known as a body-politic 
or “State.” But a state need not necessarily be a nation; 
its subjects may not possess national feeling. National 
feeling may be aroused by many things like blood-kinship, 
political association, language, culture, religion, or geog- 
raphy. Some of these elements must be present to make 
a nationality, but a strong national feeling may arise 


DISRUPTED CENTRAL EUROPE 153 


even though some are absent. Blood-kinship (‘‘Race’’) 
is one of the strongest factors which can go to make up 
a nation. It is not indispensable, but its absence is always 
a hidden weakness, which may reveal itself at any time. 
It will undoubtedly become increasingly important for 
harmonious national life as men realize its full signif- 
icance and come to think more and more in racial terms. 
However, that must not obscure the fact that Race and 
Nationality are, in themselves, two distinct things. Na- 
tionality is a state of mind. Race, on the other hand, is 
a physical fact, which may be accurately determined by 
scientific tests such as skull-measurement, hair-formation, 
and color of eyes and skin. In other words, Race is what 
people physically really are; Nationality is what people 
politically think they are. . 

The difficulty for the Habsburg Empire was that it 
took account neither of Nationality nor of Race. It was 
an old-fashioned ‘‘Empire,’”’ founded on the principle of 
loyalty to the Habsburg dynasty and on certain geo- 
graphical tendencies, chief among these being the natural 
unity of the Danube basin, which promoted the material 
prosperity of its inhabitants. To the principle of National- 
ity, in particular, the Habsburg Empire was not merely 
indifferent but positively hostile. Its ideal was the old 
Roman Empire, and the Habsburg monarchs called them- 
selves “Emperors,’”’ and considered themselves the suc- 
cessors of the Roman Caesars. They long governed as 
absolute rulers, supported by a nobility, a bureaucracy, 
an army, and an established church, all ‘imperialist”’ in 
spirit, drawn from all parts of the empire yet united in 
common loyalty to the Emperor. 


154 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


On this old-fashioned dynastic empire the principle of 
nationality worked like a powerful explosive. Region 
after region began thinking “nationally,” glorifying its 
particular language and culture, demanding local self- 
government or even dreaming of independence. In the 
year 1848 a series of revolts broke out, the most serious 
being the rebellion of Hungary. This was only natural, 
because, as already stated, the Magyars had always dis- 
liked Habsburg rule, and had never given up hopes of 
independence. After much bloody fighting these revolts 
were put down and the Habsburgs re-established their ab- 
solute government. But within twenty years a series of 
fresh misfortunes forced them to change their policy. 
Their old rival, Prussia, expelled Austria from Germany 
and transformed Germany from a loose federation into a 
modern nation-state. The rising tide of Italian national- 
ism likewise drove the Austrians from their north Italian 
provinces and forged Italy into another nation-state. 
Meanwhile, nationalist movements in other parts of the 
Habsburg Empire steadily grew in strength. 

Weakened by these disasters, the Habsburgs bolstered 
up the tottering empire by compromise. Unable to resist 
entirely the nationalist principle, they took the two lead- 
ing nationalities into partnership. In the year 1867, the 
Habsburg realm was transformed into the “Dual Em- 
pire” of Austria-Hungary. Though preserving certain 
common institutions like a single army, navy, and diplo- 
matic service, the two halves of the empire were politic- 
ally distinct. In Austria the Germans, and in Hungary 
the Magyars, were put in command to control the lesser 
nationalities such as Czechs, Croats, and Rumanians. 


DISRUPTED CENTRAL EUROPE § 155 


Under this system Austria-Hungary lived for half a cen- 
tury, until the Dual Empire was destroyed at the close 
of the late war.’ 

It is interesting to speculate whether Austria-Hungary 
might have survived if the war had not taken place. Be- 
cause the Dual Empire did in fact die in the war is not 
necessarily proof that it would have died anyway.7 De- 
spite the nationalist disorders which racked its frame, the 
Dual Empire was a real political organism possessing 
many qualities that tended to keep it together. For one 
thing, the geographical unity of the Danube basin created 
ties of self-interest which were growing rapidly stronger 
as the country became more industrialized and its inhabi- 
tants more interlaced by economic co-operation. Also, 
there was the old “imperialist” feeling of the powerful 
upper classes, and the almost fanatical loyalism of the 
populations of certain provinces like Tyrol, where his- 
toric devotion to the Habsburg dynasty survived un- 
changed. Lastly there were other unifying factors, less 
capable of exact definition, yet none the less existent. 
It must be remembered that the Habsburg Empire was 
not a sudden or recent creation; that, on the contrary, it 
was the product of many centuries of growth. Its in- 
habitants, therefore, were not just so many Germans, 
Slavs, Magyars, and Rumanians, dropped down hap- 
hazard upon the map; they had all been modified by long- 
standing political, economic, and cultural association. 
These factors may have been subtle, yet they were cer- 
tainly present. Any one who knew Austria-Hungary 
before the war will remember the distinctive “ Austrian 
atmosphere,” so intangible yet so self-evident wherever 


156 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


you crossed the Austrian frontier. You could not pre- 
cisely lay your finger on it, but you knew that it was 
there. 

Of course, Austria-Hungary might have exploded even 
without the shock of the Great War, and at best it would 
have had to pass through a long and troubled transition 
period. Austria-Hungary could probably never have be- 
come a strong, harmonious nation-state, made up as it 
was of many national and racial elements. Still, some 
formula for such a loose federalism might have been 
devised by which these elements could have subordinated 
their nationalistic differences to their common economic 
interests. 

However, it was not to be. The war destroyed the 
Dual Empire and the peace treaties cut Central Europe 
into a number of little nations. The results have been 
deplorable. Conditions in Central Europe to-day are far 
worse than they were before the war. Nationalistic pas- 
sions have become even more inflamed, while economic 
considerations have been absolutely disregarded. Few 
treaties have ever been drawn more stupidly than those 
which pretended to “re-settle” the Danube basin. Mr. 
Lloyd-George, one of the chief treaty-makers, later con- 
fessed his error when he exclaimed ruefully: ‘We have 
Balkanized all that part of Europe!” 

Lloyd-George stated the bald truth. That geographical 
unity, the Danube basin, has been slashed by a network 
of frontiers which are not merely fortified political borders 
bristling with soldiers but are also tariff-walls that strangle 
trade and kill prosperity. Raw materials are cut off from 
their factories, factories are cut off from their natural 


DISRUPTED CENTRAL EUROPE © 157 


markets, rich harvests are kept from starving cities; yet 
so fanatically jealous are the new nations of one another 
that they are ready to keep themselves poor if they can 
thereby prevent their neighbors from growing rich. That 
is, indeed, good “Balkan” doctrine, as we shall see in a 
later chapter when we come to examine the affairs of those 
troubled lands. Meanwhile, let us here observe what has 
happened to post-war Austria and Hungary—the dimin- 
ished remnants of the Dual Empire. 

We have already seen how both countries have shrunk 
in area and population, these cessions involving also the 
loss of most of their raw materials and other sources of 
wealth. Austria and Hungary have alike passed through 
terrible times since the war. Austria rapidly collapsed 
into bankruptcy and the impoverishment of her city 
population, as Germany is now doing. Hungary had an 
even worse experience. She was cursed with a Bolshevik 
revolution which developed into a bloody reign of terror 
and ended with a combined counter-revolution and for- 
eign intervention, leaving her half ruined and utterly 
disorganized. Though alike afflicted by misfortune, it 
is interesting to observe how different are the attitudes of 
the two peoples, the Austrian Germans being apparently 
broken in spirit, whereas the Magyar spirit is most em- 
phatically unbroken. This difference in attitude is due 
partly to racial differences in the two stocks and partly 
to the fact that the Austrian Germans never possessed 
a real national consciousness while the Magyars have 
been a true nationality for centuries. 

We have already seen that Old Austria was in many 
ways a survival from another age. With its ideals founded 


158 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


on Roman and Medieval Imperialism, it was a sort of 
political dinosaur living on in an increasingly nationalist 
Europe. Though Austria was trying to adapt itself to 
modern conditions, the Great War caught it in transition, 
and it perished. Now Old Austria centred in the German- 
speaking provinces, its heart being the capital-city— 
Vienna. The Austrian Germans were practically un- 
touched by nationalism. They were not, and never had 
been, a “nation.” Instead, they were the favored ele-- 
ment in a dynastic empire. Their political creed was, 
therefore, not national patriotism, but rather a curious 
blend of feudal and imperial loyalty to the reigning House 
of Habsburg. This attitude was most marked in Vienna. 
Habsburg Vienna, like ancient Rome, was an “imperial” 
city; its inhabitants prided themselves on being citizens 
of the capital of the Habsburg Empire, with its traditions 
stretching back through the Middle Ages to the Roman 
Cesars. They were distinctly “cosmopolitan” in spirit— 
and they were also cosmopolitan in blood, because Im- 
perial Vienna had for centuries attracted people not only 
from all parts of the Habsburg Empire but from all parts 
of Europe. The Viennese show their varied ancestry by 
their lively quickness as well as by their superficial in- 
stability, both being characteristic of highly mixed popu- 
lations. 

Such was the people upon whom descended the catas- 
trophe of 1918. Almost without warning their empire 
was shattered and the Habsburgs disappeared. This sud- 
den disaster acted like a blow in the solar plexus. The 
Austrian-Germans were stunned—paralyzed. Then came 
fresh misfortunes: financial collapse, bankruptcy, starva- 


DISRUPTED CENTRAL EUROPE 159 


tion. Beneath the force of these terrific blows the Austrian 
spirit broke. No more amazing transformation has proba- 
bly ever occurred than that between the Vienna of ten 
years ago and the Vienna of to-day. The soul of the city 
has basically altered, and “Imperial” Vienna is as dead 
as the Cesars. Few Austrians even dream of regaining 
their former greatness. The Viennese, in particular, have 
renounced their past, have resigned themselves to their 
loss, and limit their hopes to a modest future. One feels 
of the Viennese that here is a people which has ceased to 
struggle; which has, so to speak, ‘‘thrown up the sponge.” 

The past being not only dead but buried, the interesting 
question arises as to what shall be German Austria’s fu- 
ture. The catastrophe of 1918 left the Austrian Germans 
in a sort of political vacuum. Of course, as always happens 
in such cases, the Austrian Germans began casting about 
for new gods to take the place of the old. Never having 
possessed a national consciousness of their own, the “na- 
tionality” artificially imposed upon them by the peace- 
treaties seemed to most Austrians little short of an ab- 
surdity. Feeling that the “Republic of Austria” was a 
mere paper creation which could not stand alone, the over- 
whelming majority of the Austrian Germans instinctively 
turned to the idea of political union with their kinsmen to 
the northward, their programme being the entry of Ger- 
man Austria as a federal state, a sort of second Bavaria, 
into the German Reich. This seemed the most natural 
thing to do, not only owing to present circumstances but 
also because German Austria had formed part of the old 
Germanic Federation down to the year 1866, when, as 
the result of a war between Austria and Prussia, the loose- 


160 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


knit Germanic Federation had been transformed into a 
modern nation-state from which Austria had been ex- 
cluded. In addition to this historic reason, the Austrian 
Germans also felt that their desire to join their German 
kinsmen was based on clear moral right, because the 
peace treaties had been drawn ostensibly according to the 
principle of “self-determination.”” The Austrian Germans, 
however, were in for a rude awakening. Their plea to be 
allowed to join their German kinsmen was sternly denied 
by the victorious Entente Powers, particularly by France. 
The Austrian Germans were given clearly to understand 
that union with Germany would under no circumstances 
be permitted; that logic must yield to Allied self-interest; 
and that the principle of ‘“self-determination,”’ however 
fine in theory, did not apply to the vanquished. 

Thus thrown back upon themselves, surrounded by 
hostile neighbors, and with no patriotic faith to give them 
moral strength, the Austrian Germans fell into despair, 
covered their debts by inflating their currency, and 
plunged into a slough of misery and bankruptcy from 
which they were rescued only by the unique expedient of 
an international receivership. This is one of the most 
interesting experiments which have been tried in post- 
war Europe. It began in the autumn of the year 1922, 
when Austria was granted an international loan super- 
vised by the League of Nations. At that moment Aus- 
tria’s situation seemed hopeless; she was bankrupt and 
literally starving. Her government had solemnly warned 
the world that it could no longer carry on and that, un- 
less something were speedily done, collapse and probably 
chaos would ensue. The loan averted bankruptcy, stabil- 


DISRUPTED CENTRAL EUROPE 16l 


ized the currency, and improved the general economic 
situation. Austria is to-day in fairly good shape, its in- 
habitants enjoying an increasing measure of moderate 
well-being. Vienna, in particular, has been saved from 
threatened ruin and is fast reasserting its position as the 
natural financial and commercial centre of Mid-Europe. 

But all this has to be paid for, and the price is a prac- 
tical loss of independence. We must remember that Aus- 
tria is no longer an independent state; that it has passed 
under international control exercised by the League of 
Nations. The real ruler of Austria is the League, acting 
through its commissioner in Vienna. The commissioner 
is an able Dutchman who uses his power most tactfully. 
He is not formally part of the Austrian Government, his 
position being “‘merely”’ head of the League Commission 
to protect the international loan. But, of course, in reality 
he has the last word, because he makes the loan payments 
which alone keep Austria from bankruptcy, and since 
these payments are made monthly he has the power to 
close the purse-strings if the Austrian Government should 
decline to follow his recommendations. 

It is really an extraordinary situation, this spectacle of 
a people only a few years ago the heart of a great empire 
now fallen under an international receivership. Nothing 
like it has been seen since Lord Cromer became “financial 
adviser” to the bankrupt Khedivial Government of Egypt 
a little less than half a century ago. So far, the strange 
experiment has proved a success. But even should it 
continue to be a success, that should not blind us to the 
peculiar circumstances of the case. In Austria we have a 
people with no real national consciousness, whose historic 


162 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


past has suddenly been shorn away. In the dark days 
before the League took control it is literally true that 
nobody cared whether the “Republic of Austria” lived 
or died. In this frame of mind, the Austrians were quite 
ready to barter away an independence for which they 
cared nothing in return for financial assistance coupled 
with international control. This situation cannot be 
duplicated anywhere else in Europe. To peoples with real 
national consciousness, loss of independence is a supreme 
disaster. Therefore, even if other peoples should be 
tempted by suffering to follow Austria’s example, the 
chances are that they would try to shake off foreign con- 
trol as soon as their condition had slightly improved, while 
from the very beginning they would not give that moral 
assent which alone could insure the lasting success of the 
undertaking. 

Assuming that German Austria does acquire enough 
economic strength and political stability to exist as an 
independent state, what is to be its future? This raises 
one of the most interesting and important questions that 
the Europe of to-morrow will have to face. The blotting 
out of Austria’s past leaves something like a clear field 
and opens up several possible lines of development. 

The most likely possibility still seems to be ultimate 
union with Germany. Not to-day, of course: the veto of 
the victors in the late war is absolute, while in addition 
Germany’s present condition is so bad that few Austrians 
would under existing circumstances care to join Germany 
even if the Entente veto were removed. Even the leaders 
of the “Pan-German”’ party in Austria, the champions 
of political fusion with the Reich, admit frankly that their 


DISRUPTED CENTRAL EUROPE 163 


programme is “Zukunfismusik’”’—“music of the future.’ 
Yet sooner or later the chances are that Germany will re- 
gain stability and strength, while the diplomatic line-up 
in Europe shifts almost from year to year. Should Aus- 
tria get the chance to join Germany under such altered 
conditions, would she do so? 

The chances are that she would. History, language, 
culture, and to a lesser degree blood-kinship and geog- 
raphy, all point that way. However, it is not a certainty. 
Another possibility presents itself: the possibility that 
German Austria may continue to stand alone and may 
ultimately develop an individual political consciousness, 
part national, part international, which will make of Aus- 
tria a permanently neutralized state—a sort of second 
Switzerland. Although the Austrians do not to-day pos- 
sess a national consciousness, they have long had a local 
consciousness and a culture in many ways distinct from 
that of their kinsmen of the Reich. Also, it must not be 
forgotten that their racial make-up differs somewhat even 
from their south German neighbors’, and differs markedly 
from that of North Germany. This shows clearly in the 
Austrian temperament, particularly the temperament of 
the Viennese. If Austria should remain independent for 
even ten or twenty years, these factors might engender 
a real national consciousness on the Swiss model. Such 
an Austria would probably be safe from attack, because 
it would menace no one, while its neighbors are so jealous 
of each other that they might welcome a neutral Austria 
in their midst. 

Even these two alternatives do not exhaust the list of 
possibilities. German Austria might conceivably join 


164 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


Hungary in some form of partnership, thereby reproduc- 
ing the old Dual Empire on a small scale. Again, Austria 
might join some future “Danube Federation” or Danu- 
bian customs-union, should the states of Central Europe 
ever be able to harmonize their political and economic 
interests. Or, lastly, Austria may fly to pieces and be 
absorbed by its various neighbors. Which of these things 
will happen no one can say. The important point to re- 
member is the fluid condition of Austria’s state of mind, 
which makes any one of these various developments a 
possibility. 

Utterly different is the situation in Hungary. Unlike 
Austria, Hungary was one of the first states in Europe 
to acquire a national consciousness. Hungary’s national 
life runs back for a thousand years, and its people feel 
an intense national patriotism. The Magyars are an 
unusually high-spirited folk. The fierce, warlike blood of 
their nomad ancestors still runs hot in their veins, and 
despite extensive intermarriage the Magyar stock differs 
perceptibly from the other Central European peoples. 
It is really extraordinary to see how boldly the Magyars 
confront ill-fortune. No broken spirit here! Partitioned, 
impoverished, burdened with debts and war-indemnities, 
disarmed by the peace treaties and surrounded by watch- 
ful enemies, the Magyars grimly refuse to resign them- 
selves to their present fate and sternly resolve to right 
what they consider to be the wrongs inflicted upon them. 
High and low, rich and poor, noble and peasant, the Mag- 
yars denounce the peace-treaties and swear to obtain 
their revision in one way or another. Everywhere one 
sees maps contrasting Hungary’s pre-war and post-war 


DISRUPTED CENTRAL EUROPE 165 


frontiers, these maps further bearing the significant words: 
Nem! Nem! Sohar! (“No! No! Never!”) 

This does not mean that Hungary is likely to start a 
war to-morrow. Though high-spirited, the Magyars are 
also an intelligent people, and their present leaders are 
capable men who understand the situation. They know 
that for the time being little can be done. But they will 
also tell you frankly that the Hungarian people will not 
permanently endure conditions deemed intolerable. Fur- 
thermore, it must not be forgotten that Magyar bitterness 
is constantly exasperated by the plight of their brethren 
who have passed under foreign rule. Nearly one-third of 
the whole Magyar stock (about 3,000,000 people) to-day 
lives in Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, or Rumania, where 
their lot is a hard one. In Czechoslovakia the Magyars 
seem to be less harshly treated, but in Jugoslavia and 
Rumania they are badly persecuted, the position of na- 
tional minorities in those two countries being probably 
the worst in Europe. And of course every story of in- 
justice and suffering leaks across the frontiers (however 
closely guarded), further inflaming Magyar determina- 
tion to aid their persecuted kinsmen. 

All this is well known to Hungary’s neighbors. Fearing 
the Magyars’ fierce fighting qualities, Czechoslovakia, 
Jugoslavia, and Rumania, who have alike profited so 
largely at Hungary’s expense, have formed an alliance 
(the so-called “Little Entente’’) the main object of which 
is to uphold the peace-treaties, preserve intact the new 
frontiers, and keep Hungary down. For the moment the 
task is easy: the peace-treaties forbid Hungary to have 
more than the skeleton of an army, while the Little En- 


166 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


tente Powers*can arm as much as they choose—and are, 
in fact, armed to the teeth. But how about the future? 
The Little Entente knows that the Magyar spirit is un- 
broken and that some sudden shift in European politics 
may give Hungary her chance of revenge. This naturally 
alarms and exasperates Hungary’s neighbors, and tempts 
them to think of “preventive measures.” ‘The excep- 
tionally cool-headed leaders who guide Czechoslovakia’s 
destiny apparently frown on such proposals, but in Jugo- 
slavia and Rumania sentiment is less restrained. In both 
the latter countries there is an influential body of opinion 
which would like to smash the Magyars and practically 
wipe Hungary off the map. 

Thus we see a vicious circle of mutual hatred which 
may at any time plunge Central Europe once more into 
war. And we must also remember that to the southward 
lies the Balkan Peninsula—a veritable powder-magazine 
of national feuds. A spark struck in the Balkans could 
easily touch off an explosion which would shatter Central 
Europe as well. Meanwhile Central Europe fails to at- 
tain either true peace or prosperity. The situation is 
frankly bad, and there are few signs of real improvement. 


CHAPTER VIII 
THE ALPINE EAST 


ConpiTIons in Eastern Europe can be described in two 
words: complexity and instability. This is true not merely 
of the present but also of the past. Nature herself is pri- 
marily responsible. Eastern Europe is a vast plain stretch- 
ing from Germany across Russia to the Ural Mountains. 
Furthermore, Eastern Europe is itself only part of a larger 
whole, because the Urals are no true barrier and beyond 
them lie the even vaster plains of Siberia, which go clear 
to the Pacific Ocean. Indeed, Eastern Europe is really a 
borderland between Europe and Asia, and partakes of 
both continents in its geography, its climate, and the 
character of its inhabitants. For ages it has been the 
scene of vast racial movements. ‘These endless plains 
with their long, navigable rivers invite migration. There 
countless tribes and nomad hordes of diverse races have 
wandered, meeting and mingling their blood. In Eastern 
Europe race-lines tend to become blurred, its inhabitants 
being mostly of mixed stocks. This has, however, not 
resulted in a uniform mixture. The land is so vast, the 
climates are so varied, and the migrations have come from 
such different directions, that the populations of different 
regions vary widely from one another in racial make-up, 
though with a good deal of border-crossing. This combina- 
tion of wide migration and varied local race-mixture has 


likewise produced a complex overlapping of languages, 
167 


168 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


religions, and cultures, while the interplay of all these 
factors has resulted in profound instability—especially in 
political matters. States and “empires” have arisen 
rapidly—and as rapidly disappeared. Here and there 
populations have developed a national consciousness and 
have therefore crystallized into “nations.” But even 
they lack the stability of western nations: their territories 
are not separated from their neighbors’ by natural fron- 
tiers, and they often contain within their political borders 
elements which have not been assimilated into the na- 
tional life. Eastern Europe is thus a world still in the 
making, where frontiers are still fluid and where great 
political changes may yet take place. 

Over the greater part of this immense area one basic 
factor has long been active—the spread of Alpine blood 
and Slav speech. For the past thousand years the Alpine 
Slavs have been expanding over Eastern Europe, so that 
they to-day form the common element in the various 
racial and national combinations which have taken place. 
This is the outstanding point to remember in Eastern 
Europe’s complex history. In previous chapters we have 
observed the great outpouring of the round-headed Alpine 
Slavs from their Carpathian homeland westward into 
Germany and southward through the Danube basin to 
the Balkans. Let us now follow this same movement 
northward and eastward into what is to-day Poland, Rus- 
sia, and other east-European regions. 

When the Slav masses began pouring over Eastern 
Europe, they found a land generally level but diversified 
by climate into wide, treeless prairies, dense forests, deep 
swamps, and half-desert plains. The forests and swamps 


THE ALPINE EAST 169 


lay to the north, with a cold climate and heavy rain or 
snowfall. South of the forest belt began the open coun- 
try—at first fertile prairie but gradually shading off to 
the southeast into less fertile plains with diminishing 
rainfall until, on the borders of Asia, they became water- 
less deserts. These southern deserts and arid plains (known 
as ‘‘steppes”’) were already occupied by Asiatics—Turkish 
or Mongol nomad hordes moving in from Asia. The rest 
of Eastern Europe was then sparsely inhabited by blond 
Nordic tribes, mingled in the far north with Asiatic Fin- 
nish stocks which had wandered in from Siberia. 

Such was the land into which the migrating Slavs made 
their way, a little over a thousand years ago. What fol- 
lowed was, not so much a conquest as a confused inter- 
penetration. The Slavs were split up into a multitude of 
independent groups, while the native Nordic and Finnish 
populations were equally unorganized. After a certain 
amount of obscure fighting, the newcomers and the older 
elements seem to have rapidly mingled, the more numerous 
Alpine Slavs contributing the largest share in the new 
racial combination. The steady Alpinization of Russia 
and Poland, together with its gradual and mainly peace- 
ful character, has been proved by numerous studies of 
ancient burial-mounds and old Russian and Polish grave- 
yards. The prehistoric burial-mounds contain the bones 
of a long-skulled population unmistakably Nordic in 
type. Alpine round-skulls do not become frequent in 
Russian and Polish burial-places until about 900 A. D. 
Thereafter the proportion of round-skulls increases rapidly 
until in a few centuries it becomes the prevailing type, 
thus showing the steady replacement of the Nordic by the 


170 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


Alpine racial element. Racial change, however, varies 
widely with different regions. This is clear not only from 
historical studies but also by the appearance of the exist- 
ing population. Not only in their head-forms but also in 
their complexions, modern Russians and Poles show the 
effect of varied Alpine and Nordic crossings. The original 
Slavs were (like all distinctly Alpine peoples) a round- 
skulled, thick-set, rather dark-complexioned folk. Such is 
to-day the prevailing type in Southern Russia and Poland, 
as it also is in the Slav homeland, the highlands of the 
Carpathians. But in Northern Poland, and even more in 
Northwestern Russia, a great deal of Nordic blood sur- 
vives, showing itself in the blond and reddish-blond types 
so common among the Polish and Russian peasantry of 
those regions. At the same time, it should be noted that 
pure Nordic types are rare: so prolonged and general has 
been the intermingling of racial stocks that in most liv- 
ing individuals Nordic characteristics are found associated 
with Alpine traits like round skulls and thick-set bodies, 
thus forming what scientists call “disharmonic combina- 
tions.” Again, in Northern Russia, the population shows 
distinct signs of an admixture of Asiatic Finnish blood. 

And this by no means describes the whole of Eastern 
Europe’s complex racial make-up. Parallel to the expan- 
sion of the Alpine Slavs has gone a series of invasions by 
Asiatic nomads, mostly Turks and Mongols, who have 
several times turned back the Slav advance and who 
have also sown much Asiatic blood among the Eastern 
European peoples. Asiatic types are to-day not infre- 
quent in Poland and are much more common in Russia, 
particularly in Southern Russia, where there is much 


THE ALPINE EAST 171 


Asiatic blood. The Russian temperament is clearly part 
Asiatic in character. That old saying, “Scratch a Rus- 
sian and you find a Tartar,” contains a deal of truth. 
Besides the Asiatic strains which have become absorbed 
in the general population, there exist other Asiatic ele- 
ments which still remain distinct. Such are the Moham- 
medan Tartars of Eastern and Southern Russia, kept apart 
from the surrounding population by barriers of religion 
and culture. The same is true of the large Jewish popu- 
lation of Poland and Western Russia. The Russian and 
Polish Jews are a very mixed stock, widely different in 
type and temperament from the Jews of Western Europe 
and the Mediterranean basin. These east-European Jews 
of Russia, Poland, and Rumania together form the so- 
called “‘Ashkenazim” branch of Jewry, the west-Euro- 
pean and Mediterranean branch being known as “Sephar- 
dim.” ‘The racial make-up of the Ashkenazim is decidedly 
complicated. The largest element in their make-up con- 
sists of various Alpine strains, acquired not only from the 
Alpine populations of Europe but also from distant rela- 
tives of the European Alpines such as the Armenians and 
kindred round-skulled stocks of Western Asia. The Ash- 
kenazim possess very little of the old Semitic Hebrew 
blood. On the other hand, they have a strong Mongolian 
infusion due to intermarriage with the Khazars, a Mon- 
goloid Asiatic tribe once settled in Southern Russia which 
was converted to Judaism about a thousand years ago, 
and was thereafter absorbed by intermarriage into the 
Ashkenazic stock. It is from the Khazars that the dwarfish 
stature, flat faces, high cheekbones, and other Mongoloid 
traits so common among east-Huropean Jews seem to be 


172 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


mainly due. The mixed racial make-up of the east-Euro- 
pean Jews shows plainly in the wide varieties of physical 
appearance and temperament which appear in the stock, 
this extreme variability frequently producing very un- 
usual ‘‘disharmonic combinations.” 

One other feature in Eastern Europe’s racial make-up 
should be noted: the ruling aristocracies which have ap- 
peared at various times. The inability of Alpines to erect 
strong states of large size is well illustrated by the Slavs. 
In practically every case where large, powerful, and en- 
during states have arisen among the Slav peoples it has 
been primarily due to a masterful ruling minority differ- 
ing considerably in race from the Alpine masses. The 
best example of this is Russia, which from the very be- 
ginning of its history has been ruled by minorities chiefly 
of non-Alpine blood. 

Such is the racial and geographical background of 
Eastern Europe. To describe in detail all the human group- 
ings which have arisen as a result of these varied racial 
combinations, cross-cut as they have been by political, 
cultural, and religious factors, would make a book in 
itself. Let us therefore confine ourselves to a brief sur- 
vey of the three most important east-European peoples: 
the Russians, the Poles, and the Czecho-Slovaks. From 
this survey a good general idea of east-European condi- 
tions can be obtained. 


We will begin our survey with the Czecho-Slovaks, be- 
cause this people (divided, as its name implies, into two 
branches) forms a natural link between Central and East- 
ern Europe. A glance at the map makes this clear. The 


THE ALPINE EAST 173 


country of the Czecho-Slovaks is a long ribbon of terri- 
tory running across Hast-Central Europe almost due east 
and west. The Czechs inhabit the western portion, the 
regions known as Bohemia and Moravia, which thrust 
their mountainous bulk far to the westward, dividing the 
German plains to the north from the Danube valley to 
the south. Bohemia, the more westerly of the two regions, 
is likewise the larger and more important. It is a great 
plateau in Europe’s very heart, ringed about with moun- 
tains. Bohemia’s dominating position, overlooking as it 
does both the flatlands of Germany and the Danube val- 
ley, has given it the significant title of “The Citadel of 
Europe.” 

Moravia, a transition land of hill and plateau, is the 
link connecting Bohemia with the Slovak country to the 
eastward—the rugged highlands of the Carpathians, which 
sweep like a vast bow southeastward for hundreds of 
miles, dividing the Danube basin from the limitless east- 
European plains. We now see how geography itself has 
made the Czecho-Slovaks the link between Central and 
Eastern Europe. Bohemia seems at first sight to be geo- 
graphically part of Central Hurope. What binds it racially 
to Eastern Europe is the fact that the only easy entrance 
to Bohemia is from the east. On its other sides Bohemia’s 
mountain walls rise almost unbroken, and when (as in 
ancient times) these mountains were clothed with prime- 
val forest they formed an impenetrable barrier to large- 
scale human migration. 

Bohemia’s history begins with its settlement by the 
Czechs. This settlement was part of the great expansion 
of the Alpine Slavs which took place shortly after the 


174 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


fall of the Roman Empire. The Czechs of Bohemia and 
Moravia are the Slavs who migrated due west from the 
Carpathian homeland. ‘The Slovaks are their kinsmen 
who stayed behind. These Slovaks, backward and iso- 
lated as they have remained, have kept much of the primi- 
tive Slav physical type and temperament. However, even 
the Czechs are to-day racially nearer to the original Slavs 
than are most of the modern Slav peoples of the east- 
European plains such as the Poles and Russians, because 
the Czechs have not come in contact with so many racial 
elements. The only considerable mixture that the Czechs 
have undergone has been with Germans. When the Czechs 
first entered Bohemia they found the country thinly 
populated with Teutonic Nordics. These the more nu- 
merous Czech invaders soon overwhelmed and absorbed. 
To this early cross the blond traits which appear in the 
Czech peasantry are mainly due. The Slav strain, how- 
ever, remained predominant, so that a glance at the pres- 
ent population is enough to show that the modern Czechs 
are mainly Alpine in race. The extremely round heads, 
thick-set bodies, and dark hair and eyes so common among 
the Czech peasantry unquestionably represent the primi- 
tive Slav type. The Czech middle classes have more Nor- 
dic blood, this being due largely to the later period of 
German domination. For Bohemia, the western outpost 
of Slavdom, has been under German control during much 
of its history. The trend of affairs in Central Europe 
made this inevitable. When the Czechs invaded Bohemia 
they formed merely the middle of the great Slav wave 
which was also rolling over Germany to the northward 
and up the Danube valley to the south. But presently 


THE ALPINE EAST 175 


the Germans counter-attacked in their great eastward 
march which rapidly reconquered the German plains and 
also pushed down the valley of the Danube. The Czechs 
thus became isolated in their mountain bastion, sur- 
rounded by Germans on three sides and connected with 
the Slav world to the eastward only through Moravia. 
And presently the Germans began to filter into Bohemia. 
At first, this movement was a peaceful one. The Czech 
monarchs, anxious to increase their country’s prosperity, 
welcomed German merchants and artisans who brought 
to Bohemia their industry and higher civilization. This 
process of Germanization went on much faster when the 
old Czech kings died out and were succeeded by a dynasty 
ef German origin. Presently Bohemia and Moravia were 
connected politically with the Medieval German Empire 
and seemed in a fair way to be completely Germanized. 

In the later Middle Ages, however, there came a vio- 
lent reaction. The Czechs awoke to national self-con- 
sciousness and began a fierce fight to preserve their na- 
tional life. The terrible Hussite Wars, though religious 
in form, were in fact mainly a Czech nationalistic revolt 
against encroaching Germanism, which was checked for 
a century. Nevertheless, the Czechs had not gained com- 
plete independence, and they presently fell under the rule 
of the most powerful of the Germanic states—Habsburg 
Austria. Against Habsburg rule the Czechs soon revolted, 
their revolt marking the start of the terrible Thirty Years’ 
War (1618-1648), which devastated the whole of Central 
Europe. This time the Czechs lost. The Habsburgs (who 
here represented Germanism) took a bloody vengeance 
upon the rebellious Czechs. Bohemia and Moravia were 


176 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


half depopulated, while the old Czech nobility was en- 
tirely rooted out, their estates being given to foreigners, 
mostly Austrian Germans. Thus deprived of their natu- 
ral leaders, the oppressed Czech peasantry sank into a 
political and cultural stupor which looked like death. 
Outwardly the land became entirely German, the Czech 
language being spoken only by peasants. 

However, the nineteenth century, that awakener of 
dormant nationalities, roused the Czechs from their long 
slumber. A vigorous nationalist revival began, and the 
increasing economic prosperity which Bohemia then en- 
joyed favored the rapid growth of a Czech middle and 
educated class which furnished able leaders to the na- 
tional revival. Step by step, despite stubborn opposition, 
the Czechs drove the German minority from their privi- 
leged positions and won a large measure of political con- 
trol. The long struggle, however, aroused increasing 
bitterness on both sides. The German minority, infuriated 
by Czech successes and alarmed for its future, openly 
preached secession from Austria to the German Empire, 
while the Czech nationalists demanded what amounted 
to independence: the formation of Bohemia and Moravia 
as a fully self-governing state wherein they, as the ma- 
jority, might Slavize the Germans. When Austria refused 
these demands, the Czech nationalists began planning the 
break-up of Austria and full independence, fixing their 
hopes on Russia as their possible liberator. 

Bohemia and Moravia were thus full of race-hatred, 
secessionism, and general unrest when the Great War 
broke out in 1914. The Czech nationalists hailed the 
war as their opportunity. Most of the present leaders of 


THE ALPINE EAST 177 


Czecho-Slovakia, such as President Masaryk and Mr. 
BeneS, were in exile, and these exiled leaders hastened to 
proclaim their devotion to the Allied cause against the 
Germanic Empires. The Czechs rendered the Allies good 
service. When forced by the Austrians to do military 
service, the Czechs surrendered wholesale, disrupting the 
Austrian armies. In return, the Allies recognized the 
Czech claims to independence, and the peace-treaties set 
up the present Republic of Czecho-Slovakia as a sover- 
eign state. 

Czecho-Slovakia has an area of about 54,000 square 
miles with a population of 13,600,000. As its name im- 
plies, it contains not only the Czechs but also their kins- 
men the Slovaks. The country forms a long, narrow band 
stretching across East-Central Europe. This elongated 
form is one of Czecho-Slovakia’s chief weaknesses. Its 
frontiers are largely artificial and would be hard to de- 
fend against attack. Internally, Czecho-Slovakia’s main 
problem is the lack of harmony between the various ele- 
ments of its population. This is a very serious matter. 
Of the total population only about three-fifths (8,700,000) 
are Czecho-Slovaks. There are over 3,000,000 Germans, 
800,000 Magyars (Hungarians) 500,000 Ruthenians, or 
“Little Russians,” and fully 600,000 of other nationali- 
ties. None of these minorities are really reconciled to the 
new situation, and they are thus possible sources of 
trouble, singly or in combination. The powerful Ger- 
man minority in particular, concentrated as it is mainly 
in Bohemia and thereby in physical touch with the Ger- 
man fteich, is bitterly discontented and makes no secret 
of its hope to join Germany some day. 


178 RACIAL, REALITIES IN EUROPE 


The situation is made still more serious by the disputes 
which have arisen between the two sections of the domi- 
nant group—the Czechs and the Slovaks. Despite their 
common origin, there are many differences between them. 
Losing touch with one another almost at the start, their 
paths diverged widely and they grew asunder. Unlike 
the Czechs, the Slovaks have had no political or cultural 
development worth mentioning. Isolated in their moun-_ 
tains, the Slovaks have remained primitive and back- 
ward. For centuries they have been under Hungarian 
rule, and they have never come in contact with western 
civilization as the Czechs have done. Also, their territory 
is poor and barren compared with the Czech lands, which 
are not only fertile but possess much mineral wealth which 
has formed the basis of a prosperous industrial develop- 
ment. 

The Slovaks are thus very much the ‘‘junior partner” 
in the new concern. Among other things, they are far 
less numerous than the Czechs, numbering only a trifle 
over 2,000,000 as against the Czechs’ 6,500,000. Never- 
theless, the Slovaks possess a distinct local consciousness 
and assert their claims to consideration. During the late 
war, when both elements were struggling for a common 
cause, the Czech leaders promised the Slovaks a large 
measure of local self-government. Independence once 
gained, however, the Czechs proceeded to erect a strongly 
unified state, declaring this to be vital to the country’s 
safety in view of its exposed frontiers and discontented 
minorities. But this angered the Slovaks, who declared 
that they had been tricked. The breach was further wid- 
ened by the economic damage inflicted upon the Slovaks 


THE ALPINE EAST 179 


by the new frontiers. Slovakia’s natural market is Hun- 
gary. Its rivers and valleys run into the Hungarian plain, 
and along these natural avenues the Slovaks sent their 
agricultural and forest products which are Slovakia’s sole 
wealth. The new frontier (which was also a tariff-wall), 
however, cut off Slovakia from Hungary, and at the same 
time did not open the Czech lands to Slovak products, 
because the Czech territories are divided from Slovakia 
by rugged mountains which make transportation difficult 
and costly. 

So the quarrel between Czechs and Slovaks goes merrily 
on. Indeed, there are all the makings of an unusually 
fine family row, for both sides show their kinship by a 
common obstinacy and tactlessness characteristic of the 
stock. The chief differences between them are that the 
Czechs are well-educated, prosperous, and open to modern 
ideas, whereas the Slovaks are mostly illiterate, poor, and 
intensely conservative. Neither side makes it easy for 
the other. The Slovaks regard the Czechs as rich relatives 
who put on airs and bully their poor relations in intoler- 
able fashion. The Czechs look down on the Slovaks as 
ignorant, dirty, narrow-minded “country cousins,” who 
must be cleaned up and civilized before they can be given 
much of a say in running the country. I still smile when 
-I recall the indignant outburst of a Czech when I re- 
counted to him the grievances that a Slovak had recently 
told me. ‘Those Slovaks!” snorted the Czech disgust- 
edly. “They make me tired. ‘Liberty,’ Indeed! The 
first thing they’d better do is to get de-loused !”’ 

This Czech-Slovak quarrel is a most pressing problem. 
If it continues, the Slovaks may develop a real “nation- 


180 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


alism” of their own and instead of demanding merely 
self-government may plot secession and independence. 
This is by no means an impossible contingency. For one 
thing, it would be in line with a political tendency ob- 
servable among all Slav peoples—the tendency to local 
particularism. Throughout their history the Slavs have 
tended to form small political units and have rarely com- 
bined in large states except under the pressure of foreign | 
foes or the compulsion of able rulers. But, unless the 
Czechs and Slovaks do grow together, “ Czecho-Slovakia” 
can hardly survive. A rebellious Slovakia would become 
one more “minority,” playing in with the other minori- 
ties against the dominant Czechs. Indeed, statistically 
speaking, the Czechs themselves would become a “mi- 
nority,”’ because without the Slovaks they would form 
less than one-half of the total population. Czecho-Slovakia 
would thus become a second edition of pre-war Austria, 
and would in the long run almost certainly suffer the same 
fate. 

The most hopeful aspect of the situation is the presence 
of some very able leaders, notably President Masaryk and 
Mr. Bene’, who have displayed great skill in guiding the 
ship of state. No one can meet and talk with these men 
without being impressed by their intelligence and states- 
manlike common sense. Their wisdom is shown in both 
domestic and foreign policy. Despite the dangerous tem- 
per of the minorities, these are more liberally dealt with 
in Czecho-Slovakia than in almost any other European 
country, the Czech leaders realizing that their minorities 
are too numerous to be crushed and that the only hope 
of reconciling them lies in moderation. In their foreign 


THE ALPINE EAST 181 


policy the Czech rulers have been cautious and pacific, 
knowing that if a new explosion should occur in Europe, 
Czecho-Slovakia, with its exposed frontiers and domestic 
instability, would be one of the first to suffer. 

These wise policies have given Czecho-Slovakia a calmer 
and more prosperous post-war life than any other coun- 
try of Central or Eastern Europe. At first sight, indeed, 
Czecho-Slovakia’s future seems already fairly secure. But 
when one looks below the surface the future appears less 
certain. Czecho-Slovakia’s success has thus far been 
primarily due to a triumph of able leadership over great 
inherent difficulties. The more one sees of Czecho-Slo- 
vakia, the more one feels that its present rulers are very 
far above the level of their followers. The average Czech 
politician or official seems Just about as narrow-minded, 
short-sighted, and intolerant as the politicians and of- 
ficials of other eastern European and Balkan lands. When 
BeneS and Masaryk go, will they be replaced by states- 
men of equal calibre? On the answer to that question, 
the fate of Czecho-Slovakia will largely depend. 


Turning from Czecho-Slovakia to Poland, we encounter 
typical east-European conditions: a country without nat- 
ural frontiers, with a very mixed population, and with 
languages, religions, and cultures overlapping in extremely 
complicated fashion. In other words, we find in Poland 
those conditions of complexity and instability character- 
istic of Eastern Europe. Poland’s past has been a troubled 
and a tragic one, while Poland’s future is menaced by ills 
similar to those which have caused its previous misfor- 
tunes. 


182 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


The tragedy of Poland is rooted in its geography. Save 
on the south it has never known the protecting and pre- 
serving advantage of natural frontiers. Consequently its 
political boundaries have shifted and re-shifted as its 
fortunes rose or declined. And every shift has meant new 
complications. 

The Polish people centres in the inland plains which 
are drained by the river Vistula. This centre of Polish 
settlement is shaped like a huge oblong, its southern base — 
resting upon the Carpathian Mountains, Poland’s only 
natural frontier. Along that border the line between 
Poles and non-Poles is fairly clear. Elsewhere, however, 
the Polish nucleus shades off into regions inhabited partly 
by Poles and partly by peoples of other nationalities. In 
these debatable regions, which stretch west, north, and 
especially east, and which together form a vast area nearly 
four times as large as the nucleus of Polish settlement, 
Polish and non-Polish elements are intermingled in vari- 
ous proportions. ‘The reasons for this complicated situ- 
ation can be explained only by a glance at Polish history. 

The original Poles formed part of the great Slay wave 
which descended from the Carpathian highlands and 
inundated Central and Eastern Europe. Originally almost 
pure Alpines in race, the Poles absorbed a certain amount 
of Nordic blood from the rather sparse Nordic population 
which then occupied the Vistula plains, though this Nordie 
infusion was nowhere strong enough greatly to modify the 
ancestral Alpine type. The primitive Poles could not be 
called a “people”; they were a loose mass of small tribes 
with very slight political cohesion. What welded the 
Poles into a people with a national consciousness was the 


THE ALPINE EAST 183 


pressure of foreign foes—especially the Germans. We 
have already noted the great eastward movement of con- 
quest and colonization which the Germans undertook at 
the beginning of the Middle Ages. It was the Poles who 
checked the German “ March to the East.’”’ Among the 
Poles there arose a dynasty of able chieftains who welded 
the petty tribes of the Vistula plains into a state strong 
enough to block the German advance. For about two 
centuries this early Kingdom of Poland was strong and 
fairly prosperous. During that period the Poles not only 
became a nationality but also developed a distinct cul- 
ture based upon western ideals. This latter fact is a mat- 
ter of great importance because the Poles were thereby 
clearly marked off from the Russian Slavs to the east- 
ward. Poland took its Christianity from Rome and thus 
entered the pale of western civilization. Russia, on the 
other hand, was converted from Constantinople and be- 
came part of Greek Orthodox Christianity and Byzan- 
tine Greek civilization. With different faiths and cul- 
tures, the Poles and Russians followed divergent paths 
and presently became bitter rivals for the leadership of 
Eastern Europe. 

However, this rivalry was still in the future. The Rus- 
sians were as yet too disunited and backward to count 
for much, while Poland’s first national experiment ended 
in failure. Its ruling dynasty having lost its vigor, Poland 
broke up into several principalities. In this condition of 
mutual weakness; Poland and Russia both fell victims 
to a terrible invasion by the Mongol Tartars. These fierce 
Asiatic nomads swept like a hurricane over Eastern Eu- 
rope. Russia was stamped flat under the Mongol hoofs 


184 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


and remained for centuries under Asiatic control—with 
lasting effects upon its blood and culture. In Poland the 
Mongol tide soon ebbed, but it left the land desolated 
and with Asiatic strains in its population which are visible 
even to-day. 

So weakened had Poland now become that it not only 
lost ground to the Germans on the west but was also 
threatened by a new foe from the north—the Lithuanians. 
The Lithuanians were a group of tribes of primitive Nor- © 
dic stock who from time immemorial had dwelt among 
the forests and marshes north of Poland along the Baltic 
Sea. Unlike the other peoples of Eastern Europe, these 
warlike barbarians clung doggedly to their ancestral 
paganism and had remained entirely outside the pale of 
civilization. Emerging from their forests, the Lithuanians 
now ravaged both Poland and Russia. At last the Poles 
agreed to make the Lithuanian leader their King if he 
would become a Christian and unite the two countries 
under his sceptre. This he did in the year 1386—a notable 
date, because under his able rule the combined state of 
Poland-Lithuania rapidly rose to power. The next two 
centuries, indeed, are Poland’s golden age. Poland-Lithu- 
ania became the strongest state in Eastern Europe. The 
Germans were defeated and huge tracts of Russia were 
conquered and partially colonized, the Russian inhabi- 
tants being reduced to serfdom under Polish-Lithuanian 
landlords. It was during this same period that the great 
Jewish immigration took place. At first welcomed and 
encouraged by the Polish Kings, the Jews flocked in from 
every side, settling in the towns in such numbers that 
the Poles at length checked this immigration. However, 


THE ALPINE EAST 185 


the Polish Jews throve and multiplied, and Poland be- 
came thenceforth the numerical centre of the Jewish race. 

The Lithuanian dynasty produced a series of able rulers, 
but after about two centuries the dynasty died out and 
with its extinction Poland-Lithuania fell into rapid de- 
cline. The turbulent and factious nobility (which had 
always given trouble) seized control and set up a govern- 
ment which was little better than legalized anarchy. The 
Crown became a mere shadow, while the nobles, split into 
warring factions, plunged the land into endless confusion. 
The decadent state, with its vast outlying territories, in- 
habited by oppressed and rebellious alien elements like 
Russians and Germans, and with its cities full of unas- 
similated Jews, became a mere helpless hulk, inviting 
aggression by more powerful neighbors. And unfortu- 
nately for Poland, as it got weaker its neighbors grew 
stronger. To the westward stood Germanic Prussia, to 
the southward was Habsburg Austria, while to the east- 
ward Russia at last found herself with Peter the Great, 
and made ready to regain those Russian lands which 
Poland and Lithuania had conquered during Russia’s time 
of trouble. Having beaten Poland in several wars and 
thus discovered her full weaxness, Russia, Prussia, and 
Austria decided to wipe her out altogether. There fol- 
‘lowed the famous Partitions of Poland (1772-1795) by 
which Poland disappeared from the map. Russia got the 
lion’s share of the booty, Prussia and Austria receiving 
smaller, yet valuable, portions. 

However, the political extinction of Poland did not 
solve the Polish problem. The anarchic Polish state died, 
as it deserved to die; but the Polish people lived. The 


186 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


very depth of their misfortunes roused the Poles to a 
fresh national consciousness. Accordingly, the nineteenth 
century witnessed an intense national revival in all the 
sundered branches of the Polish stock. Despite their best 
efforts, Russia and Prussia failed to de-nationalize their 
Polish subjects. Austria never seriously attempted to de- 
nationalize her Poles, permitting them a large measure of 
local self-government. Thus the “Polish Question’’ con- — 
tinued to vex the politics of Hastern Europe and remained 
a source of chronic trouble and unrest. 

Then came the Great War, which ended by re-creating 
a Polish state almost as large and populous as medieval 
Poland. This result, however, was quite unexpected and 
was mainly due to an unlooked-for event—the Russian 
Revolution. When the war began, Polish independence 
was scarcely mentioned in Europe, while the Poles them- 
selves were divided as to what attitude they should as- 
sume. To some Poles Russia was the supreme foe, to 
other Poles Germany was the most hated enemy. As for 
Russia, it had very definite ideas on the Polish question, 
its intention being to seize both Prussia’s and Austria’s 
Polish territories and thus bring all Poles under Russian 
dominion. Had Russia stood by its allies until the end 
of the war, this would undoubtedly have happened, France 
and England having agreed that Russia should receive 
Prussian and Austrian Poland as the spoils of victory. 
But Russia broke down in 1917, went Bolshevist, and 
made peace with the Germanic Empires at the most crit- 
ical moment of the war. Thenceforth the western Allies 
considered Soviet Russia their enemy, both on account 
of its i ph of the common cause and on account of 


THE ALPINE EAST 187 


its Bolshevist propaganda which sought to disrupt the 
Allied nations as part of the Bolshevik programme of 
“World-Revolution.”’ 

Under these circumstances the restoration of Polish 
independence naturally suggested itself to the western 
Powers. The Peace Conference, therefore, erected a Polish 
state to serve as a check on both Germany and Russia, 
and to keep these two countries from possibly combining 
to upset the peace-treaties which had been framed largely 
at their expense. France, in particular, pressed this policy 
to its logical conclusion. The French argued that since 
Poland was to be restored primarily to watch Germany 
and Russia and to keep them apart, she should be made 
as strong as possible in order to do her work well. That 
naturally appealed to the Poles. The Poles had never 
forgotten their old dream of supremacy in Eastern Europe. 
Accordingly, they demanded frontiers which went even 
beyond the “historic Poland of 1772.” Acting on the old 
saying: “It’s a poor rule that doesn’t work both ways,” 
the Poles advanced two utterly contradictory sets of 
arguments for the same end. Said the Poles: All terri- 
tories which to-day contain any considerable number of 
Poles must be Polish, in accordance with the “principle of 
nationalities.” But, likewise, all territories which formed 
part of the old Polish state, whatever their present popu- 
lation, must also be Polish, to square with other “prin- 
ciples” like “historic justice,” and, failing those, “stra- 
tegic necessity.” Lastly, Lithuania was regarded as 
“Polish” as a matter of course. Such were the claims 
which the Poles pressed at the Peace Conference which 
re-made the map of Europe. 


188 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


The Poles got by no means all they wanted, but they — 
got enough to make the New Poland a very large and 
populous state. Poland to-day has an area of nearly 147,- 
000 square miles (considerably larger than the British 
Isles) and a population of over 27,000,000. These terri- 
tories are mainly fertile and contain much mineral wealth, 
so that Poland has the possibility of both a prosperous ~ 
agricultural and industrial life. 

Superficially, Poland might seem to have bright pros- 
pects. Actually, her prospects are very far from bright. 
Poland owes her new independence primarily to a lucky 
turn in European politics, and she has attained her pres- 
ent frontiers not only through the peace-treaties but also 
by a series of successful aggressions against her neigh- 
bors. Poland has “gotten away with” these aggressions 
through French backing, France regarding Poland as the 
keystone of her system of alliances, and thus favoring 
Poland in every way. But Poland’s successes have left 
a legacy of foreign and domestic problems very ominous 
for the future. Having not only quarrelled but fought 
bloodily with every one of her neighbors, Poland has not 
a friend in Eastern Europe. Universally disliked and 
widely hated, Poland is to-day surrounded by a ring of 
potential enemies. Even her former partner, Lithuania, 
has been infuriated by Poland’s seizure of Lithuania’s 
chief city, Vilna—about the most barefaced act of aggres- 
sion that has occurred anywhere since the war. As for 
Russia and Germany, Poland’s most powerful neigh- 
bors, they are precisely her most embittered opponents. 
Poland’s present frontiers are a standing challenge to 
both nations, which they will tolerate just so long as 
they have to—and not one moment longer. 


THE ALPINE EAST 189 


Furthermore, in addition to these external dangers, 
Poland is afflicted with grave internal troubles ominously 
like those which brought Old Poland to decline and ruin. 
Poland’s frontiers are far-flung, but they contain many 
large and rebellious minorities, while the Poles have al- 
ready begun to quarrel among themselves as of yore. 
Of Poland’s 27,000,000 inhabitants only a trifle more 
than half are of Polish blood. The balance of the popu- 
lation consists of over 2,500,000 Germans, nearly 4,000,000 
Jews, 4,000,000 Ruthenians, or “Little Russians,’ and 
more than 1,500,000 of other nationalities—principally 
White Russians, Great Russians, and Lithuanians, with 
a few Czechs and Slovaks thrown in for good measure. 
None of these minorities likes Polish rule, and the Poles 
are doing their best to make them like it still less by op- 
pressing them as harshly as the Poles themselves were 
oppressed by their former Russian and German rulers. 
Meanwhile the Poles are quarrelling fiercely among them- 
selves, Polish politics being enlivened by riots, assassina- 
tions, and kindred disturbances. Furthermore, Poland’s 
big army and other governmental expenditures have 
plunged her into debt and debased her currency, which is 
now practically worthless. In fine: although the New 
Poland has been running less than ten years, conditions 
begin more and more strongly to resemble those of the 
“historic Poland of 1772,’’ when Old Poland was parti- 
tioned among her neighbors. Unless the New Poland 
mends her ways, her neighbors may well partition her 
again. But will Poland mend her ways? Events thus far 
strongly suggest that the Poles are the Bourbons of East- 
ern Europe—“‘learning nothing and forgetting nothing.” 


199 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


All things considered, New Poland seems to be a pretty 
poor life-insurance risk. 


Beyond Polana lies Russia—vast and incalculable. 
This immense region of huge forests, boundless prairies, 
and illimitable plains is the borderland of Europe and 
Asia. Here diverse races have wandered, fought, and 
mingled, producing strange blends and equally strange 
contrasts of blood, temperament, and ideals. Despite all 
the thought and investigation devoted to it, Russia re- 
mains essentially unknown, not merely to foreigners but 
even to Russians themselves. Many Russians frankly 
admit that the soul of Russia is still an enigma—a mys- 
tery. Bolshevism is merely the last of a long series of 
strange Russian developments which have surprised the 
world—and Russia probably has other startling surprises 
yet in store. 

The constant factors in Russian history are Alpine 
blood and Slav speech, which have been spreading east- 
ward and northward for more than a thousand years. 
Yet these factors are merely the binding strands in a 
tangled skein. We commonly speak of Russia as a unit; 
yet true unity Russia has never known. Leaving aside 
the various non-Russian tribes and peoples which dwell 
within Russia’s borders, the Russian stock is divided into 
three main branches differing distinctly from one another 
in blood, temperament, culture, and speech. These three 
branches are usually called the “Great,” “Little,” and 
“White” Russians respectively. Although probably 
much reduced in numbers by the frightful disasters of 
the last ten years, the total Russian stock must to-day 


THE ALPINE EAST 191 


number well over 100,000,000. Of these fully 60,000,000 
are Great Russians, while over 30,000,000 are Little Rus- 
_ sians—this figure including the “Ruthenian” popula- 

tions under Polish and Czecho-Slovak rule. The White 
Russians, numbering somewhere between 5,000,000 and 
10,000,000, are to-day politically divided between Russia 
and Poland. It was this diversity of the Russian stock (as 
well as the idea of their eventual unity) which prompted 
the title assumed by the former Russian monarchs: ‘Czar 
of all the Russias.” 

The Great Russians are not merely the most numerous 
but also the dominant branch of the Russian stock. It 
is they who form the core of modern Russia and who 
have colonized its outlying dependencies like Siberia. 
They inhabit the forest zone of modern Russia and ex- 
tend well into the rich prairie belt to the southward until 
they merge with the Little Russians. Racially the Great 
Russians are a cross between Alpine Slavs and the earlier 
Nordic population, mixed in varying proportions with 
Asiatic elements. The Nordic strain is strongest to the 
northwest near the Baltic Sea, fading out gradually in- 
land. However, Nordic traits are widespread, as is shown 
by the blond and reddish-blond types that are so fre- 
quent among the Great Russian population. These Nor- 
_ dic characteristics are usually found in “disharmonic 
combination” with Alpine and Asiatic traits, thus prov- 
ing the racially mixed character of the stock. Pure Nor- 
dic types are rare save among the upper classes, which 
are composed largely of Scandinavian and German ele- 
ments that have entered Russia in comparatively recent 
times. 


1922 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


The Little Russians centre in the southwest and, as 
already stated, are not all included within Russia’s polit- 
ical frontiers, a large section of the Little Russians living 
under Polish rule while a small fraction is found in Czecho- 
Slovakia. The Little Russians have much less Nordic 
blood than their Great Russian kinsmen but contain more 
Asiatic strains in their racial make-up, this being due to 
their prolonged contact with Mongol Tartar and Turkish 
nomads who often overran their territories. The Little 
Russians’ political disunion and other misfortunes have 
kept them relatively backward and have given their 
Great Russian cousins the leadership in Russian affairs. 
Even more backward, however, are the White Russians, 
who inhabit the swamp and forest regions of Western 
Russia. Racially the White Russians have kept closest 
to the primitive Alpine Slav type. They have never de- 
veloped a true national consciousness or even a distinctive 
culture. During the Middle Ages they fell under Polish 
rule and many of them are to-day included within Poland’s 
new political frontiers. 

These three branches of the Russian stock represent 
distinct crystallizations of invading Alpine Slavs with 
diverse racial elements in different regions. Russia’s 
early history is an obscure welter of petty tribes over an 
immense area. Significantly enough, the beginnings of 
political cohesion were due, not to the Russians them- 
selves but to a foreign ruling element—the Scandinavians. 
Back somewhere in the dim past adventurous Seandina- 
vian Nordics discovered a trade-route across Western 
Russia and established commercial contact between their 
Baltic homeland and Constantinople, then the capital of 


THE ALPINE EAST 193 


the Byzantine Greek Empire and a centre of civilization. 
Despite their small numbers, these masterful Norse Vik- 
ings easily kept in order the petty tribes along the rivers 
which formed their trade-highway, and as time passed 
the natives came to regard the strangers as arbiters in 
their endless intertribal quarrels. Becoming more and 
more influential, the Norsemen established themselves 
firmly at several points and at length founded a real state 
at Kiev, a natural centre in Southwestern Russia situated 
on the great river Dnieper—the water-route to the Black 
Sea and Constantinople. The legend of the founding of 
Kiev is quaintly significant. The story goes that the 
local tribes were so afflicted by domestic feuds and raids 
by their neighbors that they invited a famous Viking 
chief to be their ruler. Their invitation is said to have 
run as follows: “Our land is great and has everything 
in abundance, but it lacks order and justice. Come and 
take possession and rule over us.” 

Whether or not the legend states the exact facts of the 
case, certain it is that about a thousand years ago a Norse 
chief named Rurik did become ruler of Kiev and built 
up a state which soon became powerful and which laid 
the foundations of Russian nationality and civilization. 
It is also noteworthy that the early political centres in 
northern Russia, like Novgorod and Pskov, lay likewise 
on the Scandinavian trade-route and seem to have been 
mainly due to Scandinavian influence. 

Kiev long remained the heart of Russia and, owing to 
its contact with Constantinople, Kiev took its Chris- 
tianity and civilization from the Byzantine Empire. This 
is a fact of great importance. We have already seen how 


194 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


Poland’s conversion from Rome brought the Poles with- 
in the pale of west-European civilization. Russia, on the 
other hand, became Greek Orthodox in faith and Byzan- 
tine in culture. The breach between the two halves of 
Christendom went deep, friendly intercourse between 
them being impossible. Therefore, when Russia became 
Orthodox she cut herself off from the West and looked 
eastward for her ideals. : 
And presently this first link which bound Russia to the 
East was followed by other links of a very unfortunate 
character. From their earliest days the Russians had 
been harassed by Asiatic nomads raiding up from the arid 
plains that stretched southeastward into Asia. These 
raids grew steadily more violent until they culminated in 
the terrible Mongol invasion which marks a sinister epoch 
in Russian history. The Mongols were hideously cruel, 
destructive barbarians whose sole ideas were bloodshed 
and plunder. Sweeping across Russia like a cyclone, they 
reduced it to ruin and impotence. The budding civiliza- 
tion of Russia was stamped flat under the terrible Mongol 
hoofs. Kiev was destroyed and all southern Russia de- 
populated. Only in the forests of the north, beyond the 
sweep of the Mongol horse, did Russia survive. But it 
was a barbarized Russia, entirely cut off from the civi- 
lized world and subject to Mongol domination. Instead 
of advancing, Russia retrograded, turning away from 
Europe toward Asia. Both Mongol blood and Mongol 
ideas penetrated Russia. And this penetration was de- 
erading, because the Mongol Tartars were bloodthirsty 
barbarians with nothing to offer except savage ideals of 
violence and despotism. The Mongol influence upon Rus- 


THE ALPINE EAST 195. 


sia has been profound and lasting; to it many, if not most, 
of the unlovely traits of the modern Russian character 
seem to be due. “Scratch a Russian and you find a Tar- 

tar!” is no idle phrase. : 
Slowly Russia regained strength and at length a new 

political centre arose in north-central Russia at Moscow, 

where a dynasty of able rulers conquered the other Rus- 

sian principalities, shook off the Mongol yoke, and be- 

came the powerful “Czardom of Muscovy.” This increase 

of political strength, however, was not accompanied by 

any corresponding increase in culture. Down to about 

two centuries ago Russia remained barbarous and back- 

ward, cut off from Western civilization, and more Asiatic 

than European in its manners and ideals. Russia’s polit- 

ical life, in particular, was thoroughly Asiatic in char- 

acter. The Czars of Moscow had the outlook of Tartar 

Khans; they were arbitrary despots who were oftea fero- 

cious tyrants. Thus Russia lived on, a hermit nation; 

ignorant, fanatically devoted to a degraded Orthodoxy, 

and steeped in a barbarous mixture of half-forgotten 
Byzantine culture and Asiatic ideas borrowed from the 
Tartars. 

Suddenly, dramatically, the situation changed. Peter 
the Great became Czar and determined to “open a win- 
dow to the West” and let in the light of civilization. Peter 
was a man of tremendous energy and iron will. He hated 
half-measures and insisted that he be instantly obeyed. 
Accordingly, he tried to jump several centuries and or- 
dered Russia to become westernized overnight. But his 
subjects hung back. Ignorant and fanatical, they clung 
doggedly to their old ways and refused to embrace a civi- 


196 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


lization which they did not in the least comprehend. 
This resistance, however, merely infuriated Peter and 
hardened his resolution. As much a tyrant as any of his 
predecessors, opposition seemed to him criminal and in- 
tolerable. Accordingly, he not only opened a window but 
dragged Russia by the hair of the head clear out of its 
dark house into the Western sunshine, and since he could 
get little aid from his subjects he imported multitudes of 
Westerners to act as drill-masters and carry out his orders. — 

This policy, begun by Peter and continued by his suc- 
cessors, westernized Russia—on the surface. Within a 
short time Russia looked pretty much like a Western na- 
tion. The newcomers from Western Europe (mostly Ger- 
mans and Scandinavians) together with many Russians 
converted to the government’s policy gave Russia a veneer 
of Western civilization and formed a ruling class which 
was almost a caste apart. Beneath this veneer, however, 
Old Russia lived on, the bulk of the Russian people, espe- 
cially the peasants, remaining almost untouched by West- 
ern influences. Henceforth Russia became more than 
ever a land of strange contrasts and conflicting ideas, 
where new and old, east and west, Europe and Asia, jos- 
tled, fought, and illogically combined. 

These contrasts and conflicts were nowhere better re- 
vealed than in Russian political life. Despite its western- 
izing policy, the Russian Government remained at heart 
un-westernized. Its spirit was still that of the Tartar 
Khans, even though it wore European clothes and built 
railroads. The Russian Government, in fact, tried to 
borrow the material equipment of Western civilization and 
fit it to half-Oriental ideals. This experiment, however, 


THE ALPINE EAST 197 


created difficulties which led ultimately to disaster. 
Though outwardly Russia became a great World Power, 
inwardly she was torn by mental and spiritual conflicts 
which grew sharper as time went on. Imperial Russia 
was thus a giant with feet of clay. Not only did the Rus- 
sian masses remain instinctively hostile to westerniza- 
tion, but the upper classes quarrelled among themselves. 
Those Russians who became truly westernized in spirit 
began demanding that Russia adopt the liberal ideals as 
well as the material improvements of Western civilization. 
‘This, however, the despotic government refused, and 
the liberal protesters were sent to Siberia. That embit- 
tered the liberals and made them revolutionists, while 
revolutionary agitation in turn further infuriated the 
government and increased its persecuting activity. More 
and more Russia became a house divided against itself, 
and consequently broke down whenever faced by a real 
test. The preliminary break down took place under the 
strain of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, when Russia 
fell into revolutionary turmoil. The old régime just man- 
aged to save itself and restore order, but below the sur- 
face Russia went on seething and the social foundations 
were badly shaken. Then came the far heavier strain of 
the Great War—and Imperial Russia collapsed. The old 
order being hopelessly shattered, the extreme revolu- 
tionary elements took advantage of the chaotic confusion, 
established their Bolshevist dictatorship, and plunged 
Russia into a hell of class war, terrorism, poverty, cold, 
disease, and famine. | 

Into the horrors and failures of Bolshevism I do not 
propose to enter. They are well known and need no de- 


198 RACIAL’ REALITIES IN EUROPE 


tailed discussion here. What is not so well known is the 
important fact that the present Bolshevik government, 
though differing widely in its economic aims, is in its 
spirit and political methods strikingly like the old im- 
perial government which it replaced. The outstanding 
characteristics of the Bolshevik régime are violence and 
despotism. But those were precisely the outstanding 
characteristics of the old imperial régime. Russia has. 
thus merely changed tyrants, one despotism having been 
followed by another. The main outcome of the revolu- 
tion has been a cracking of the Western veneer which had 
been imposed upon Russia by Peter the Great. Much of 
the material equipment borrowed by Russia from the 
West has been destroyed, while the former upper classes 
(largely of Western origin) have been killed or driven 
into exile. The real losers by the revolution are the truly 
westernized elements who had worked for a Russia wes- 
ternized in spirit but who now see their illusions shat- 
tered. In fact, the revolution was largely a revolt against 
westernism. In many ways Russia is to-day farther from 
Europe and nearer to Asia than she has been since Peter 
opened his “window to the West.” 

What will emerge from the obscure and troubled transi- 
tion period through which Russia is passing no one can 
say. Yet one word of caution is distinctly needed. Many — 
persons imagine that because Russia is a land of huge 
size, vast natural resources, and immense population, 
something “great” and “constructive” must necessarily 
arise. Such persons are thinking in terms of quantity 
rather than quality. The more we look at Russia’s past 
and Russia’s racial make-up, the more we are led to sus- 
pect that Russia may not be really great, but merely 


THE ALPINE HAST 199 


big—which is something very different from true great- 
ness. To-day, as in former days, Russia appears as a 
complex, unstable mass of diverse bloods, tendencies, and 
ideas. This of course makes possible startling and in- 
teresting developments, but it also works against crea- 
tive, constructive progress. Russia has given birth to 
many brilliant individuals, but as a people, what has 
Russia done? This distinction should be clearly kept in 
mind. Because a stock produces talented writers and 
artists Is no necessary proof that it possesses high polit- 
ical and social capacities. Russian history has been the 
story of mixed populations dominated by a succession of 
masterful ruling minorities mainly of foreign origin. Now, 
no people of high political initiative and creative capacity 
would be likely to leave the direction of their political 
and economic life so continuously and so generally in 
the hands of foreign masters. It is therefore only fair to 
judge the Russians, not so much by what they have said 
as by what they have done—or rather, by what they 
have failed to do. 

Brilliancy of thought combined with failure in action 
is characteristic of the Russians—as it is of many mixed 
stocks. This is instinctively recognized by Russians them- 
selves. Russian novels are full of attractive young heroes 
full of ideas who start out to do great things but soon 
slack off and end in futile melancholy. Russian life seems 
to be typified in those stimulating yet inconclusive con- 
versations so beloved by Russians, which go on all night 
long over innumerable cigarettes and cups of tea, and 
which end at dawn with everybody tired, everything dis- 
cussed—and nothing settled! 


CHAPTER IX 
THE BALKAN FLUX 


Tue Balkans are the “Wild East” of Europe. Abode of 
half-barbarian peoples fired by crude ambitions and cursed 
by savage blood feuds, the Balkans are a permanent polit- 
ical storm-centre lying like a perpetual thunder-cloud on 
EKurope’s southeastern horizon. Here the late war began, 
and here new wars may well arise. In fact, the most omi- 
nous feature of the situation is that, as a result of the 
late war, Europe’s “Wild East” has spread far beyond 
its former borders. Instead of being confined to the Bal- 
kan Peninsula, as it was before 1914, it now stretches 
over most of east Central Europe, which has been both 
politically and spiritually ‘“ Balkanized.”’ 

The Balkan Peninsula is the easternmost of the three 
great projections which jut out from the continent of 
Europe southward into the Mediterranean Sea. Much 
larger than Italy and somewhat larger than Spain, the 
Balkan Peninsula differs from them in both its shape and 
its internal structure. To begin with, it is separated from 
the European land mass, not by definite mountain chains 
like the Alps and Pyrenees, but by broad rivers and marshy 
plains. Again, the Balkan Peninsula is neither a plateau 
like Spain nor a well-defined land like Italy, but is rather 
an irregular mass of rugged highlands criss-crossed by 
short mountain ranges which run in every direction and 


break up the land surface into many disconnected regions. 
200 


THE BALKAN FLUX 201 


Lastly, the Balkan Peninsula is closely connected with 
both Europe and Asia. Geographically speaking, it is 
merely the European section of a Eurasian land bridge, 
divided from the Asiatic section (the peninsula of Asia 
Minor) by a water rift in places only about a mile wide. 

Geographical location and internal structure combine 
to make the Balkan Peninsula a region of contending 
forces. A border-land between Europe and Asia, streams 
of human migration have poured into the Balkans from 
both continents. Indeed, though geographically part of 
Europe, the Balkan Peninsula is more open to Asiatic 
than to European penetration, because its rivers and 
valleys run eastward or southward while its mountains 
run in ways which hinder communication with the north 
and west. Thus turning its back on Europe and looking 
toward Asia, the Balkan Peninsula has continually in- 
vited settlement from Asia, and it is therefore only natu- 
ral that Asiatic races, religions, and cultures should have 
invaded the Balkans at various times, while it is equally 
natural that Europe should have fiercely resisted these 
Asiatic invasions. Thus fated to be the border-land and 
battle-ground of two continents, the Balkans have been 
predestined to chronic turmoil and unrest. 

The one thing which might have averted these misfor- 
tunes would have been the rise of a strong, stable people 
which could have welded the Balkans into a political 
unity and kept out foreign invaders. But that was made 
almost impossible by the peninsula’s internal structure. 
Broken up by its mountains into many distinct regions 
more or less isolated from one another, it was not suited 
to political unity. The Balkan peoples have, therefore, 


202 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


naturally tended to form many separate groups, and 
every new stream of invasion has tended to concentrate 
in some particular region instead of spreading widely 
over the peninsula. That has made the situation steadily 
more complex by adding new groups sharply marked off 
in blood, speech, religion, and culture. In the course of 
time, to be sure, these various factors have spread and 
blended. But they have done so only partially and very | 
unequally. Strange combinations have resulted; race, 
language, religion, and culture have become criss-crossed 
in truly extraordinary fashion. Thus a sort of vicious 
circle has been set up: instead of evolving toward unity 
and stability the Balkan Peninsula has become ever more 
disunited and unstable—which has made it less able to 
resist foreign invasions—which have further increased 
disunion and instability. The significance of all this can 
be grasped by a glance at Balkan history. 

The earliest inhabitants of the Balkans whom we can 
identify with reasonable certainty were of Mediterranean 
stock. They occupied tne southern part of the peninsula 
in very early times, though they seem to have dispossessed 
still earlier stocks of whom practically nothing is known. 
It was these slender, dark-complexioned Mediterraneans 
who were the primitive Greeks, and who created the pre- 
historic civilizations of Crete and Mycenz. About 3,000 
years ago a series of Nordic invasions occurred which 
changed the situation. These Nordics conquered the 
southern Balkans and settled down as masters. Homer 
describes the first results. Homeric Greece was ruled by 
an upper caste of tall, blond Nordics, the mass of their 
subjects being small, dark Mediterraneans. Later on a 


THE BALKAN FLUX 203 


partial fusion of the two races produced the “Hellas” of 
classic times, and created the brilliant civilization which 
is Hellas’ undying glory. However, it is interesting to 
note how essentially ‘‘Balkan”’ was the situation. The 
broken character of the country prevented political union. 
Ancient Greece was divided into many small states in- 
habited by Mediterraneans and Nordics in varying pro- 
portions and differing markedly from one another in tem- 
perament and culture. Disunion was, in fact, Hellas’ un- 
doing. Classic Greece tore itself to pieces by its domestic 
quarrels and fell under the rule of its northern neighbors. 
These neighbors were vigorous tribes of Nordic stock, 
akin to the Nordic invaders of Greece, who had settled 
the northern portion of the Balkan Peninsula, and had 
been welded into a powerful state (Macedon) by a dynasty 
of able rulers culminating in Alexander the Great. Alex- 
ander founded a mighty empire stretching far into Asia, 
but it broke up with his death, and the Balkans again 
fell into confusion until conquered by Rome. 

Rome gave the Balkans political unity and peace, but 
when Rome declined, the Balkans were overwhelmed by 
misfortunes which have continued to the present day. 
A series of barbarian invasions swept the Balkans from 
end to end, destroying classic civilization and wiping out 
most of the old population. These barbarian invaders 
were of various racial stocks, some being of European 
and others of Asiatic blood. Alpine Slavs were the most 
numerous element, and it is Slav blood which has ever 
since been the predominant Balkan strain. However, the 
Slavs formed separate groups, mixed with the older popu- 
lations and with Asiatic invaders in varying proportions, 


204 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


and therefore formed no cement of political cohesion. 
Meanwhile, the older population had stood its ground at 
various points, especially at Constantinople, which be- 
came the seat of the so-called Byzantine Empire—Greek 
in speech and culture though extending into Asia Minor, 
and inhabited by a very mixed population. Throughout 
the Middle Ages the Balkans were torn by complicated 
struggles between the Byzantines and the various Slav - 
peoples. As the Byzantine Empire declined, the Slav 
groups built up barbarian “empires” of their own, though 
they soon broke down into the chronic Balkan tur- 
moil. 

Then, about 500 years ago, Byzantines and Slavs were 
alike overwhelmed by a mighty wave of Asiatic conquest 
—the Ottoman Turks. For centuries the Balkan Penin- 
sula lay under Turkish rule. But the Turks never suc- 
ceeded in giving the Balkans peace or prosperity. On the 
contrary, they merely introduced new complications and 
sowed the seeds of future troubles. Turkish domination 
bore within itself the germs of decay. Most terrible of 
conquerors, the Turks were the poorest of assimilators. 
They remained a mere Asiatic army camped on European 
soil, and never succeeded in impressing either the Moham- 
medan religion or their Turkish language upon the mass 
of their Christian subjects. What the Turks did was to 
degrade and brutalize the Balkan peoples. The Turkish 
conquest everywhere destroyed the strongest and best 
elements of the population, who perished on the battle- 
field or went into exile. The remnants of the upper classes 
embraced Mohammedanism in order to keep their privi- 
leges, and thus became merged with their conquerors. 


THE BALKAN FLUX 205 


The mass of the population, deprived of its natural leaders 
and reduced almost to slavery, sunk to the level of an op- 
pressed peasantry significantly called by their Turkish 
masters “Rayah’—“‘cattle.” What civilization they had 
possessed vanished, though memories of better days lived 
on in legends which glorified the past into a sort of Golden 
Age and formed the basis of those extravagant national 
and imperial claims that have so afflicted the Balkans in 
modern times. 

Such was the situation when Turkish power had so 
crumbled that the Balkan peoples began one after another 
to regain their lost independence. So artificial had been 
Ottoman rule that as the Turkish tide receded the old 
landmarks reappeared above the flood, muddy and dam- 
aged by long immersion but substantially the same, and 
the Balkan peoples resumed their old lives once more. 

They resumed their old lives. Note that well. It is 
the key to the whole story. The Balkan peoples are not 
“young,” as we are apt to think. They are very old; in 
fact, so many Rip Van Winkles aroused from a long sleep 
with all their medieval racial characteristics and political 
aspirations practically unchanged. For them the last 
five centuries have been a dream—or a nightmare. One 
thing only do they:remember—their “glorious pasts,” 
-and they are each determined that their special past shall 
live again. But this made inevitable a resumption of the 
old quarrels before the Turks came, when the Balkan 
peoples had fought each other for centuries, and during 
that long period had each gained a short-lived Balkan 
supremacy. This shows clearly in the rival claims which 
are to-day put forward. Because a province belonged to 


206 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


a certain medieval Balkan Empire, it must go to the par- 
ticular state which to-day bears the same name, and since 
some districts belonged to all those empires in turn, the 
rival claims form a veritable Gordian knot which can be 
cut only by the sharp sword of war. Truly, among the 
Balkan peoples “a thousand years is but a day!” 

All this is somewhat hidden from Western eyes by the 
fact that the Balkan peoples have acquired a superficial 
knowledge of Western political ideas, and have learned to — 
clothe their thoughts in Western phrases like “nation” 
and “race.”’ The Balkan peoples, however, pervert the 
true meaning of such terms into mere jingo propaganda. 
The truth of the matter is that these peoples are not yet 
“nations” in the Western sense; they are, rather, group- 
ings of kindred clans or tribes, with primitive political 
ideas and with aims handed down from the crude medi- 
seval past. What each of the Balkan peoples hopes in 
its heart of hearts is to dominate the whole of the Balkans 
and eventually to destroy its rivals by “converting” the 
conquered peoples to its particular language, church, and 
way of thinking. That is what makes Balkan quarrels 
so ferocious; each people realizes that its very life may 
be at stake, and is therefore ready to fight its opponents’ 
imperialistic aspirations to the death. 

The primitive character of the Balkan peoples shows 
not only in their foreign policies but also in their domestic 
politics. Despite high-sounding constitutions and elab- 
orate parliamentary forms copied from Western models, 
Balkan politics are crude and backward. Power is usually 
in the hands of some masterful individual or dominant 
group which “makes” elections and rules by a combina- 


THE BALKAN FLUX 207 


tion of “strong-arm” methods and bribery. As for the 
“Opposition,” it often refuses to play the parliamentary 
game, preferring instead to sulk or plot revolution. Under 
such conditions neither side hesitates to use violence and 
assassination to gain their respective ends. Fortunately, 
other aspects of Balkan life have improved faster than its 
politics. Intellectually and culturally, considerable prog- 
ress has been made since emancipation from Turkish rule, 
and an upper class has developed, some of whose members 
are finely educated, cultured persons with high ideals. As 
yet, however, such persons are too few in number and too 
far above the popular level to exercise much effect upon 
political life. The masses are still thinly veneered bar- 
barians, with the virtues and vices common to that stage 
of human evolution. These primitive folk are capable of 
sudden and intense outbursts of boundless fanaticism and 
savage cruelty unknown, or at least very rare, among 
more developed peoples. 

All this gives the key to the great Balkan upheaval of 
1912-1913, which was the climax of a century of struggle 
against Turkish rule. In 1912 the Christian Balkan states 
at last succeeded in combining against the hereditary 
Turkish foe. But no sooner was the Turk defeated than 
the victors quarrelled fiercely over the spoils. There fol- 
_ lowed the Second Balkan War—a ferocious death-grapple 
which ended in the despoiling and humiliation of Bul- 
garia, hitherto the leading Balkan state, by the other 
Balkan peoples. The Treaty of Bucharest which closed 
the war was an attempt permanently to kill Bulgaria’s 
ambitions by surrounding her with a ring of aggrandized 
and watchful enemies. To this end the other important 


208 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


Balkan states, Serbia, Rumania, and Greece, concluded 
an anti-Bulgarian league. 

The so-called “Peace” of Bucharest was thus no peace 
It was merely a whetting of knives. Anticipating a proba- 
ble next war, all parties began to consolidate their terri- 
torial gains by the process known as “‘extirpation.” This 
process consisted in the rooting out or forcible conversion 
of hostile minorities, thus attempting to make national . 
lines correspond with political frontiers and to assure the 
fanatical loyalty of the whole future population within 
any given state border. The ruthlessness with which 
these persecutions were conducted scandalized the outside | 
world and enormously envenomed Balkan hatreds. The 
wretched victims of “extirpation”? streamed into their 
respective motherlands by the hundred thousand, and 
there sowed broadcast the seeds of fury and revenge. 
Each Balkan people swore to crush the accursed foe and 
erect its special greatness upon his ruin. 

Such was the poison-gas of unslaked hatreds and gnaw- 
ing ambitions which inflamed the Balkans at the out- 
break of the Great War. In fact, that war began in an 
attempt of Austria-Hungary to crush the nationalistic 
aspirations of Serbia to annex its kinsmen who lived under 
Austrian rule. Once more the Balkans became a battle- 
ground, and once more unwise peace treaties sowed the 
seeds of future strife. Bulgaria, which had joined the 
Central Empires and shared their defeat, was punished 
even more severely than she had been after the Balkan 
Wars. Serbia and Rumania, which had chosen the win- 
ning side, were given large slices of disrupted Austria- 
Hungary and thus expanded beyond the Balkans into 


THE BALKAN FLUX 209 


Central Europe. Greece, which had also joined the Allies, 
was rewarded with territories both in the Balkans and in 
Asia Minor. Such were the treaty settlements at the close 
of the Great War. Yet already the Greek “settlement”’ 
hes broken down, and few unbiassed observers believe 
that the other arrangements will last. The truth of the 
matter is that the Balkans are still in flux and that almost 
anything may happen. When we come to consider the 
Balkan states separately we shall see how profoundly 
unstable conditions are at the present time. Before do- 
ing so, however, let us pause to remember that Balkan 
instability arises, not merely from superficial matters like 
badly drawn peace treaties, but even more from funda- 
mental factors like the lay of the land and the nature of 
its inhabitants. Once again, let us remember that the 
Balkans have always been a border-land where races, 
religions, languages, and cultures have met and fought 
in endless turmoil. The present Balkan peoples are not 
yet true nations, and they are certainly not races, but 
rather combinations of widely varied racial elements 
mixed in different proportions. Alpine Slav blood is the 
largest single factor in their racial make-up, but it is so 
intermingled with other strains and so cross-cut by non- 
racial factors like language, religion, and culture that it 
- forms no real bond of union between the Balkan peoples. 
Bearing in mind these underlying truths, let us now glance 
at the several Balkan states as they stand to-day. 

Our survey had best begin with Jugoslavia, the enlarged 
successor of Serbia and to-day the most powerful Balkan 
state. The name Jugoslavia means “Land of the South 
Slavs,” and symbolizes the political union of the various 


210 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


branches of the south Slav stock. The Jugoslavs are de- 
scended from tribes of Alpine Slav blood which settled 
the northwestern Balkans shortly after the fall of the 
Roman Empire. These tribes were closely related in 
blood and speech, but the broken character of the regions 
in which they settled marked them off into groups polit- 
ically distinct from one another. And presently the phys- 
ical barriers which separated them were reinforced by | 
barriers.of religion and culture. The southern tribes (the 
ancestors of the Serbs) took their Christianity from Con- 
stantinople, and became Greek Orthodox in faith and 
Byzantine in culture. The tribes living to the northward 
or along the coast of the Adriatic Sea (the ancestors of 
the Croats and Slovenes) were converted to Christianity 
from Rome and took their culture from the European 
West. The result was that the Serbs looked east while 
the Croats and Slovenes looked west, neither branch of 
the Jugoslav stock having much to do with the other. 
The Croats and Slovenes soon lost their independence. 
The Slovenes were subjugated by the Austrian-Germans, 
the Croats fell under the rule of the Hungarians, while 
the tribes of the Adriatic coast came under Italian in- 
fluence exercised by the Venetian Republic. The Serbs 
remained independent but were divided into several petty 
states and played a minor part in Balkan history until 
the latter part of the Middle Ages, when an able chief- 
tain named Stephen Dushan united the Serb states, over- 
ran most of the Balkan Peninsula, and built up an “em- 
pire.” Dushan’s empire was, however, short-lived. It 
fell to pieces after his death and the fragments were soon 
afterward engulfed by the tide of Turkish conquest. 


THE BALKAN FLUX 211 


Dushan’s empire is important only as it forms the basis 
for modern Serb dreams of Balkan domination. Note that 
Dushan’s empire never included the Croats and Slovenes. 
It was thus purely a Balkan, not a “Jugoslav,”’ state. 

The Turkish conquest not only destroyed the flower of 
the Serb stock and reduced the remainder to an oppressed 
peasantry, but also caused a religious split which still 
exists. In the highlands of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a moun- 
tainous region lying between Serbia proper and the Adri- 
atic, a large part of the population was converted to Islam, 
and became fanatical Moslems who lost all sense of kin- 
ship with their Serb brethren. On the other hand, a few 
Christian Serbs fled to the inaccessible crags of Monte- 
negro, just south of Bosnia, and there maintained a wild 
independence which the Turks were never able to break. 
It was the Montenegrins who for centuries kept alive the 
old Serb traditions. This was perhaps the chief reason 
why the Serbs were the first Balkan people to throw off 
the Turkish yoke, a little over a century ago. Modern 
Serbia started as a small state with a rude peasant popu- 
lation, but it slowly grew in power and prosperity, al- 
though its progress was hindered by the turbulence of its 
political life. | 

As Serbia grew, she began to dream of her former great- 
ness and to aspire to unite all the Serbs in a single national 
state. As matters then stood, more than half the Serbs 
remained under Turkish rule in Bosnia-Herzegovina to 
the west and in Macedonia to the south. Also, Monte- 
negro remained separate and independent. Furthermore, 
as time went on, Serb ambitions grew still greater. No 
longer content with the idea of uniting all the Serbs, Ser- 


212 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


bian nationalists began to dream of including the Croats 
and Slovenes in a larger south Slav unity. Thus the ideal 
of “Jugoslavia” was born. But this naturally alarmed 
Austria-Hungary, whose very existence would be threat- 
ened by any such development. Since Serbia was the 
champion of the Jugoslav idea, Austrian policy aimed at 
keeping Serbia down. ‘The quarrel gradually became a 
deadly feud which presently got involved in the general 
tangle of European politics that preceded the Great War. 
Serbia was backed by Russia and openly plotted to dis- 
rupt Austria-Hungary, and establish Jugoslav unity on 
its ruins. But Austria-Hungary was backed by Germany 
and thus felt strong enough to risk crushing Serbia at 
the first opportunity. Then came the Balkan Wars of 
1912-1913. From them Serbia emerged victorious and 
confident, while Austria grew more alarmed and impla- 
cable. In this tense atmosphere the assassination of the 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austrian 
throne, by Serb nationalists in June, 1914, caused the 
explosion of the Great War. After a heroic resistance, 
Serbia was overrun by the Austro-German armies, aided 
by the Bulgarians, who joined the Austro-Germans to 
revenge themselves upon the Serbs for Bulgaria’s defeat 
in the Balkan Wars. However, the victory of Serbia’s 
allies, the Western Powers, not only restored her inde- 
pendence, but also realized her dream of Jugoslav unity. 
The peace treaties of 1919 erected the present ‘“Jugo- 
slavia,” a powerful state, with an area of 96,000 square 
miles and a population of 12,000,000. 

At first sight Jugoslavia looks strong and assured of a 
prosperous future. In reality, Jugoslavia is rent by grave 


THE BALKAN FLUX 213 


internal quarrels and is surrounded by hostile neighbors. 
Jugoslavia is to-day a state, but she is as yet very far 
from being a nation. Brought suddenly together after 
ages of separation and divergent development, the vari- 
ous branches of the south-Slav stock do not fuse. So long 
as they were politically divided they could sympathize 
with one another. Now that they all live in the same 
house they see mutual differences rather than common 
likenesses. And there are so many varieties of Jugoslavs! 
Out of Jugoslavia’s 12,000,000 population only about 
4,500,000 are true Serbs, who dominate the situation and 
“run” Jugoslavia. But all the other Jugoslavs are more 
or less opposed to this state of things. The 500,000 Monte- 
negrins object to the way in which their heroic individual- 
ity has been arbitrarily merged with the Serbs. The 800,- 
000 Mohammedans of Bosnia and adjacent regions, though 
Serbs in blood, are sullen and rebellious, their sympathies 
being with the Turks rather than with their Slav kins- 
men. As for the 5,500,000 Croats, Slovenes, and Dalma- 
tians, Roman Catholic in religion and West European in 
culture, they look down on their Balkan relatives as semi- 
barbarous heretics and object strenuously to being ruled 
by Serbs, whom they consider their inferiors. Lastly, 
there are nearly 1,000,000 Bulgarians, Magyars, and 
-Rumanians to whom the very word “Jugoslavia’”’ is 
anathema. 

' The fact is that, as things now stand, the term “Jugo- 
slavia” is a misnomer. The new state should be called 
“Greater Serbia.’”’ It is the Serbs who to-day run the 
country—and they run it with a heavy hand. A rough, 
primitive folk, the Serbs have got where they are by fight- 


214 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


ing, and they think almost solely in terms of force. By a 
series of successful wars they have built up a strong, uni- 
fied state. However, they know that this means a ring 
of hostile neighbors. Accordingly, when the other Jugo- 
slavs talk of turning the new state into a Federation with 
wide local rights for the various elements, the Serbs de- 
nounce such talk as treason. Serb leaders will tell you 
frankly that they intend to go on governing with the - 
strong hand until they have ‘‘made” the other elements 
into “good Jugoslavs.”” But the other elements promptly 
answer that this merely means “good Serbs,” and they 
go on to say that they won’t be made into Serbs and that 
they do not intend to tolerate the rough, tactless Serb 
soldiers and officials who have been set over them. And 

this is causing grave difficulties. Already parliamentary — 
government has broken down, the Serbs ruling by a veiled 
dictatorship, with the Croats and Slovenes suddenly re- 
bellious and with Montenegro and Macedonia full of 
brigandage and unrest. This cannot go on indefinitely. 
It seems pretty clear that Jugoslavia must ultimately be- 
come a Federal state if it is to endure. Unless the Serbs 
realize this, the other elements will plot secession—and 
Jugoslavia will fly to pieces. Meanwhile, Jugoslavia’s 
neighbors watch and wait. Hitherto the chief thing that 
has kept the Serb-Croat quarrel within bounds has been 
their common hatred of Italy, which opposed Jugoslav 
aspirations. If war had resulted, the Jugoslavs might 
have developed a real national consciousness in the strug- 
gle against a foreign foe. But Italy has now compromised 
her differences with Jugoslavia, so foreign pressure has 
been relaxed and domestic quarrels flare up unchecked. 


THE BALKAN FLUX 215 


Of course, the Jugoslavs may come to an understanding 
with one another and become a true nation. At present, 
however, the prospects look rather dubious. 


From Jugoslavia let us turn to Bulgaria. Here we find 
a very different situation. If Jugoslavia is suffering from 
victory, Bulgaria is suffering from defeat. Yet defeat 
has not quenched hope. Toughest and stubbornest of all 
the Balkan peoples, the Bulgars nurse their wounds and 
await better days. 

This attitude springs from their inheritance. Racially 
the Bulgars are Alpine Slavs crossed with Asiatic Finnish 
or Turkish blood. That cross has produced a stock noted 
for patient determination and dogged energy. The Bul- 
gars are great workers—and they can work together. 
This capacity for “team-play” is a great advantage to 
the Bulgars, because the other Balkan peoples are so 
much more prone to internal quarrels. Despite their 
recent defeats and present misfortunes, the Bulgars may 
yet outstrip their rivals. It is well to remember their 
favorite proverb: ‘The Bulgar on his ox-cart pursues 
the hare—and overtakes it!” 

Bulgaria has had a checkered past. During the Middle 
Ages the Bulgars played a leading réle in the Balkans. 
For centuries they and the Byzantine Greeks fought 
fiercely for Balkan supremacy. ‘Twice the Bulgars built 
up powerful “empires,” though these presently collapsed 
into the chronic Balkan turmoil. The Turkish conquest 
bore harder upon the Bulgars than upon any other Bal- 
kan people. So thoroughly were they crushed that less 
than fifty years ago the Bulgars were an obscure popula- 


216 RACIAL,REALITIES IN EUROPE 


tion of wretched serfs, exploited to the limit of human 
endurance, whom the world had so completely forgotten 
that many Western travellers passed through their land 
without becoming aware of their existence. 

The victorious war which Russia waged against Tur- 
key in 1877 freed most of the Bulgars from the Turkish 
yoke and set up a Bulgarian state. This new state de- 
veloped with extraordinary rapidity. Although the Serbs’ 
and Greeks had been liberated much earlier, Bulgaria 
soon passed them both in national progress and became 
the leading Balkan state. Awakening from their long 
slumber, the Bulgars recalled their past and determined 
on a yet greater future. The first step in their programme 
was the political unity of the whole Bulgarian stock. A 
large fraction of the Bulgarian people remained under 
Turkish rule in Macedonia, the central region of the Bal- 
kans. Once possessed of Macedonia, the resulting Big 
Bulgaria would be far and away the most powerful Bal- 
kan state. Thereafter Bulgaria might hope to subjugate 
the other Balkan peoples and expel the Turks from Con- 
stantinople, founding a true Bulgarian Empire which 
would dominate the Near East. 

That was Bulgaria’s ideal, evolved in the very first 
years of its political life. Such an ideal appeared absurd 
for a little peasant state just freed from Turkish servi- 
tude. But, if Bulgaria’s dreams were great, her waking 
hours were long, and they were all given up to strenuous 
endeavor and rigid self-denial. These high hopes became 
part of the developing national consciousness. They 
braced every Bulgar to gigantic efforts. The way Bul- 
garia pinched and taxed herself for nearly forty years 


THE BALKAN FLUX 217 


to create proportionately the greatest war machine in the 
world showed this folk to be possessed of a sombre power 
and ferocious energy which made the goal seem less im- 
practicable. 

At last Bulgaria’s hour seemed to have come. In the 
year 1912 Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece combined against 
the Turks, who were defeated and driven to the walls of 
Constantinople. The Balkans were free from Turkish 
rule. Unhappily, this was merely the beginning of fresh 
troubles. The victors promptly quarrelled over the spoils 
—particularly over Macedonia. Bulgaria had gone to 
war with Turkey for Macedonia and claimed the greater 
part of it as her reward. But this Greece and Serbia re- 
fused. Macedonia has, in fact, been for ages an apple of 
discord. In the first place, it is the geographical and stra- 
tegical heart of the Balkans, so that whoever possesses it 
automatically gains something like Balkan supremacy. 
In the second place, it is a racial crossroads where all the 
Balkan stocks meet. The Macedonians are an extraor- 
dinarily mixed population, race lines being blurred even 
more than in other parts of the Balkans. Yet this does 
not prevent the various Balkan peoples from concocting 
elaborate “statistics” and other propagandist arguments 
“proving” the Macedonians to be the blood-brothers of 
each and every one of them. The tangle of rival claims is 
thus inextricable. As for the Macedonians themselves, 
the majority seem to feel themselves Bulgarians, though 
there are strong Serb- and Greek-feeling minorities, not 
to mention minor elements like Albanians, Rumanians, 
Turks, Jews, and Gypsies. The fierce wrangle which broke 
out among the Balkan states after their victory over 


218 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


Turkey culminated in a ferocious war in which Bulgaria 
was defeated. Serbia and Greece divided Macedonia be- 
tween them and promptly proceeded to expel or forcibly 
convert the Bulgar-feeling inhabitants. Bulgaria sat by 
in helpless rage until the Great War gave her a chance 
for revenge. But Bulgaria again lost, and by the peace 
treaties was left disarmed before her fully armed neigh- 
bors. 

Owing to these misfortunes Bulgaria has sunk from her 
former position of the most powerful Balkan state to a 
place far below Serbia, Greece, and Rumania—all of 
whom to-day vastly outstrip Bulgaria in area and popu- 
lation. Bulgaria now possesses only 40,000 square miles 
of territory and less than 5,000,000 inhabitants. Yet 
Bulgaria remains a factor to be reckoned with. Certainly, 
Bulgaria seems to-day to be the most solid of the Balkan 
states. Her very defeats have left her with a thoroughly 
Bulgarian population, free from those rebellious minori- 
ties which are such dangerous internal weaknesses to her 
swollen neighbors. Meanwhile the Bulgarian peasant 
works as hard as ever, and the war losses are being re- 
paired. Who can tell what opportunity may come to 
Bulgaria through some sudden shift in the strange ka- 
leidoscope of Balkan politics? For, in the Balkans, the 
one thing certain is—uncertainty ! 


The story of Greece is perhaps the most dramatic in 
world history. No other people has probably ever passed 
through such extremes of glory and decline. Grave though 
Greece’s situation is to-day, it should not be forgotten 
that the Greek people has endured even greater disasters 


THE BALKAN FLUX 219 


in the past—yet has survived. And it is this which lends 
the Greeks faith in their future. 

Modern Greece draws its inspiration from two main 
sources: Ancient Hellas and the Medieval Byzantine 
Empire. This latter source is often overlooked by Western 
observers, but to Greek minds it is the more important. 
The ties between Modern Greece and Ancient Hellas are 
dim and remote. The ties with Medizval Byzantium, on 
the contrary, are close and unbroken. Modern Greece 
may feel itself to be the spiritual heir of Hellas, but it 
knows itself to be the political heir of Byzantium, and a 
restoration of the Byzantine Empire is at once the key- 
note of Greek patriotism and the basis of Greek politics. 
Greece’s political goal is expressed in a phrase: ‘The 
Great Idea.” Herein Greek aims differ markedly from 
those of the other Balkan peoples. The aspirations of 
the other Balkan peoples never stray much beyond the 
boundaries of the peninsula. The Greek dream, however, 
is truly imperial in its far-flung horizons. The Great Idea 
is a revival of Medieval Byzantium, incarnated in a new 
Greek Empire seated at Constantinople, which shall em- 
brace both the Balkans and Asia Minor and shall win 
back the whole Near East to Hellenism. 

At first sight the Great Idea may seem mere wild fancy, 
but when we look closer we see that it is a logical out- 
growth of Greece’s historic past. When Ancient Hellas 
declined and finally fell under Roman rule, it did not 
lose its identity. The Hellenic stock, to be sure, greatly 
altered, most of the Nordic strains that had formed the 
ruling class during Hellas’ great days dying out, while 
the Mediterranean strains which survived became con- 


220 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


siderably mixed with other racial elements. Nevertheless, 
the Greek language and Greek culture not only main- 
tained themselves in Greece itself but also spread over 
both the Balkans and Asia Minor, so that when the Roman 
Empire collapsed in Western Europe and transferred its 
capital to “Constantinople” (the new name given by 
the Roman Emperor Constantine to the Greek city of 
Byzantium) it came into a Greek atmosphere, lost its 
Latin character, and was transformed into the Greek 
“Byzantine Empire.”” With Western Europe sunk in the 
turmoil of the Dark Ages, the Byzantine Empire became 
the centre of European civilization. It also became the 
seat of Eastern Christendom, for about this time Chris- 
tianity split in twain, the West following Rome while the 
East adhered to the “Orthodox”’ Church, which was thor- 
oughly Greek in character. It was the Orthodox Church 
which converted the Slav invaders of the Balkans, and 
however bitterly the Slavs fought the Byzantine Empire 
they nevertheless acquired a Byzantine Greek religious 
and cultural stamp which could not be effaced. Indeed, 
this Greek stamp became even more pronounced after 
the Turkish conquest. To the Turks all their Christian 
subjects looked very much alike. They therefore con- 
sidered the Byzantine Greeks as the natural spokesmen 
for the Christian elements, and the Balkan Slavs wel- 
comed this arrangement since the Greeks were best fitted 
to stand between them and their Turkish masters. Down 
to the reawakening of the Balkan peoples about a cen- 
tury ago, religion rather than nationality was the test of 
men’s allegiance, so the Balkan peoples thought of them- 
selves as “Greek Orthodox” and very little else. 


THE BALKAN FLUX 221 


We are now in a position to understand the peculiar 
nature of the Greek “Great Idea,’”’ and to realize how it 
differs from the aspirations of the other Balkan peoples. 
Those aspirations are all founded on a more or less tribal 
nationalism. The Great Idea, on the other hand, is based 
on a religious imperialism. In fact, the Great Idea is 
essentially cosmopolitan, and is fundamentally opposed 
to the ideas of both nationality and race. The Greeks 
have never been able really to adjust themselves to the 
modern nationalist philosophy. In their heart of hearts 
they still believe that the Christian inhabitants of both 
the Balkans and Asia Minor should be one people, spiritu- 
ally united in the Greek Orthodox Church and politically 
united in a Greek Empire. Certainly the Greek ideal 
has succeeded in binding together very different racial 
elements. The present “Greek” populations scattered 
so widely over the Balkans and Asia Minor are of many 
different stocks. Yet they are all ardent supporters of 
the Great Idea. 

When the Greeks revolted against the Turks a cen- 
tury ago they hoped for a general rising of all the Chris- 
tian elements. In fact, the first outbreak took place, not 
in Greece itself, but far to the northward in what is now 
Rumania, which had long been governed by Byzantine 
Greeks appointed by the Turkish Sultans, and where the 
educated upper class was then strongly Greek in feeling. 
However, the revolutionists were quickly disillusioned. 
The other Balkan peoples, already obscurely stirring to 
nationalist ideas, refused to move, and the Turks were 
thus able to concentrate against the Greeks, who were 
massacred wholesale, and deprived of the privileged posi- 


222 RACIAL, REALITIES IN EUROPE 


tion that they had heretofore enjoyed. After years of 
bloody fighting, Western Europe intervened and set up 
an independent Greek state, but this state was so small 
and weak that in Greek eyes it was little more than a 
mockery of their hopes. The majority of the Greeks were 
left outside its frontiers, mainly under Turkish rule. 
Under these circumstances the larger aspects of the 
Great Idea fell into the background. The Greeks had to 
confine their efforts mainly to building up their new state 
as a nucleus for later efforts. This was a slow and difficult 
task. Until the beginning of the present century Greece 
played a minor réle in Balkan affairs. Her first real chance 
came when the Balkan states made their alliance against 
the Turk in the year 1912. From both the Balkan Wars 
which ensued Greece came out the big winner. With a 
minimum of loss she doubled her territory and popula- 
tion, her chief conquest being southern Macedonia with 
its great port-city of Salonika—next to Constantinople 
the richest prize in the Balkans. These remarkable suc- | 
cesses fired the Greeks with wild enthusiasm and brought 
the Great Idea once more to the front. Then came the 
Great War, which brought to Greece an extraordinary 
series of successes and failures. For a moment it looked 
as though the Great Idea was to be realized. The Peace 
Conference seriously considered giving Greece Constan- 
tinople, and, though this was finally denied her, Greece 
was given a large slice of Asia Minor including the great 
port-city of Smyrna. At that dramatic hour Greece ap- 
peared to have become the leading state not only of the 
Balkans but of the whole Near East. The peace treaties 
had virtually condemned Turkey to death and, with the 


THE BALKAN FLUX 223 


destruction of her arch-enemy, Greece might well hope 
to establish something very like the empire of her dreams. 

Suddenly, almost without warning, Greece was plunged 
from her pinnacle of triumph to the depths of defeat. A 
shift of European politics left her unsupported, the Turks 
made a desperate rally, and the Greek armies in Asia 
Minor were broken. The Greek cause suffered the most 
terrible disaster that had befallen it since the Turks wiped 
out the Byzantine Empire 500 years before. The very 
foundations of Hellenism in Asia Minor were destroyed, 
for the Turks, determined to make any fresh attack im- 
possible, proceeded to root out the whole Greek popula- 
tion. Fully 2,000,000 Asiatic Greeks were either mas- 
sacred or driven as starving, diseased refugees to their 
distracted motherland. The situation was made still 
worse by the political disturbances which broke out in 
Greece itself. Filled with fury and despair, the Greeks 
vented their rage upon one another. Greek politics are 
habitually turbulent, and Greece is to-day rent by bitter 
factional disputes. 

Unless Greece speedily pulls herself together she may 
suffer still further losses. The Balkans are a primitive 
land where the weak usually get short shrift. Greece 
still has things worth taking, and there are those quite 
- ready to take them. Not only would Bulgaria jump at 
the chance to seize the tongue of Greek territory (taken 
from Bulgaria by the peace treaties) which bars Bulgaria 
from the Mediterranean, but Jugoslavia is also to be 
feared. Though technically Greece’s friend, Jugoslavia 
looks longingly at southern Macedonia and Salonika, 
possession of which would give Jugoslavia a Mediterra- 


224 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


nean outlet and clinch its Balkan supremacy at one and 
the same time. When I was last in Belgrade, the Jugoslav 
capital, I heard much talk about Salonika, and some Serbs 
made no bones of stating that they would seize it if a good 
opportunity offered. 

Greece thus stands to-day in a very dangerous situa- 
tion. In many ways she is worse off than Bulgaria. Yet, 
here again, no one can predict with certainty what the - 
morrow may bring. In the Balkans fortune’s wheel turns 
swiftly, political combinations shift with amazing sud- 
denness and startling surprises may be in store. 


Finally, let us consider Rumania, the fourth important 
Balkan state. Rumania is the link between the Balkans 
and both Central and Eastern Europe. Geographically 
she lies mainly outside the Balkans, but historically she 
has been so closely connected with Balkan affairs that 
she forms a logical part of the Balkan area. 

Of all the Balkan states Rumania gained most by the 
Great War. The peace treaties more than doubled her 
pre-war territory and population, so that to-day she 
exceeds even Jugoslavia in size and wealth. With her 
present area of 122,000 square miles (larger than Italy), 
her population of over 17,000,000, and her rich agricul- 
tural and mineral resources, Rumania looks almost like 
a first-class Power. However, as so often happens in the 
Balkans, appearances are deceptive. In reality, Ru- 
mania’s very gains have produced such grave internal 
problems, and made such bitter foreign foes that Ru- 
mania’s future is extremely troubled and uncertain. 

The Rumanians themselves are a curious folk. They 


THE BALKAN FLUX 225 


illustrate the power of language and culture to form a 
national consciousness out of varied racial elements. 
The Rumanians are obviously of extremely mixed racial 
origin. Alpine Slav blood seems to be the largest element 
in their make-up, though there is also a considerable in- 
fusion of Mediterranean blood, together with diverse 
Asiatic strains. Nevertheless, the Rumanians speak a 
Latin language and proudly consider themselves full- 
fiedged members of the “Latin Race” (there being, of 
course, no such thing). 

How, then, do we find a Latin-speaking folk living along 
the lower Danube in the southeastern corner of Europe, 
hundreds of miles from the other Latin-speaking peoples? 
The Rumanians themselves explain the mystery by claim- 
ing to be the descendants of Roman colonists planted 
north of the Danube by the Emperor Trajan after his 
conquest of that region in the second century A. D. 
Racially this does not mean much, because Trajan’s 
colonists were undoubtedly a miscellaneous lot of pro- 
vincials with very little “Roman” blood. But culturally 
the picturesque legend probably does give the reason for 
the persistence of Latin speech along the lower Danube. 
Flooded though these regions were by all sorts of bar- 
barian hordes for centuries after the fall of Rome, the 
- Latin-speaking population possessed cultural traditions 
superior to their conquerors and, as so often occurs in 
such cases, converted the conquerors to their speech and 
customs. Precisely what happened we do not know, for 
the Rumanians do not appear as a distinct people until 
well into the Middle Ages, when we find them settled 
both in the fertile plains north of the Danube and in the 


226 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


adjacent highlands of Transylvania. They were not a 
warlike folk and were mostly subject to foreign masters, 
but they were extremely persistent and prolific, and they 
took advantage of the devasting wars which raged about 
them to spread steadily east, north, and west, settling 
large sections of Hungary and of Southern Russia—espe- 
cially the province known as Bessarabia. The Turks 
conquered the Rumanians as they did the other Balkan _ 
peoples, but the Rumanians were so far from the seat of 
Turkish Power that they were governed indirectly by 
Byzantine Greek viceroys appointed by the Sultans. 
These tributary provinces, lying north of the Danube, 
formed the nucleus for the later Kingdom of Rumania. 
As Turkish Power declined it seemed for a while that the 
Rumanians of the Danube plains would be annexed to 
Russia, which did succeed in getting Bessarabia early in 
the nineteenth century. But the Rumanians, like the 
other Balkan peoples, were now awakening to national 
consciousness, and after many difficulties the people of 
the Danubian plains (excepting Bessarabia) succeeded in 
escaping Russian annexation, threw off their vassalage 
to Turkey, and established an independent Kingdom of 
Rumania. 

This Rumanian state was not very large, but so fertile 
was its soil and so dense its population that it rapidly 
grew in importance and prosperity. Like the other Bal- 
kan peoples, the Rumanians began dreaming of a great 
future and eyed with increasing impatience the sight of 
millions of their knmsmen under Russian and Hungarian 
rule. Until the outbreak of the Great War, however, 
such dreams of a “Greater Rumania” had little chance 


THE BALKAN FLUX 227 


of coming true. Rumania’s “unredeemed” kinsfolk were 
subjects of first-class European Powers—Austria-Hun- 
gary and Russia. Furthermore, these Rumanians lived 
intermixed with other populations, which added grave 
difficulties to Rumanian annexation even had this been 
politically possible. Rumania therefore contented her- 
self with encouraging nationalistic movements among the 
Rumanians of Hungary and Bessarabia, her active for- 
eign policy being mainly directed to Balkan affairs, where 
she was dealing with nations of her own size. In fact, 
Rumania’s sole accession of territory before 1914 was her 
annexation of the Bulgarian district known as the Dobru- 
dja when Rumania joined Greece and Serbia, and shared 
in the despoiling of Bulgaria after the Second Balkan War. 
Rumania thus gained a province with no Rumanian in- 
habitants. It rounded out her Black Sea frontage very 
nicely, but it made Bulgaria her bitter enemy. 

When the Great War began Rumania adopted an atti- 
tude of canny neutrality. By the year 1916 Rumania 
made an excellent bargain with the Allies, obtaining their 
promise of Austria-Hungary’s Ruman-inhabited terri- 
tories, and entered the war on the Allied side. At first 
it looked as though Rumania had made a bad bet. The 
Rumanian armies were quickly beaten and the Kingdom 
_ of Rumania was overrun by Austro-German, Bulgarian, 
and Turkish forces. Then occurred an event which, for 
Rumania, turned out to be a great piece of luck—the 
Russian Revolution. Bolshevik Russia became the enemy 
of the Allies. Therefore, when the Allies won the war, 
Rumania claimed not only the Austro-Hungarian prov- 
inces that had been promised her but Russia’s province 


228 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


of Bessarabia as well. The Allies finally agreed, and Ru- 
mania thus fulfilled her wildest dreams. 

However, Rumania’s gains contained germs of trouble. 
Even the pre-war Rumania had been none too stable, 
her social system suffering from grave defects. The chief 
element of stability had been the fact that the great bulk 
of the population was Rumanian. Such was the country 
which suddenly swelled to more than twice its pre-war 
size, annexing a whole series of powerful, rebellious mi-— 
norities, and thereby making powerful embittered foreign 
enemies who would be almost certain ultimately to make 
trouble. Of post-war Rumania’s 17,500,000 inhabitants 
only about 11,500,000 are Rumanians. Furthermore, it 
must be remembered that of these 11,500,000 Rumanians, 
only 6,500,000 live in pre-war Rumania, the balance being 
‘redeemed’? Rumanians formerly subjects of Austria- 
Hungary and Russia. This is important, because the ‘“re- 
deemed”? Rumanians differ in many ways from those of 
the former kingdom, and have already had some lively 
political tiffs with their kinsmen. It is this none too 
stable Rumanian bloc which has to hold down nearly 
2,000,000 Magyars (Hungarians), over 1,000,000 Russians, 
nearly 1,000,000 Jews, 500,000 Serbs, 500,000 Germans, 
and fully 1,000,000 of lesser national groups such as Bul- 
gars, Turks, Greeks, Armenians, and Gypsies. Thus far 
Rumania’s handling of her minorities has been charac- 
terized by brutality tempered by bribery. Rumanian 
politics have always been corrupt, and official corruption 
seems to have increased rather than diminished since the 
war. These things not only weaken the government but 
give encouragement to foreign enemies. And Rumania 


THE BALKAN FLUX 229 


certainly has dangerous foreign foes. First and foremost 
stands Russia, which has never forgiven what it considers 
to be Rumania’s “robbery” of Bessarabia, and which will 
certainly try to get it back again—perhaps with interest. 
Then there is Hungary, stricken to her very heart by 
Rumania’s new frontiers. Again there is Bulgaria, which 
has not forgotten Dobrudja. Lastly, there is Serbia, to- 
day allied to Rumania through common dislike of Hun- 
gary, but dissatisfied over its boundary with Rumania, 
which leaves so many Serbs inside Rumania’s frontiers. 
Nowhere in Eastern Europe has Rumania a real friend. 
The Rumanians often call themselves “the Latin islet 
in the Slav ocean.” They instinctively distrust all Slavs— 
and the Slavs have no love for them. 


CHAPTER X 
THE NEW REALISM OF SCIENCE 


SCIENCE is giving us a new world. Few persons will ques- 
tion the truth of that statement. But how many of us © 
realize all that it implies? We may think that we do. 
We see science evoking a series of marvellous inventions 
which affect every phase of our daily lives. New sources 
of material energy are tapped and harnessed to innumer- 
able machines obedient to our will. A recent survey of 
mechanical development estimates that the amount of 
work done by machinery in the United States alone would 
demand the toil of 3,000,000,000 hard-driven slaves. 
Nature’s hidden powers yield themselves as at the touch 
of a magician’s wand. Time and distance alike diminish, 
and the very planet shrinks to the measure of human 
hands. 

Science thus continually gives us new powers, new 
tools, new playthings. Very important, to be sure. Yet, 
how much more important is the new knowledge which 
science gives us about ourselves. That is what really 
matters! Had science merely given us a new material 
world without telling us what sort of people we truly 
are and how we may adjust ourselves to our novel sur- 
roundings, we would be like children playing with lighted 
matches in a powder-magazine, and would almost cer- 
tainly blow ourselves and our new domicile to fragments. 


That is just what many students of present-day affairs 
230 


THE NEW REALISM OF SCIENCE 231 


are afraid of. The late war is merely one warning of the 
perils which beset us, and it may be that we are destined 
to go “rattling back into barbarism.” 

Our best (perhaps our only) safeguard against so melan- 
choly a fate is the scope of the scientific movement, which 
goes so much wider and deeper than we ordinarily sup- 
pose. The same movement which gives us the airship 
and the radio is also presenting us with a new outlook 
and philosophy of life. It is forcing us to re-examine our- 
selves and our relations with one another. More and 
more, forward-looking men and women the world over 
are coming to realize that the vast increase in knowledge 
which has occurred during the last few decades requires 
a thoroughgoing reconsideration of ideas and view-points 
—what a philosopher has well termed “a re-valuation of 
all values.” 

Every well-informed observer of contemporary events 
knows that this process is to-day in full swing. Through- 
out the civilized world the most cherished ideals are being 
scrutinized, while no institution, however venerable, 
escapes the fire of criticism. Much of this criticism is, to 
be sure, so ignorant and so destructive that we are often 
tempted to fear lest the social fabric give way under the 
strain. Other civilizations have perished in similar crises; 
why may not our civilization go down as well? The an- 
swer is that it may, but that its chief chance of success- 
ful survival lies in the one factor which distinguishes our 
age over past times. This great new factor is the spread 
of exact knowledge, inspired by and infused with the 
scientific spirit. | 

The spirit of science is a desire for truth so strong and 


232 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


so compelling that prejudices and preconceptions are 
burned away, leaving the mind crystal clear to perceive 
the significance of fresh knowledge and adjust it har- 
moniously to knowledge already acquired. This means 
a mental attitude both free and flexible, capable of prog- 
ress by methods at once steady and sure. 

Here is something really new in human history! Hith- 
erto Man has not only known comparatively little but has. 
tended to misinterpret the little that he knew. On slender 
fact-bases he has reared elaborate theories, fine-spun from 
his logic and imagination, and he has then crystallized 
these theories into beliefs so dogmatic and intolerant that 
they have blinded his vision and closed his mind. So- 
ciety has thus continually ossified, and the few free souls 
who sought truth with single-hearted devotion have 
usually been crushed by the prejudice and passion aroused 
at the mere thought of examining matters which had be- 
come cherished faiths. Human progress has thus far been 
like a series of lava-flows: at first moving with hot haste, 
yet soon cooling into a rigidity which might be broken 
or worn down but which could not be kept long in mo- 
tion. Now, for the first time, we have in the scientific 
spirit a force capable of maintaining steady and consis- 
tent social progress. Its passion for truth can keep us 
going, while its insistence on proving and testing each 
step of the way can keep us going right. A society genu- 
inely imbued with the scientific spirit and using scientific 
methods could neither ossify nor run wild. It would there- 
by avoid both reaction and revolution—those twin ills 
that have so afflicted mankind. 

How shall we characterize the outlook and philosophy 


THE NEW REALISM OF SCIENCE 233 


of life enjoyed by those whom the scientific spirit has 
touched and transformed? It can be expressed in one 
word: Realism! ‘This new realism of science must not be 
confused with the narrow materialism which rejects all 
not evident to the senses as vain or non-existent. Scien- 
tific realism recognizes the most intangible as well as the 
most palpable; it demands reality, yet understands that 
reality is infinitely varied; it seeks truth, knowing that 
truth manifests itself in countless ways. The genuine 
disciple of science has a bold mind but a humble heart. 
All that he insists upon is a recognition of the fact that 
the most disturbing truth is better than the most cherished 
error. Thus fortified, he is neither cast down by failure 
nor puffed up by success. His sense of balance and pro- 
portion is never obscured. Our age has discovered powers 
and secrets of nature that our forebears never knew. But 
our age has also awakened a passion for truth such as 
the world has never seen. Other ages have sought truth 
from the lips of seers and prophets; our age seeks it from 
scientific proof. Other ages have had their saints and 
martyrs—dauntless souls who clung to their faith with 
unshakable constancy. Yet our age has also its saints 
and martyrs—heroes who can not only face death for their 
faith, but who can also scrap that faith when facts have 
proved it wrong. There, indeed, is courage! And therein 
lies our hope. 

This matchless love of truth, this spirit of science which 
combines knowledge and idealism in the synthesis of a 
higher wisdom, as yet inspires only a chosen few. Most 
of us are still more or less under the spell of the past— 
the spell of passion, prejudice, and unreason. It is thus 


234 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


that ideas and ideals clearly disproved by science yet 
claim the allegiance of multitudes of worthy men. The 
dead hand of false doctrines and fallacious hopes lies, in- 
deed, heavy upon us. Customs, laws, and institutions are 
alike stamped deep with its imprint. Our very minds and 
souls are imbued with delusions from whose emotional 
erip it is hard to escape. Mighty as is the new truth, our 
eyes are yet blinded to its full meaning, our hearts shrink 
instinctively from its wider implications, and our feet 
falter on the path to higher destinies. | 

This path we must essay to tread. It may be that we 
shall fail, that we shall fall into some abyss of disaster 
lurking by the way; nevertheless, we cannot stop where 
we are, nor can we turn back toward our simpler past. 
Science has given us a new world, and to that new world 
we must adapt ourselves or perish, as all living beings 
who do not fit themselves to new conditions must perish. 
Our task is only just begun. Scientific knowledge, hither- 
to employed mainly in material discoveries and mechanical 
inventions, must be increasingly applied to our institu- 
tions—and ourselves. Tremendous changes in our laws, 
our politics, and our social relations are inevitable. All 
these matters are the products of past times. They no 
longer fit present conditions and will have to be radically 
changed. Yet such changes, if made in the scientific spirit 
and according to scientific methods, can be effected in an 
entirely stable and progressive manner. In other words, 
they should be, not revolutions, but evolutions. That is 
the way science works when it is given a chance. Think, 
for example, of the sweeping transformations in abstract 
ideas that have taken place during the past few decades— 


THE NEW REALISM OF SCIENCE 235 


and all without shattering upheavals. There is no funda- 
mental reason why the same cannot be accomplished in 
politics or institutions, provided the necessity for action 
be sufficiently clear and the will to act sufficiently strong. 

The chief reason for hoping that such a process will 
occur is the way scientific knowledge is being spread and 
popularized. In past times knowledge was confined to a 
few learned individuals quite out of touch with their 
fellows. To-day knowledge is being extended by a numer- 
ous class of scientists, is intelligently appreciated by mil- 
lions of educated persons throughout the civilized world, 
and is increasingly respected by the masses of the popu- 
lation. When a sufficient number of us come to realize 
that we need no longer be the sport of blind forces, but 
that we now know enough to control our destiny, we 
may expect marvellous developments of all kinds—at 
least among the more intelligent and forward-looking 
peoples. 

These developments will include in their scope not only 
our material surroundings, institutions, and social rela- 
tions, but also, most emphatically—ourselves. ‘The 
proper study of mankind is Man!” ‘That famous line, 
coined by a poet long ago, now takes on its full signifi- 
cance. For the first time in his history, Man begins 
really to know himself and to appreciate the solemn fact 
that within him lies the power to make or mar his destiny. 
Science’s greatest achievement has been its discovery of 
those laws of life on which, in the last analysis, all human 
activity depends. By these discoveries our ideas concern- 
ing human nature have been radically altered. Hitherto 
we have usually believed that human beings were born 


236 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


pretty much alike, and that how they developed depended 
mainly upon their surroundings, these surroundings being 
both natural, like soil and climate, and man-made, such as 
the laws, institutions, customs, and ideals prevailing in 
the various human groups. Believing such theories, men 
have for ages devoted their best efforts to changing con- 
ditions, without, studying closely the sort of people to 
whom these conditions were to be applied. , 

How the discoveries of modern science have altered 
this traditional attitude! We now know that the basic 
factor in human affairs is not men’s surroundings but the 
qualities of men themselves, and that these qualities are 
inborn, not grafted on by outward circumstances. In 
other words, a man’s heredity is of more fundamental 
importance than his environment in determining his 
course in life, because environment can only bring out 
the qualities that he has inherited. 

Furthermore, we know that, instead of being born 
very much alike, men are born infinitely unlike. During 
the long ages of its existence mankind has differentiated 
into an amazingly wide range of types differing from 
one another in inborn characteristics. These human 
types, known as races, differ not only in outward ap- 
pearance but also in mind, temperament, and capacity. 
Of course, within the racial groups a similar differentia- 
tion has gone on, so that each;human stock produces in- 
dividuals ranging in hereditary endowment all the way 
from the idiot to the genius. Nevertheless, the members 
of each race inherit certain physical, mental, and moral 
traits which together form a generalized race-type that 
descends from generation to generation, persists under 


THE NEW REALISM OF SCIENCE 237 


all sorts of surroundings, and determines more than any- 
thing else what sort of persons the members of the race 
will be, how they will act, and what they will do. Thus 
the most vital element in human affairs is seen to be the 
racial factor, and the fundamental aspect of the new 
scientific realism is racial reality. 

In the preceding chapters we have investigated the 
racial factor in European affairs, and we have observed 
how this factor, though often obscured by other matters, 
underlies the entire course of events. We have seen how 
even such powerful influences as geography and climate 
are not so important in shaping a country’s destiny as 
the blood of its inhabitants, while the institutions, cus- 
toms, and doings of peoples are mainly the result of their 
racial make-up. We have studied the three European 
races (Nordics, Alpines, and Mediterraneans) and have 
been impressed by the way the fortunes of the various 
European countries have depended primarily upon this 
great underlying factor, which has subtly yet surely 
moulded every phase of national life, from manners and 
ideals to politics and institutions. How the racial inter- 
pretation of history clarifies and vitalizes the record of 
human events! So many mysteries explained; so many 
riddles solved; such seemingly tangled situations become 
simple and understandable! And all this because we are 
at last looking at things in terms of basic reality. 

For Americans such a survey of European affairs is of 
special significance, because America is racially an off- 
shoot of Europe, the vast majority of its population being 
of European blood. And surely nothing reveals more 
strikingly the supreme importance of race than the story 


933 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


of America itself. If environment rather than heredity 
were the basic force in human affairs, here was a unique 
opportunity of proving it. Coming into novel surround- 
ings, the Europeans who migrated to the New World 
should, according to the environmentalist theory, have 
rapidly developed into beings vastly different from their 
kinsmen in Europe. Especially should the differences 
which marked the newcomers while they were in their _ 
European homes have quickly disappeared, their changed 
environment fusing them into one or more genuine new 
types. Yet nothing of the kind has occurred. Instead, 
the races have persisted in the New World as they have 
in the Old, displaying the same temperaments and act- 
ing in much the same way. As good examples of this, 
observe the United States, French Canada, and Mexico 
respectively. The United States, settled overwhelmingly 
by Nordics, developed a thoroughly Nordic national life, 
with ideals and institutions plainly corresponding to 
those which Nordics have always produced wherever they 
have established themselves. On the other hand, French 
Canada, being settled by colonists mainly of Alpine French 
stock, became a typical Alpine land, instantly recogniza- 
ble as such to any one acquainted with the Alpine element 
in France or in other parts of Europe. What a contrast 
between New England and Quebec! Yet these two regions 
adjoin one another and are not very different in climate 
or other natural features. As for Mexico, the Spanish colo- 
nists established a society which was originally a faithful 
counterpart of their racially Mediterranean homeland, and 
such changes as have since occurred are traceable almost 
wholly to the influence of the native Indian elements. - 


THE NEW REALISM OF SCIENCE 239 


To no country has knowledge of racial realities come as 
a greater blessing than to America, because only our 
present awakening to their supreme importance promises 
to save America from perils which were beginning to 
threaten the whole fabric of its national life. The United 
States was founded by men of Nordic stock; its institu- 
tions, ideals, and culture are typical fruits of the Nordic 
spirit. These are the things which make “America.” 
Yet only so long as America remains predominantly 
Nordic in blood will these things endure. History shows 
conclusively that as the blood of a nation changes, so does 
every phase of the national life; it proves beyond the 
shadow of a doubt that if the United States should cease 
to be a mainly Nordic land, our America would pass away. 

Only of late years has this vital truth been widely real- 
ized and its full significance appreciated. Until recently 
the average American had slight knowledge of racial 
matters. Influenced by the old idea that environment 
rather than heredity is the chief factor in human affairs, 
most Americans professed an easy optimism, confident 
that America could quickly weld all comers, of whatever 
origin or traditions, into the fabric of American national 
life. This attitude was strengthened by the way in which, 
_ during the greater part of the nineteenth century, millions 
of immigrants were, generally speaking, thus assimilated. 

However, as time passed, American optimism began 
to waver. The stream of immigration shifted its sources, 
ceasing to come from Northern and Western Europe (where 
the old-stock Americans had originated) and flowing in- 
stead from Southern and Eastern Europe, or even from 
Asia. New elements came pouring into America: people 


240 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


strange in aspect, and equally strange in habits and ideas. 
And the new immigrants did not assimilate as their pred- 
ecessors had done. Unable to absorb these refractory 
aliens, America began to show symptoms of indigestion, 
painfully evident in many ways, from politics to social 
relations. 

For a while American public opinion refused to face 
facts. The old-fashioned optimism was very attractive. - 
It was so inspiring (and so self-flattering !) to believe that 
America was a marvellous “melting-pot,’”’ wherein all 
dross would be purged away, leaving only fine gold! In 
fact, those who first raised warning voices against the 
trend of things were taken roundly to task, their warn- 
ings being stigmatized as “un-American.” 

Pain, however, is a great persuader, and the pangs of 
national indigestion presently grew so alarming that the 
American people had to sit up and do some hard think- 
ing. Forced to face facts, the truth soon became clear 
and a lot of old notions went into the discard. The first 
to go was the shibboleth of the “melting-pot.’”’ That pet 
fancy could hold water only while most of our immigrants 
were North Europeans, people of the same racial stocks 
as the old colonial population, with the same tempera- 
ments, the same inborn impulses, and much the same 
traditional and cultural backgrounds. Such people could, 
and did, understand our ideas and institutions; could, 
and did, sympathize with our ideals; could, and did, rap- 
idly fuse with us and become genuinely part and parcel 
of ourselves—if not at once, at least after one or two 
generations. 

Far different has it been with the newer immigrant 


THE NEW REALISM OF SCIENCE 241 


stocks from Southern and Eastern Europe and from West- 
ern Asia. These people, sundered from the older stocks 
not only by widely different traditions and cultures but 
also by the even deeper gulfs of race, could not, and did 
not, fit readily into the fabric of American life. Most 
Americans used to think that, though the original im- 
migrants might remain largely alien in spirit, the next 
generation, born in America, would be fully assimilated. 
We now know that, broadly speaking, this has not been 
the case. A considerable minority of the newer stocks 
have, to be sure, adapted themselves fairly well to Amer- 
ican conditions and American ideals. But the majority 
even of the American-born members of these stocks re- 
main more or less alien. They have, it is true, mostly 
lost their ancestral languages and cultures, speak English, 
and in many cases profess an ardent Americanism. But 
the pullof heredity remains, and instinctive reactions of 
temperament and inborn impulse make their attitude 
toward America necessarily very different from that of 
the children of immigrants from North European stocks. 

The North European comes to us predisposed by his 
heredity to understand and to sympathize with the civili- 
zation that his kinsfolk have built up in America. The 
South and East European (and still more the Asiatic) are 
- not thus predisposed. Much of our American life is, to 
these people, not only incomprehensible but positively 
distasteful. They react instinctively against such things, 
and thus tend to become, as one writer has well phrased 
it, “American citizens but not Americans.” 

Such is the attitude of what has been aptly termed 
the ‘“New American.” The New American is already 


242 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


a grave problem that will become graver as time goes 
on because his attitude tends rapidly to become more 
positive and aggressive in character. The original im- 
migrant, however incomprehensible or repugnant Amer- 
ica may be to him, can content himself with a negative 
protest, consoling himself by withdrawal into the haven 
of his particular group, language, and traditions. But 
his children, discarding such things as they usually do, _ 
have no such refuge. Accordingly, they tend to voice 
their discontent in positive fashion by seeking to change 
their American environment and mould it to their liking. 

However, they soon discover that this is no easy mat- 
ter. America is not a wilderness plastic to the latest touch; 
it is a settled country, with traditions extending back 
three centuries and with a resident population deeply 
attached to those traditions and determined to develop 
them along traditional lines. ‘Thus balked in his desires, 
the New American’s discontent increases, and he is apt 
to broaden his specific dislikes into a general criticism of 
everything characteristically American, from manners and 
institutions to the very inhabitants themselves. Here we 
have the secret of current protests against the ‘“domina- 
tion”’ of the older stocks, together with vehement insis- 
tence upon America’s “hybrid” character. The New 
American frequently asserts hotly that America is still 
“in the making,” and that there is as yet no real Amer- 
ican nationality or civilization. Not long ago a prominent 
member of an East European racial group stated: ‘This 
country is not a ‘nation.’ It is a gathering together of 
peoples from every corner of the earth. No one racial 
group, no matter how early settled in this country, can 


THE NEW REALISM OF SCIENCE 243 


furnish more than one note in this vast symphony of 
peoples.” To hear some of these alien protests, one would 
think that America had no history, no traditions, no 
coherent fabric of civilization, but that all of us had been 
dumped down together at Ellis Island a few short years 
ago | 

The rise of the New American has, however, had one 
rather startling result: it has roused the Old American. 
Shocked broad awake, the old stock is for the first time 
developing a real racial consciousness. Hitherto the aver- 
age American’s racial vision did not extend much beyond 
a perception of such obvious racial differences as those 
which separated him from the negro, the Red Indian, or 
the Mongolian of Eastern Asia. Now, however, he is fast 
realizing that ‘‘America”’ means not only certain ideals 
and institutions but also a racial stock, which must be 
preserved if the ideals and institutions which that stock 
has created are to endure. To the New American’s cry 
that America is still ‘in the making,” and that it should 
become a hybrid civilization, the Old American answers 
grimly that America is basically ‘‘made’’—and that it 
shall not be unmade. 

And the Old American is not merely thinking and talk- 
ing: he is acting as well. The outstanding feature of his 
- awakening self-consciousness is the immigration legis- 
lation of the last few years, culminating in the bill which 
has recently become law. This law sharply restricts the 
total number of immigrants and limits such immigration 
as is permitted chiefly to North Europeans. In other 
words, the American people has made up its mind that 
America is going to remain predominantly Nordic in 


244 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


race, ideals, and institutions. And that decision will stand, 
because, despite the immigrant flood of the past genera- 
tion, the American people is still mainly Nordic in blood. 
Now that the North European stocks have begun to real- 
ize that they and their ideals are really challenged by the 
presence of unassimilated alien elements, they are draw- 
ing together in instinctive self-defense and will exert a 
power that will be irresistible. For, in the last analysis, - 
it is the North European stocks which constitute the pre- 
dominant force in America. The most cursory analysis 
of our racial make-up proves this in striking fashion. 
According to the census of 1920, the white population of 
the United States was a trifle under 95,000,000. Of these 
fully 40,000,000 were descended from the old colonial 
stock (which was of course almost wholly Nordic) while 
another 40,000,000 were of the same or kindred North 
European stocks, the majority being either assimilated 
or in rapid process of assimilation. Only 14,000,000 or 
15,000,000 of our population belong to the newer elements 
from Southern and Eastern Europe and the Levantine 
fringe of Asia. They are thus in a decided minority, 
which will be unlikely to gain very much at the expense 
of the older stocks, now that our gates have been firmly 
closed against further wholesale immigration. In fact, 
our immigration-restriction laws are the best proof of 
Nordic racial ascendancy in America. The passage of 
those laws was fought tooth and nail, not only by the 
newer immigrant groups but also by very powerful eco- 
nomic influences like the steamship lobby and industrial 
interests eager for cheap labor. Nevertheless, the old 
stock had made up its mind that wholesale immigration 


THE NEW REALISM OF SCIENCE 245 


was a menace to America—and the restriction laws went 
through ! 

America does not stand alone in this matter. All over 
the world barriers against wholesale immigration are ris- 
ing, made necessary by the development of cheap and 
rapid communication which enables vast masses of popu- 
lation to pour themselves easily into distant lands. More 
and more, peoples are coming to realize that such im- 
migrant floods are a deadly menace not only to their 
living standards but also to their very national integrity 
and racial existence.., Beside such supreme values, what 
does the momentary economic gain of “cheap labor” 
amount to? 

Furthermore, immigration ‘restriction is only one of 
many new developments which the knowledge of racial 
values is bringing about in world affairs. Both in their 
internal politics and their relations with one another, 
peoples will be influenced more and more by racial con- 
siderations. The benefits from such a change of attitude 
will be enormous. Many false ideas and prejudices which 
now warp our judgment and hinder progress will be swept 
away, and we will face our problems with a fresher, keener 
vision, capable of piercing through surface appearances to 
the underlying reality. Within each country social ideals 
and legislation will be increasingly directed to conserv- 
ing and improving its racial stocks, while across state 
frontiers men of like vision will co-operate more easily, 
the realization of kinship in blood and temperament 
serving to diminish differences in nationality. Already 
we see the process at work on an international scale among 
two groups of kindred peoples—the Scandinavians and 


246 RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 


the English-speaking nations. Within both those groups 
war has become practically unthinkable, while their grow- 
ing sense of racial affinity will tend to draw them still 
more closely together. 
» Even between peoples utterly unlike in blood a frank 
facing of racial facts will be helpful by showing them 
precisely how they differ and what are the true grounds 
on which their relations should be based. Nothing is - 
more dangerous than illusions. One of the chief evils of 
our present political thinking is that we tend to oscillate 
between a narrow nationalism and an impracticable inter- 
nationalism. Both doctrines ignore or oppose the racial 
factor, which logically stands between them, cross-cutting 
national borders, yet recognizing the divisions which na- 
ture has established within the human species. In the 
long run, nothing is gained by glozing over unwelcome 
facts or indulging in false sentimentalities. On the con- 
trary, much may be lost, because such an attitude is apt 
to end in bitter disillusionment, leaving matters worse 
than they were before. Between peoples, as between in- 
dividuals, an honest recognition of differences as well as 
likenesses is the surest basis for a true understanding. 
“Know thyself!’’ Those words of profound wisdom, 
uttered long ago, were never so significant as they are 
to-day, when science has revealed to us secrets of life 
hitherto unknown. Armed with this new knowledge, 
Man is endowed as never before with power to shape his 
destiny, and can, if he will, tread his upward path clear- 
eyed and unafraid. 


INDEX 


Aachen, 127 

Act of Union, 65 

Adolphus, Gustavus, 58 

Africa, French in, 90; North, 103 

Agriculture, in Denmark, 59 

Aix-la-Chapelle, 127. 

Aland Islands, Sweden’s attitude in 
controversy over, 68; award of, to 
Finland, 69 

Alexander the Great, 203 

Algeria, 90 

Allies, the, Austria denied union with 
Germany by, 160; independence of 
Czechs recognized by, 177 

Alpine race, the, 5, 6; physical appear- 
ance of, 7; in Norway, 9; origin and 
temperamental characteristics of, 12, 
13; relations between Nordic and, 13, 
14; survival of, over Nordics in Ger- 
many, 14; tendency of, to form po- 
litical units, 15; in France, 76 7f.; in 
Northern Italy, 99; in Germany, 124, 
134, 141; the Slavs of, 129, 168, 190, 
203, 225; in Canada, 238 

Alsace-Lorraine, 84 

America, see United States 


Americans, ‘‘New,’’ 241 ff.; ‘Old,”’ 
243; and the English, 29-31 

Angles, the, 33 

Arabs, the, 90 


Aristocracy, of the Nordic, 17, 99; in 
Eastern Europe, 172 

Aryan race, the, invasion of India by, 
18; description of, 18 

Ashkenazim Jews, the, 171 

Asia Minor, massacre of Greeks in, 223 

Asiatics, in Danube basin, 148; in East- 
ern Europe, 27, 169; in Poland and 
Russia, 171; in the Balkans, 201, 204 

. Austria, 139; race distribution in Ger- 
man, 25, 26; foundation of, 147; ex- 
pelled from Germany, 154; decline of, 
157; imperialism in, 158; the catas- 
trophe of 1918 in, 158; desire of, for 
political union with Germany, 159 
ff.; international receivership of, 160; 
uncertain future of, 162; Czechs un- 
der Habsburg, 175 

Austria-Hungary, 145; area and popu- 
lation of, 146; formation of, 154; 
destruction of, 155: quarrel with 
See 212; Rumanians subject to, 

2 


Balkan Peninsula, the, 26, 166; geo- 
graphical location of, 200; Asiatic in- 
vasions in, 201; instability of, 202, 
209; Nordic conquest in, 202; 
Mediterraneans in, 202; barbarian 
invasion of, 203; conquered by Rome, 
203; Alpine Slavs in, 203; Asiatic 
conquest of, 204; independence of, re- 
gained, 205; primitive character of 
peoples of, 206; intellectual progress 
of peoples of, 207; extirpation in, 
208; Turkish conquest in, 210; Turks 
defeated in, 217 

Barbarians, in Italy, 103; in Germany, 
124; in the Balkans, 203 

Belgium, racial distribution in, 24 

Benes, Mr., 177, 180 

Berbers, the, 90 

Bessarabia, 226 

Bismarck, 136 

Black Army of France, the, 75, 90 ff. 

Bohemia, settled by Czechs, 173; Ger- 
manization of, 175 

Bolshevism, in Italy, 107; in Hungary, 
157; in Russia, 197, 198 

Bosnia-Herzegovina, 146, 211 

Brazil, American colonial empire in, 120 

Britain, see Great Britain 

Bucharest, the treaty of, 207, 208 

Bulgaria, defeat of, in Balkan Wars; 
207, 218; racial distribution in, 215; 
development of national conscious- 
ness in, 216; in contest over Mace- 
donia, 217; area and population of, 
218; present condition of, 218 

Bulgars, effect of Turkish conquest on, 
215 

Busts, clay, found in Egypt, 1-3 

Byzantine Empire, 204; influence of, on 
Russia, 193; revival of, dream of 
modern Greece, 219 ff. 


Caciquism, in Spain, 118; compared 
with Fascismo, 119 

Ceesar, 76-78 

Canada, French, Alpine character of, 
238 

Carpathians, the, 148 

Charlemagne, 126, 127, 129 

Charles XII, 58 

Christianity, split in, 220 

Clemenceau, 74 


2A7 


248 


Continentals, misunderstanding of Brit- 
ish by, 46 

Copenhagen, 55 

Cornwall, 32 

Crete, 202 

Croats, the, 210 

Cromer, Lord, 161 

Czecho-Slovakia, Magyars in, 165; al- 
liance with Jugoslavia and Rumania, 
165; independence of, recognized by 
Allies, 177; area and population of, 
177; lack of harmony between vari- 
ous elements of population of, 177; 
uncertain future of, 180 

Czechs, the, Slav and Nordic strains in, 
174; isolation of, 175; Habsburg rule 
of, 175; destruction of nobility of, 
176; political control of, regained, 
176; superiority over Slovaks, 178; 
quarrel between Slovaks and, 179; 
foreign population of, 181 


Danes, 33; Iceland under, 65; in Schles- 
wig, 67 

Danube Basin, diverse stocks in, 146; 
racial changes in, 147; Asiatic no- 
mads in, 148; German invasion of, 
149 

De Lapouge, 74 

Denmark, racial distribution in, 24; 
prosperity of, 50; peaceable settle- 
ment of disputes by, 53, 54; limita- 
tions to growth of, 55; area and popu- 
lation of, 55; Medizval might of, 58; 
industrialization of agriculture in, 
59; prosperity and progress of, 60; 
economic, social, and political achieve- 
ments in, 62 ff.; political unity of 
Norway with, 63; controversy of, 
with Iceland, 64; loss of Schleswig- 
Holstein by, 67 

Dobrudja, 227 

Dual Empire, see Austria-Hungary 

Dushan, Stephen, 210 


Egypt, clay busts found in; 1-3; rest- 
lessness of, 40; Khedivial Govern- 
ment of, 161 

England, Nordics in, 18; racial ele- 
ments of, 31-34; labor government 
in, 37; widespread poverty in, 42 f7.; 
effect of war on economic situation 
of, 43; dependence of, on good rela- 
tions with America, 47; difference in 
racial make-up of France and, 72; 
economic system of, compared with 
French, 82; hostility of, to France’s 
African policies, 91 

English, the, and Americans, 29-31; 
basic unity of, 36; stable character of 
political life of, 37; characteristics of 


INDEX 


workingman, 39; divergent points of 
view of French and, 45; reserve of, 
46; underrating of, by Continentals, 
46; economic system of, compared 
with French, 82; sense of racial af- 
finity in, 246 

Ericson, Leif, 57 

Europe, racial factor in, 4, 5; Nordic 
decline in, 19, 21, 126; Asiatic in- 
vasions of Eastern, 27, 169; imperial- 
istic ambitions of nations of, 66; 
Nordicization of Western, 125; Teu- 
tonic invasion of, 125, 130; inter- 
Nordic wars in, 126; Dark Ages in, 
127, 220; Latinized Nordics in, 128; 
crystallization of, into nations, 138; 
clashing foreign policies in, 139; 
danger of war in Central, 166; Alpine 
Slavs in Eastern, 168; instability of 
Eastern, 168; Nordic and Finnish 
stocks in Eastern, 169; complex 
racial make-up of Eastern, 170;ruling 
aristocracies in Eastern, 172; ex- 
pansion of Rumanians and Serbs into 
Central, 208 


Fascismo, 104, 107; spirit and char- 
acter of, 108 ff.; realism of, 109 ff.; 
youth of leaders of, 112; compared 
with Caciquism, 119 

Fascisti, the, 101 

Ferdinand, Archduke Franz, 212 

Finland, 63; relation of, to Sweden; 
56; Sweden’s loss of, 67; controversy 
of, with Sweden, 68 ff. 

Finns in Eastern Europe, 169 

Flemings, the, 24 

France, racial distribution in, 22, 23; 
national unity in, 71-73; difference in 
racial make-up of England and, 72; 
regionalism movement in, 74; geo- 
graphical character of, 75; the Black 
Army of, 75, 90 ff.; racial make-up of 
Gaul, 76; growth of Alpine element 
in, 77, 79-81, 93; collapse of Roman 
civilization in, 78; Nordic ascendancy 
in, 79; Nordic decline in, 79 ;revolution 
in racial history of, 80; prosperity of 
peasants in, 81; economic system of, 
compared with England and Ger- 
many, 82; investing public of, 83; 
effect of war on, 83 ff.; population of, 
84, 85; foreign elements in, 85; finan- 
cial situation of, 85 ff.; political and 
military strength of, 87; colonial em- 
pire of, 87, 89 ff.; under Louis XIV, 
92; Teutonic invasion of, 125; Poland 
favored by, 187-188 

Franks, the, 126 

French, the misunderstanding between 
British and, 45, 46; lack of racial ele- 
ment in, 72 


INDEX 


French Revolution, the, 73; racial as- 
pect of, 80. 


Gama, Vasco da, 120 

Gaul, 76-78 

Gerarchia, 110 

Germans, invasion of Danube Basin by, 
149; in Bohemia, 175; ‘‘ March to the 
East’’ of, checked by Poland, 183 

Germany, survival of Alpines over Nor- 
dics in, 14, 124, 134; racial distribu- 
tion in, 24; effect of racial differences 
on, 25; Scandinavia’s resistance 
broken by, 58; economic system of, 
compared with French, 82; pre-war 
state of mind of, 122, 123; early 
Nordic population of, 124; barbarians 
in, 124; Nordics in, 127, 131, 141; 
Slavs in, 129, 130; racial transforma- 
tion of, 129; political grouping of 
nationality of, 130; mixed racial 
stocks in, 131, 135; annexation of 
Italy by, 131; decline of political 
power of, 132; Thirty Years’ War in, 
133 ff.; founding of German Empire, 
136; economic transformation of, 
138; excessive prosperity of, 138, 140; 
foreign policy of, 139; Alpine race in 
modern, 141; propaganda in, 141; 
effect of wars on, 142; elimination of 
intellectual element in, 142; condi- 
tions imposed on, by Versailles 
Treaty, 143, 144; Austria expelled 
from, 154 

Great Britain, racial distribution in, 22, 
31 ff.; invasion by Nordics of, 32; 
progress of, due to Nordics, 34; 
transformation of economic life of, 
35; attitude of, toward India, 40; 
imperial problems of, 40; artificiality 
of economic situation of, 41; severity 
of foreign competition in, 41; unem- 
ployment problem in, 42-44; over- 
population of, 44; period of readjust- 
ment in, 47 

Great Idea, the, 219, 221 

Great War, the, 139, 176, 208 

Greece, 26, 218; ancient, 203; terri- 
tories gained in Great War, 209, 222; 
revival of Byzantine Empire, the 
Great Idea in, 219 ff.; racial elements 
in, 219, 220; revolt of, against Turks, 
221; successes of, in Balkan Wars, 
222; dangers which threaten, 223 

Greeks, in Asia Minor, massacre of, 223 

Greenland, 57 


Habsburg Empire, the, 150; expansion 
of, 152; nationalist movements in, 
153, 154; unity of, 155; Czechs un- 
der, 175 


249 


Habsburgs, the, colonizations of Hun- 
gary by, 151; disappearance of, 158 
Hellas, 203; inspiration of, to modern 

Greece, 219 
Heredity, importance of, 236 
Holland, racial distribution in, 24 
Holstein, 67 
Holy Roman Empire, the, 131 
Hungary, foundation of, 147; under 
Turkish rule, 151; colonization of, by 
Austrians, 151; rebellion of, 154; 
Bolshevik revolution in, 157; pa- 
triotism in, 164; Rumanians in, 226 
Hussite Wars, the, 175 


Iberian Peninsula, the, 112, 113 

Iceland, settled by Scandinavians, 57; 
controversy of, with Denmark, 64; 
Norwegian vikings in, 64; under 
Danish rule, 65; declared free state, 
65 

Immigration, in United States, likely 
result of, 19; new elements of, 239 
f.; restriction of, 243 ff. 

India, Nordic Aryan invasion of, 18; 
relation of home government to, 40; 
restlessness of, 40 

Indo-China, French colonies in, 90 

Insurance, British unemployment, 43 

Islam, 2il1 

Italy, racial elements in, 23, 24, 105; 
hostility of, to France’s African 
policies, 91; Mediterranean race in, 
94, 99, 101, 102; area and population 
of, 97; racial diversity in, 98; con- 
quered by Alpines, 99; Nordics ruling 
aristocracies in, 99; influence of 
Roman period on, 101-103; the 
Fascist movement in, 101, 104, 107— 
109, 112, 119; degeneration of South- 
ern, 102, 103; barbarian invasions of, 
103; contrast between North and 
South, 104; political life of, 105-107; 
trasformismo in, 106, 118; defeat of 
Bolshevik element in, 107; Teutonic 
tide in, 125; decline of Nordics in, 
125; annexation of, by Germany, 
131; influence on Jugoslavia of, 210 


Jews, Russian and Polish, 171; immigra- 
tion of, in Poland, 184 

Jugoslavia, Magyars in, 165; alliance 
of, with Czecho-Slovakia and Ru- 
mania, 165; meaning of name, 209; 
tribes in, 210; influence of Italy on, 
210; area and population of, 212; in- 
ternal quarrels, 213; Serb dictator- 
ship in, 214, 

Jutes, the, 33 


Khazars, the, 171 
Kiev, 193 


250 


Labor government in England, 37, 38; 
attitude of, toward India, 40 

Latifundia, 103 

Latin peoples, the, 22, 94-96, 99 

League of Nations, Alands awarded to 
Finland by, 69; control of Austria 
exercised by, 161 

Le Bon, 74 

Levant, the, 103 

Lisbon, 120 

Lithuania, 184, 185, 188 

Little Entente, the, 165, 166 

Lloyd-George, 156 

Louis XIV, 92 


— 


Macedonia, Balkan contention over, 
217 

Magyars, invasion of Danube basin by, 
148; in Czecho-Slovakia, 165 

Manchester Guardian, the, 92 

Mangin, General, 91, 92 

Masaryk, President, 177, 180 

Mediterranean race, the, 5, 6; physical 
appearance of, 7; origin and charac- 
teristics of, 10-12; in France, 76; 
rise of, during Roman Conquest, 78; 
in Spain, 94, 117; in Italy, 94, 99, 
101, 102; in Portugal, 94; distinc- 
tion between Latin and, 95, 99; in 
Balkan Peninsula, 202; in Rumania, 
225 

Mexico, 238 

Mongols, invasion of Poland and Rus- 
sia by, 183, 194 

Montenegro, 211 

Moors, the, in Spain, 115 

Moravia, 173 

Moslems, the, 211 

Mussolini, 101, 104, 107, 110, 112 

Mycens, 202 


Napoleon, 80, 92 

Nationalists in Italy, 107 

Nationality, the doctrine of, 73 

Negroes, in Portugal, 23, 121; in French 
colonial army, 75, 90 ff. 

Nordic race, 5, 6; physical appearance 
of, 7; relations between Alpine and, 
13, 14; characteristics of, 17; an 
aristocratic ruling class, 17; invasion 
of India by, 18; in England and Scot- 
land, 18; permanent racial conquest 
of, 18; expansion of, outside Europe, 
19; decline of, in Europe, 19, 21, 125, 
126; in Wales and Ireland, 19; great- 
est expansion of, 19; effect of environ- 
ment on, 20; effect of war on, 20, 21, 
25; in northwestern Russia, 26, 170; 
invasion of Britain by, 32; inter- 
marriage of, with other stock, 33; 
Britain’s greatness due to, 34; in 
Scandinavia, 57; in France, 76, 79, 


INDEX 


80; Roman ruling class, 100; in Ger- 
many, 124, 127, 131, 141; in Italy, 
125; in Poland, 170; in Czecho- 
Slovakia, 174; conquest of Balkans 
by, 202 

Normans, the, 33 

North America, viking discovery of, 57 

Norway, Alpines in, 9; racial distribu- 
tion in, 24; prosperity of, 50; peace- 
able settlement of disputes by, 53, 54; 
geographical limitations of, 55; area 
and population of, 56; water-power in, 
61; development of Arctic fisheries 
by, 61; economic development of, 61; 
economic, social, and political achieve- . 
ments in, 62 f7.; separation of Sweden 
and, 63; political unity with Den- 
mark, 63; assigned to Sweden, 63; 
independence of, declared, 63; in- 
dependence of, recognized by Sweden, 
64; effect on, of Russian peril, 64; 
settling of Iceland by vikings of, 65 

Norwegians, the, 33, 64 


Pan-Germans, the, 141, 162 

Pan-Latinism, 96 

Parthenon, the, 2 

Paris, centralization of French life in, 72 

Persepolis, 2 

Peter the Great, 185, 195, 196 

Po, valley of the, 98 

Poincaré, Premier, 91 

Poland, racial changes in, 169; burial- 
mounds in, 169; Nordic blood in 
Northern, 170; Asiatics in, 171; com- 
plexity of, 181; early Kingdom of, 183; 
invasion of, by Mongol Tartars, 183; 
German ‘March to the East” 
checked by, 183; Western ideals in, 
183; rivalry between Russia and, 183; 
Jewish immigration in, 184; under 
control of nobility of, 185; Partitions 
of, 185; national revival in, 186; res- 
toration of, 186, 187; French backing 
of, 187-188; area and population of, 
188; universal dislike of, 188; seizure 
of Vilna by, 188; internal dangers of, 
189 

Poland-Lithuania, rise of, 184; decline 
of, 185 

Poles, the, primitive, 182; development 
of nationality and Western ideals by, 
183; rivalry between Russians and, 
183 

Portugal, racial distribution in, 23; 
Mediterranean race in, 94; area and 
population of, 119; decline of, 120; 
colonial empire of, 120; political in- 
stability of, 121; negroslaveryin, 121; 
racial impoverishment of, 121 

Prussia, Schleswig-Holstein acquired 


INDEX 


by, 67; Austria expelled from Ger- 
many by, 154 


Race, importance of, in human af- 
fairs, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 70; comparison of 
types of, 7; persistence of character- 
istics of, 8, 9, 18; tendency to breed 
out alien strains, 9; unstability of, 10; 
relations between Alpine and Nordic, 
13, 14; distribution of, in Europe, 22 
#f.; intermarriage, 33; tendency of, to 
follow geographical lines in France, 
76 

**Rayah,’’ 205 

Realism, 233 

Regionalism movement in France, 74 

Rienzi, 101 

Rivera, General Primo de, 119 

Romans, the, racial origin of, 99; Nor- 
dics ruling class of, 100; respect of, 
for early Germans, 124; outcome of 
prehistoric migrations, 99; racial dif- 
ferences in, 100; Balkans conquered 
by, 203 

Rurik, 193 

Rumania, alliance of, with Czechoslov- 
akia and Jugoslavia, 165; Magyars 
in, 165; expansion of, into Central 
Europe, 208; area and population of, 
224; racial elements in, 225; estab- 
lishment of Kingdom of, 226; official 
corruption in, 228 

Russia, Nordics in northwestern, 26, 
170; Scandinavia’s resistance broken 
by, 58; Finland acquired by, 67; 
racial changes in, 169; burial-mounds 
in, 169; Mohammedan Tartars in, 
171; Asiatics in, 171; invasion of, by 
Mongols, 183, 194; Polish-Lithuan- 
ian conquests in, 184; Alpine Slavs 
constant factor in, 190; beginnings of 
political cohesion in, 192; Scandina- 
vians in, 192; foundation of national- 
ity of, 193; Byzantine culture of, 193-— 
194; increase of political strength in, 
195; under Peter the Great, 196; con- 
flicts in, 196, 197; collapse of Imperial, 
197; Bolshevist dictatorship in, 197; 
future of, 198; War of 1877, 216; 
Rumanians in, 226, 227 

Russian Revolution, the, 186; Ru- 
mania’s acquisitions in, 227 

Russians, the, rivalry between Poles 
and, 183; Great, Little, and White, 
189 f.; racially mixed character of 
Great, 191; racial make-up and back- 
ward character of Little and White, 
192 

Russo-Japanese War, the, 197 


Salonika, 222 
Sanscrit scriptures, the, 18 


201 


Saracens, the, 103 

Sardinia, 97, 99 

Saxons, the, 33 

Scandinavia, racial distribution in, 24; 
prosperity of, 50 #.; peaceable set- 
tlement of disputes by, 53, 54; Nordic 
migration from, 57; resistance broken 
by Russia and Germany, 58; eco- 
nomic, social, and political achieve- 
ments in, 62 ff.; attitude of, toward 
neighbors, 66 ff.; in reconstruction of 
Europe, 70; see also Denmark, Nor- 
way, and Sweden 

Scandinavians, the, emigration of, 56; 
Iceland settled by, 57; discovery of 
North America by, 57; blood broth- 
ers of Anglo-Saxons, 57; industrious 
character of, 59; forbearance and self- 
control of, 64, 65 f.; characteristics 
of, 70; in Russia, 192; sense of racial 
affinity in, 245, 246 

Schleswig, political allegiance of, de- 
termined by vote, 67, 68 

Schleswig-Holstein, 67 

Science, new knowledge of mankind re- 
vealed by, 230 ff. 

Scotland, 32 

Sephardim Jews, the, 171 

Serbs, the, 210; expansion of, into Cen- 
tral Europe, 208; ambitions of, 211-— 
212 

Siberia, 197 , 

Sicily, 24, 97, 99, 103; Mediterraneans 
in, 101 

Slavs, the, 26; in Germany, 129; Alpine 
blood of, 129; in Central and Eastern 
Europe, 148, 168, 169; in the Balkans, 
203; in Rumania, 225 

Slovaks, the, isolation of, 174; in- 
feriority of, compared to Czechs, 178; 
quarrel between Czechs and, 179 

Slovenes, the, 210 

Smyrna, acquired by Greece, 222 

Spain, racial distribution in, 23, 94, 114; 
area and population of, 114; collapse 
of, 116; decline of Nordics in, 117, 
125; Mediterranean characteristics 
of, 117; Caciquism in, 118; political 
life of, 118; Teutonic invasion of, 125 

Spanish Inquisition, the, 116 

Suevi, 115 

Sweden, a purely Nordic nation, 24; 
prosperity of, 50; peaceable settle- 
ment of disputes by, 53, 54; geograph- 
ical limitations of, 55; area and popu- 
lation of,: 56; water-power in, 61; 
mineral wealth of, 61; economic de- 
velopment of, 61; economic, social, 
and political achievements in, 62 ff.; 
separation of Norway and, 63; recog- 
nition of Norway’s independence by, 
64; effect of Russian peril on, 64; loss 


202 


of Finland by, 67; attitude of, in 

Aland Islands controversy, 68 ff. 
Switzerland, racial distribution in, 25, 

26 
Syndicalists, the, 107 


Tacitus, 124 


Tartars, Mohammedan, of Russia, 171 


Thirty Years’ War, the, 133 ff., 175 

Trajan, Emperor, 225 

Transylvania, 226 

Trasformismo, in Italy, 106, 118 

Turks, the, conquest of Hungary by, 
151; Balkan conquests of, 204, 210, 
215; defeat of, 207, 217; massacre of 
Greeks by, 221, 223 ; 

United States, immigrationin, 19, 239 f., 
243 ff.; essential Anglo-Saxon charac- 
ter of, 28; relations of, with England, 


INDEX 


30, 31, 47, 48; Nordic national life 
of, 238, 239, 244; the census of 1920 
in, 244 


Vandals, the, 115 

Versailles, Peace Conference at, 66, 67, 
148, 144, 187 

Vienna, 150, 158, 159 

Vienna Congress, the, 63 

Vikings, the, discovery of North Amer- 
ica by, 57; Norwegian, in Iceland, 64; 
Norse, in Russia, 193 

Vilna, seizure of, by Poland, 188 

Visigoths, the, 115 

Vistula plains, the, 182 


Wales, Nordics in, 19, 32 
Walloons, the, 24 

War, World, see Great War 
William II, 137 


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